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Firms are the engines of growth in any economy.  It is therefore important to study 
how they finance themselves, as this may have a direct impact on the overall growth 
rate of the economy.  A firm can choose whether to finance its activities with equity, 
debt, or both.  An optimal capital structure is that mix of internal and external finance 
(debt and/or equity) that optimizes the value of a firm.  Therefore, the question of how 
to finance or equivalently from where to borrow becomes a crucial decision.   
In each chapter of this study, we study the financing decisions of a different 
set of firms faced with financial constraints.  The two countries we focus on are the 
UK and China.  Our study examines two types of firms in the UK.  We first study 
listed firms and examine how financial constraints affect their leverage decisions.  
Next, we focus on the financing decisions of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), as these firms are more likely to suffer from financial constraints.  To 
examine financial constraints, we use both conventionally used indicators of financial 
constraints and new indicators. 
Our study on China is mainly based on listed manufacturing Chinese firms.  
China is currently the largest developing and transition economy in the world.  It is 
interesting to study the financing behaviour of manufacturing firms in China as 
manufacturing is believed to be the main engine behind the Chinese growth miracle.  
We account for factors specific to the Chinese case to determine if the leverage 
decisions of Chinese firms are similar to those of firms in other parts of the world.  
We also examine the cash holding decisions of Chinese firms as these firms seem to 
be highly financially conservative. 
Our results indicate that firms tend to follow a financial hierarchy in their 
financing patters and that the preferred source of external finance of most firms, 
whether in the UK or China, remains leverage.  However firms tend to reduce their 
leverage when they experience an increase in their internal funds, which points 
towards a financially conservative behaviour.  This needs to be accounted for in 
policy decisions that are mainly formulated on the supply side.  
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Many factors are believed to influence the capital structure decisions of firms.  Most 
studies on capital structure have been based on firms in the US and have concentrated 
mainly on firms that are quoted on the stock market.  The main reason for this is easy 
data availability.  Very few studies have examined the capital structure of firms in 
other countries.  The primary aim of this study is to analyse the capital structure of 
firms in the UK and China by taking into account financial constraints that firms in 
these countries might face.  Specifically, we will examine how internal finance affects 
the leverage decisions of firms. 
The first part of this study consists in examining the capital structure of quoted 
firms in the UK.  It should be noted that most capital structure theories have been 
developed to explain the capital structure of large firms and the question whether 
these capital structure theories apply to small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) is still 
a puzzle.  The second part of this study therefore investigates if capital structure 
theories are relevant to SMEs in the UK.   We also study if quoted firms and SMEs in 
the UK have the same financing behaviour.  This results in a direct comparison of 
quoted and unquoted firms especially when financial constraints are taken into 
account. 
The third aspect of this study consists in studying the capital structure of listed 
Chinese firms.  As is well-known, China is currently the largest transition economy, 
having one of the highest growth rates in the world.  China has unique features.  For 
instance, most of the Chinese firms listed on the stock market were previously state-
owned enterprises and even now the state exercises controlling rights in these firms.  
Although China has a poorly developed financial system, most studies have found that 
Chinese firms use a lot of external finance where short-term debt is the dominating 
form of debt.  Therefore, the third purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to 
 12 
which the capital structure of Chinese firms is similar to the capital structure of firms 
in the UK. 
Our main contribution to the literature is mainly empirical.  We study the 
financing behaviour of firms in countries which have not been highly researched 
namely the UK and China.  We study two very different financial systems, the UK 
having a very well-developed and mature financial system, while China is a 
developing transition economy with the prospects of becoming one of the most 
influential players in the world.  Most research on financing and financial constraints 
has mainly focussed on firms in the US.  We study the UK and China as this provides 
an interesting comparison and goes off the beaten track.   
As stated by Hutton (2006) China is the new factor in global politics and 
economics.  By focussing a major part of this study on the financing decisions of 
Chinese firms, this study gives a new dimension to research in this area.  Empirical 
research on China is a very challenging task especially as data availability is a serious 
issue.  The availability of good quality financial data enables us to examine the 
leverage and cash holding decisions of these firms and provides some understanding 
about how firms in the fastest developing and transition economy in the world make 
their financing decisions. 
Our second contribution to the literature is that we examine leverage 
behaviour of firms faced with financial constraints and therefore merge two different 
strands of literature namely the literature on capital structure and the literature of the 
effect of financial constraints on firm behaviour.  Prior literature has mainly 
concentrated on the effects of financial constraints on the investment decisions of 
firms.  Financial constraints are also quite important in leverage decisions as is 
demonstrated in this study. 
We also examine the cash holding decisions of listed Chinese manufacturing 
firms.  Chinese firms are among the biggest savers in the Chinese economy and it is 
interesting to study the factors that lead these firms to hold vast amounts of cash.  We 
investigate the factors that affect the cash holdings of Chinese firms and examine the 
reasons why Chinese firms have accumulated large reserves of cash.  We study the 
cash holding decisions of these firms by taking into account the financial constraints 
that these firms might face and also take into account events such as WTO accession. 
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Firms are the engines of growth in any economy.  It is therefore important to study 
how firms finance themselves as this has a direct impact on the overall growth rate of 
the economy.  A firm can choose whether to finance its activities with internally 
generated funds, debt, equity or a combination of these.  The various means of 
financing represent the financial structure of an enterprise.  According to Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), capital structure is irrelevant in the sense that internal and external 
finance can be regarded as perfect substitutes.  Therefore it does not matter whether 
investment is financed by debt, equity or internal funds.   
One important and rather unrealistic assumption of the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem is that capital markets are perfect and thus firms have unrestricted access to 
funds.  Another rather unrealistic assumption is that they consider that all firms are 
homogenous.  Due to these unrealistic assumptions, there is growing awareness 
among economists and researchers alike that capital markets are characterised by 
market imperfections, namely asymmetric information and that firms are definitely 
not homogeneous. 
Once we move away from a model of perfect capital markets, capital structure 
becomes relevant and how investment is financed becomes a crucial decision.  Hence 
the alternative view that firms are heterogeneous and that internal and external finance 
may not be perfect substitutes triggered research into finding whether capital market 
imperfections affect investment decisions.   
Previous studies of capital structure have mainly investigated how firms 
choose between equity and debt as their main source of financing (Marsh, 1982; 
Jalilvand and Harris, 1984).  However, by concentrating on these sources of 
financing, an important source of finance that has been sidelined is internal funds.  
Prior to the development of the pecking order model, previous studies have tended to 
generalise that firms would use internal finance only when they cannot have access to 
external sources of funds mainly leverage and equity (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 
1988, henceforth FHP, 1988).  However, this does not explain why even listed, 
established and mature firms tend to rely a lot on internal finance. 
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An alternative theory that has gained recognition in the wake of the 
Modigliani and Miller theorem is the Pecking Order Theory proposed by Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  According to the Pecking Order Model, there is 
a strict ordering or hierarchy of sources finance. Firms always seem to prefer internal 
sources of finance followed by debt and then, when such sources are exhausted, 
equity finance is used.  This is because internal and external finance are not perfect 
substitutes as internal finance is believed to be the cheapest source of finance.  The 
availability of internal funds allows firms to undertake investment without having to 
resort to external finance which is relatively more expensive due to transaction costs, 
tax advantages, agency problems, costs of financial distress and asymmetric 
information (FHP, 1988).  
Asymmetric information increases the cost of debt but, on the other hand, tax 
advantages have an opposing effect which reduces the cost of debt relative to equity 
issues (Benito 2003).  The most expensive source of finance is believed to be equity 
finance due to the various costs associated with new equity issues such as 
underwriting discounts, registration fees, taxes, and selling and administrative 
expenses. Support for the Pecking Order Model comes from the fact that most listed 
companies seldom make net new equity issues (Benito, 2003). 
Firms are characterised by heterogeneity.  Some firms are listed on the stock 
market and have access to capital markets.  These are the firms that are also less likely 
to face problems of asymmetric information.  Hence, these firms that more likely to 
secure bank loans to finance their investment.  Thus against all expectations, it may be 
the case that listed firms rely a lot on bank loans to finance their investment.  The 
belief that listed firms are market-dependent while non-listed firms are bank-
dependent may therefore be erroneous, as there are numerous costs associated with 
equity issues as mentioned above, that may make debt-finance, namely in the form of 
bank loans more attractive.  
Some studies have tried to show that a bank lending channel is operating in the 
UK despite the fact that the UK is classified as a market- based system (Benito, 2003; 
Huang, 2003).  Evidence can be found in Huang (2003) of whether tight money 
reduces bank loan supplies to firms in the UK.  In particular, his findings suggest that 
tight money reduces bank-loan supplies to non-listed companies and increases bank-
loan supplies to public companies.  But when monetary policy becomes tight enough 
even bank-dependent public companies start suffering from losses in bank-loans. 
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Furthermore as mentioned by Benito (2003), a feature of market-based systems such 
as the UK is greater availability and use of new equity finance. However, for the 
Pecking Order Model to hold it should be borrowing and not equity issues which 
should respond to increased need for finance. 
In a study of financial systems and financial structures by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (1999), the UK is classified as a market-based system, where markets play a 
more dynamic role, and it is believed that firms rely a lot on markets to get funds for 
investment1. But it has been found that the majority of firms do not issue equity.  Only 
a substantial minority of companies undertake new equity issues (Benito, 2003).  This 
supports the notion that a majority of quoted companies do not issue equity after the 
initial public offering and that firms rely on other sources to get funds for investment.  
A number of studies have shown that compared to other countries, UK firms face 
higher financing constraints compared to, for instance, Germany, which is a bank-
based system (Bond, Harhoff and Reenen, 1999; Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay, 
2003). 
 
1.2 	

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"We have seen that on average internal funds (depreciation plus retained earnings) 
make up the bulk of money that companies need [for investment]. ... Why, then do 
managers have an apparent preference for financing by retained earnings?" Brealey 
and Myers (2000), p. 385.  
"Internal finance is a more important source of funds than debt or equity for 
investment" Allen and Gale (2000), pp. 15 – 16.  
 
If a firm is observed to be relying on internal finance, this is mainly attributed to the 
fact that the firm is financially constrained.  This is reflected in the investment-cash 
flow literature where firms with positive investment cash flow sensitivities are 
regarded as being financially constrained, that is, these firms find it costly to gain 
access to external finance (FHP, 1988).    However, this view was challenged by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (henceforth KZ, 1997) who suggested that positive 
investment cash flow sensitivities might not necessarily reflect financial constraints. 
                                                 
1 Here “market-based” also includes access to debt markets, where firms can issue their own 
obligations rather than through a financial intermediary such as a bank. 
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In the capital structure literature, firms are often observed to be relying quite 
heavily on internally generated funds such as cash flow or retained earnings. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) suggest that this behaviour can be attributed to asymmetric 
information.  The problem in capital markets is that it makes it costly for external 
finance providers to evaluate the quality of a firm.  Hence the cost of new debt and 
equity are much higher than the opportunity cost of using internal finance generated 
through cash flow and retained earnings.  Because of this, firms prefer to use internal 
finance as it is a cheaper source of finance compared to debt or equity.  It has been 
observed that not only small firms (who suffer more from asymmetric information) 
rely on internal finance but also established firms such as IBM, General Motors and 
Ford to name a few. 
In this study, it is quite important how we define a financially constrained or 
unconstrained firm. Previous empirical research has used a number of classification 
schemes to partition firms between those that are financially constrained and 
unconstrained.  Of the articles in the literature that was among the first to attempt a 
classification scheme of firms is that by FHP (1988) followed by KZ (1997), Cleary 
(1999), FHP (2000), KZ (2000), Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Cleary et al 
(2004).   
We use different criteria in this study to distinguish between financial 
constraints.  We follow Guariglia (2006) and divide our constraints between internal 
financial constraints and external financial constraints.  Internal constraints are 
measured as constraints internal to the firm that would influence whether or not a firm 
chooses to go for external finance.  External financial constraints refer to those 
constraints that limit the availability of external funds to a firm.  They represent those 
factors that normally outsiders would look at before granting funds to a firm.  Internal 
financial constraints are measured by the cash flow and profit distribution, while 
overall constraints are measured by the distribution of real assets, coverage ratios or a 
measure of risk. 
 
1.3  
To study the capital structure of listed firms in the UK, we use data from 
DATASTREAM.  The database contains accounting data for approximately 1,800 UK 
firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange.  The database lists all the firms with 
available accounting data at the time of downloading.  Data is collected over the 
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1968-2000 period2. We focus only on manufacturing firms that operate in the 
following industries: Metal and Metal goods, Other Minerals and Mineral products, 
Chemicals and man-made fibres, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical and Instrument 
Engineering, Motor Vehicles and Parts, Other Transport Equipment, Food, Drink and 
Tobacco, Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear and Other Manufacturing.  We 
have data on 958 firms that gives us 13110 firm-years of observations. 
To study the capital structure of SMEs in the UK we use the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) dataset. FAME is a database that contains information 
on companies in the UK and Ireland.  The FAME database is collected by Jordans 
Bureau Van Dijk for commercial use.  This database includes balance sheet data, 
profit and loss statements and some other information.   This amounts to over 1.3 
million companies.   For the purpose of this study we have data on 13,556 unquoted 
manufacturing firms that gives us 81,556 firm-years of observations over the 1994-
2003 period. 
The CSMAR database contains data on the trading of Chinese stock markets 
and the financial statements of China’s listed companies.  This database is designed 
and developed by Centre for China Financial Research (CCFR) of the University of 
Hong Kong and GTA Information Technology Company Limited (GTA IT Co., Ltd).  
The dataset contains data on 1,393 general industry companies listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the 1994-2004 period.  For 
the purpose of this study we have  data on 800 manufacturing firms that amounts to 
15,806 firm-years of observations. 
We undertake a comprehensive study of UK firms and their financing choices 
using both Datastream and the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) datasets.  The 
former dataset includes only listed companies, whereas the latter includes mainly non-
listed companies in the UK. The broad picture may suggest that listed firms would be 
relatively less bank-dependent while non-listed firms would be more bank–dependent.   
However for the Pecking Order Model to hold, there will be some listed firms for 
which bank loans are still preferred over new equity issues, although it is not clear 
how far this practice is widespread among listed firms.  Some of the questions that I 
will try to answer are: does the Pecking Order Model apply to both listed and non-
listed firms in the UK? Are listed firms in the UK mainly bank-dependent? How 
                                                 
2 Since the structure of the dataset changes after the year 2000, we limit our study to the 1968-2000 
period. 
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widespread is this tendency if it is true?  One of the more interesting issues is to 
investigate how similar or different are the capital structures of firms in the UK and 
China. 
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The main focus of our study will be on two major theories of capital structure namely 
the Trade-off Theory (TOT) and the Pecking Order Theory (POT). According to the 
Trade-off Theory, an optimal capital structure is achieved by “trading-off” the costs 
and benefits of debt (Berens and Cuny, 1995, Fama and French, 2002, Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999).  In the trade-off model, companies equate the costs and benefits of 
debt and choose a debt level that optimises the value of the firm.  According to the 
POT, firms have a strong preference for internal finance (Myers, 1984) as internal 
finance is believed to have a cost advantage over new debt and equity.  If external 
finance is required, firms first issue debt and when all other “safe” options are 
exhausted, they issue equity as a last resort.  The literature regarding the POT has 
been dormant since its inception in the early 1980’s when it was first proposed by 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  It is only in the late 1990’s that a new 
interest has been revived in the POT by financial theorists. 
We mainly examine the relationship between debt and cash flow in both 
quoted and unquoted firms in the UK.  Quoted firms are likely to be big firms as they 
have access to stock markets and can thus issue public equity.  Unquoted firms are 
mainly Small and Medium-sized firms (SMEs) who do not have access to stock 
markets and mainly rely on debt as their primary source of external finance.  There 
are various reasons why we study quoted and unquoted firms.  First, most capital 
structure theories have been developed to explain the capital structure of large firms 
and the question whether these theories apply to SMEs is still a puzzle. Also, 
comparing the financing decisions of quoted and unquoted firms (SMEs) would be 
interesting and maybe unquoted firms can follow in the footsteps of quoted firms and 
learn how to grow.    
Firms with different levels of cash flow are likely to have different levels of 
debt.  However, no studies have attempted to take this into account.  An innovative 
aspect of our study is that we account for firms having different levels of cash flow.  
Most of the financial constraint literature has only studied how financial constraints 
affect firms’ investment decisions. Financial constraints could possibly affect capital 
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structure decisions, that is, the amount of debt that a firm holds.  For instance, the 
degree of financial constraints that a firm faces might well affect the amount of 
internal finance that a firm uses or more importantly the amount of debt that a firm 
has in its capital structure.  Instead of analysing firms in the whole economy as has 
been done in a number of studies, we follow Fazzari et al (1988) and study firms only 
belonging to the Manufacturing sector3. 
Another innovative aspect of our study is that we examine the capital structure 
decisions of firms in China and also investigate how the presence of financial 
constraints affect the capital structure decisions of listed Chinese firms. Sources of 
external finance are limited in economies in transition.  Firms in these economies can 
be heavily dependent on financing sources such as bank credit.  Factors that affect the 
capital structure of firms in developed countries might not have the same effect on the 
capital structure of firms in transition economies.  Due to the availability of good 
quality financial data, China is the ideal case to study these issues. 
The main estimator used in our study is the first-difference GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).  Unlike the OLS and Within-Groups estimators, the first-
difference GMM estimator takes into account both unobserved firm heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity  of regressors. 
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The first part of Chapter 2 provides a review of literature and surveys studies that 
have investigated the capital structure decisions of listed firms across various 
countries.  In particular, we focus on the Trade off Theory and the Pecking Order 
Theory of capital structure.  In the second part, we focus on the financing decisions of 
SMEs across a cross section of countries. 
In Part I of chapter 3, we study the capital structure decisions of quoted firms 
in the UK. We mainly concentrate on the relationship between debt and cash flow.  
Quoted firms are likely to be the relatively larger firms in our sample, with access to 
stock markets and could issue public equity if they so desired.  However, even in the 
UK, where stock markets are quite well-developed, firms do not rely a lot on equity 
but more on other sources of finance such as internal funds and debt. The innovative 
                                                 
3 According to the DTI (2004), Manufacturing represents a sixth of the UK economy and it is 
responsible for the majority of UK exports.  It is also one of the biggest employment providers and 
responsible for the bulk of research and development in the UK. 
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aspect of our study is that we account for (overall) financial constraints and show how 
these constraints affect the capital structure decisions of firms. 
In Part II of Chapter 3 we examine the same issues as in Part I of Chapter 3 
but here the focus is on unquoted firms in the UK which are mainly small and 
medium-sized firms.  Unlike Part I, we examine both internal and overall financial 
constraints that firms might face as unquoted firms are likely to suffer more from both 
types of financial constraints.  By internal constraints, we refer to financial constraints 
that are present inside the firm and that encourages the firm to go for external 
financing.  On the other hand overall constraints refer to those constraints that 
outsiders would consider important and which could signal to an outsider that a firm 
is financially constrained. For example if a firm has insufficient internal funds, we 
would refer to the firm as being internally financially constrained.  If a firm has low 
real assets (small firm), then we would say that firm is financially constrained as 
outsiders (lenders) would be unwilling to lend to it. 
Chapter 4 reviews the Chinese economy where we discuss the transition and 
reform process in China.  We also discuss finance and growth in the Chinese context 
and provide a detailed description of the Chinese financial system where we focus on 
the development of the stock market and the banking system.  We also look at the FDI 
phenomenon in China in more detail to examine if FDI has relaxed the financial 
constraints that Chinese firms face. 
In Chapter 5, we study the capital structure decisions of listed Chinese firms.  
The main issue addressed in this chapter is to test whether the financing decisions 
made in listed Chinese firms are different from those made by listed firms in the UK.  
This is interesting as in China, property rights are not well-defined and the financial 
system is not very efficient.  Furthermore, this directly addresses the issue whether 
financial system development is important for the mobilisation of resources to firms 
as a number of studies including Levine (2002), La Porta et al (1999) amongst others 
have found financial system development to be a pre-requisite for growth.  We also 
examine whether the financing of firms differ across eastern (coastal), central and 
western provinces as regional disparity is a serious issue in China.  Additionally, we 
investigate if subsidies and accession to the WTO has affected the leverage decisions 
of firms.  Studying the effects of WTO is important as this was a very significant 
event for China especially as it meant that China now has secure export markets. 
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Chapter 6 reviews studies based on cash holdings.  We are interested in this 
literature as it is found that the Chinese firms in our sample hold a major portion of 
their assets in the form of cash.  We find that most empirical studies on cash holdings 
have been based on listed firms in the US and there is a gap in the literature where the 
cash holding behaviour of firms in other parts of the world has not been given its due 
attention.  We also examine the determinants of cash holdings of Chinese 
manufacturing firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
Additionally we examine if financial constraints affect cash holding behaviour and 
whether WTO accession has had an effect on the cash holdings behaviour of listed 
manufacturing firms in China.  This chapter also puts some emphasis on the bank-
firm relationship that exists in China and provides an explanation about the changing 
conditions in which agents are operating. 
Chapter 7 concludes.  We provide a synthesis of financing decisions under 
financial constraints of both firms in the UK and China.  We also discuss some policy 
implications and directions of future research. 
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This chapter reviews the various theories that have been proposed in the literature to 
try to provide some explanation for the capital structure decisions of firms.  In 
particular, we focus on the heterogeneity of firms and try to determine how firms 
make decisions about the mix of internal and external finance in their capital 
structure.   
In section 2.1, we consider the major capital structure theories that have been 
proposed in the literature.  These theories have been classified into three main 
categories, namely tax-based theories, agency cost theories and asymmetric 
information and signaling theories. The main theory that takes into account both taxes 
and agency costs is the Trade-off Theory (henceforth TOT) while the main theory 
under asymmetric information and signaling theories seems to be the Pecking Order 
Theory (henceforth POT). Section 2.2 provides an in-depth study of the TOT, 
followed by section 2.3 that provides a discussion of the POT.  Section 2.4 provides 
further discussion on recent studies. 
 
2.0    	
	

Modigliani and Miller (1958) provided the theoretical approach that under the perfect 
capital markets assumption, financial structure and financial policy are irrelevant for 
real investment.  In particular, since perfect markets exist there is no difference 
between internal and external finance and they are thus perfectly substitutable.  As 
argued by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) (henceforth FHP), financial structure 
becomes relevant when the highly unrealistic assumption of perfect capital markets is 
dropped.  Another important aspect that has been largely sidelined in the financial 
literature is the heterogeneity of firms. The literature on financing of firms has mainly 
focused on ‘the representative firm,’ (FHP, 1988).  The ‘representative firm’ faces 
perfect capital markets and is thus indifferent between the various sources of finance 
available.  
Firms are not homogeneous and treating them as such destroys valuable 
insights that can be obtained.  Some studies have tried to show that firms are not 
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homogeneous by focusing on asymmetric information.  However, putting asymmetric 
information aside, there are other more obvious factors that discriminate among firms. 
The recent literature has tried to make amends and tried to partition firms into various 
categories instead of just lumping all firms in one group.   By attempting a 
classification of firms into various categories, we can examine whether firms indeed 
behave differently when they belong to different categories. 
  The financing constraint literature has been the first to recognise that 
partitioning firms helps to provide important insights into their behaviour.  The 
pioneers in this field have undoubtedly been FHP (1988) who point out the fact that 
firms are definitely not homogeneous.  They classify firms according to their dividend 
payout ratio.  Their main aim in doing this is to show that firms that have different 
dividend payout ratios and therefore belong to different categories, have differential 
access to finance.  
 Some firms are financially constrained while others are not.  Following FHP 
(1988), a number of studies have tried to distinguish between various categories of 
firms.  For instance, Whited (1992) uses measures of indebtedness, interest coverage, 
and whether or not a firm has a bond rating to discriminate among firms.  Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) use both quantitative and qualitative data to distinguish among firms.  
Bond et al (1999) classify firms according to whether a firm operates in a bank-based 
or market-based system.   
Cleary (1999) uses a financial constraint index to differentiate between firms, 
which takes into account a number of factors such as  firm liquidity, leverage, 
profitability, and growth.  Carpenter and Guariglia (2003) use the number of 
employees to distinguish between large and small firms.  However, the factor 
common to all these studies is that they have tried to discriminate only within firms 
that have access to capital markets.   
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Several theories have been put forward to explain the capital structure of firms.  An 
optimal structure is that mix of internal and external finance (debt and/or equity) that 
optimises the value of a firm.  Therefore, the question of how to finance or 
equivalently from where to borrow becomes a crucial decision.  According to Titman 
and Wessels (1988), firms select capital structures depending on attributes that 
determine various costs and benefits associated with the form of financing used. 
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The literature has recognised that there are a number of potential determinants 
of capital structure.  Capital structure theories have been based on agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), asymmetric information (Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984)), product/ input interactions (Brander and Lewis (1986)) and theories 
driven by corporate control considerations (Harris and Raviv (1991)).  For a survey on 
capital structure theories see Harris and Raviv (1991).   
It should be noted that most capital structure theories have been developed to 
explain the capital structure of large firms and the question whether these capital 
structure theories apply to small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) is still a puzzle.  
The second part of this study will try to investigate if capital structure theories are 
relevant to SMEs.  
Michaelas et al (1999) partition the theory of capital structure in three 
categories.  These categories are the tax-based theories, the agency cost theories and 
the asymmetric information and signaling theories. 
 
(i)  Tax-based theories 
Mackie-Mason (1990), Graham (1996) and Graham (2000) believe that tax benefits of 
debt affect financing decisions.  According to tax-based theories, tax and bankruptcy 
considerations are a primary force influencing capital structure decisions.  Payment of 
interest on debt is usually tax deductible. Debt interest shields income from taxation 
and thus profitable firms should use more debt.  Michaelas et al (1999) propose the 
view that tax paying firms would be expected to use debt instead of equity, at least up 
to the point where the probability of financial distress starts to be important.   
Fama and French (2002) propose that firms identify their optimal leverage by 
weighing up the costs and benefits of debt.  The benefits of debt include the tax 
deductibility of interest and the reduction of free cash flow problems.  They further 
argue that taxes have two offsetting effects on optimal capital structures.  The 
deductibility of interest payments pushes firms towards more target leverage while the 
higher personal tax rate on debt relative to equity pushes them towards less leverage.  
Also, bankruptcy costs rise when profitability declines4.  These costs push firms 
towards lower leverage targets. 
 
                                                 
4 Bankruptcy costs are higher for firms with more volatile earnings, which should drive smaller, less 
diversified firms towards less leverage. 
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(ii) Agency cost theories 
Agency cost theories concentrate on agency costs, which arise due to conflict of 
interest.  The pioneers of agency cost theory, Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), identify two types of conflict: conflict between managers and 
shareholders and conflict between debt holders and equity holders. 
Conflict between managers and shareholders arise mainly because managers 
are not the sole beneficiaries if they work hard to increase profit.  Hence, managers 
will prefer to consume more ‘perquisites’ eg corporate jets, plush offices, building 
‘empires’ (Harris and Raviv, 1991) rather than increasing shareholders’ wealth.  
Conflicts between debt holders and equity holders arise mainly due to the fact that 
when an investment pays off, the ones to benefit are the equity holders.  When an 
investment fails, debt holders are the ones to bear most of the cost.  Due to this 
asymmetry in risk-sharing, equity holders prefer very risky projects that have high 
returns, while debt holders prefer the opposite. 
Both these conflicts can be solved by choosing an optimal capital structure 
that is obtained by trading off the costs and benefits of debt (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Jensen (1986), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1991), Diamond (1984), 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989)).  Debt increases managers’ ownership of the firm.  For 
instance, Jensen and Mecking (1976), argue that if a firm is increasingly financed by 
debt, this implies that it consequently relies less on equity, which in turn implies that 
the equity ownership of managers (instead of shareholders) in the firm increases5.  
Hence, managers will act in the interest of the firm.  They will now benefit more from 
their “profit enhancement activities” rather than shareholders benefiting.  Also, more 
debt implies that cash is used to repay debt, and thus less cash is available to 
managers to engage in activities for their personal gain.  Hence, debt increases 
managers’ ownership in the firm and ensures they act in the interest of the firm and 
also by making less cash available to them ensures that they do not engage in 
activities for their personal gain. 
 
(iii) Asymmetric information and signaling theories 
                                                 
5 The underlying assumption here is that there is a trade-off between shareholders’ and managers’ 
ownership of the firm.  Hence if managers’ ownership in the firm decreases this implies that 
shareholders’ ownership in the firm increases. 
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Firm managers or insiders are assumed to possess private information about the 
characteristics of the firm’s return stream or investment opportunities.  This branch of 
literature was first developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  
According to this branch of literature, firms that issue equity will face underpricing 
due to the information asymmetry that exists. Ross (1977) proposes a model where he 
extends the asymmetric information framework.  In his model, the managers know 
about the firm’s future returns, while investors do not.   High debt levels signal to 
investors that firms are of high quality, which explains the preference for debt rather 
than equity.  High levels of debt in a firm indicate to investors that the firms 
investment will indeed pay off and that the firm will be able to fulfil its debt 
obligations.  This is why investors regard high debt levels in firms favourably. 
The implication behind this is that when a firm announces an equity issue, the 
market value of the firms’ existing shares will fall.  Internal funds and/or riskless debt 
is preferred as there is no undervaluation involved (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  This is 
referred by Myers (1984) as the ‘pecking order’ where capital structure is driven by 
firm’s desire to finance new investment, first internally, then with low risk debt and 
finally with equity as a last resort. 
Above, we have considered three broad categories of capital structure: tax 
based theories, agency cost theories and asymmetric information and signalling 
theories.  Agency and tax-based theories cannot be considered separately as they have 
many factors in common.  They each try to explain why firms use debt in their capital 
structure. Agency cost theories regard debt as having the capacity to minimise 
conflicts and control managers’ behaviour, while tax-based theories show that debt 
provides a tax shield for income.  In essence, they each try to find some explanation 
for gearing6.  Therefore, within the category of agency cost and tax-based theories we 
will mainly focus on the Trade-off theory of capital structure.  In the case of 
asymmetric information and signalling theories, our focus will be on the Pecking 
Order theory. 
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According to the Trade-off Theory, an optimal capital structure is achieved by 
“trading-off” the costs and benefits of debt (Berens and Cuny, 1995, Fama and 
                                                 
6 Gearing is concerned with the relationship between the long-term liabilities that a business has and its 
capital employed. 
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French, 2002, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  In the trade-off model, companies 
equate the costs and benefits of debt and choose a debt level that optimises the value 
of the firm. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below: 
 
Debt provides firms with an interest tax shield as interest payments are usually tax 
deductible.  This gives an incentive to firms to take more debt in their capital 
structure.  However, this does not lead firms to be fully financed with debt.  The 
reason is that since interest payments are fixed payments, the more debt a firms takes, 
the more interest it has to pay.  This can be explained by the diagram above. 
The straight line AB shows the value of a firm under all-equity financing.  
When a firm undertakes debt it has to pay interest.  Interest payments are generally 
tax deductible, thus when a firm takes debt, it is able to increase its value.  This is 
called the interest tax shield of debt.  Debt almost literally shields the firm from 
paying out more in taxes.  Therefore, as curve AC shows, initially as the firm 
undertakes more debt, the value of the firm increases.   
However, after a certain level of debt, (the optimum level), the value of the 
firm starts falling as shown by the falling portion of curve AC. After a certain level of 
debt, the costs of debt start outweighing the benefits of debt.  This is illustrated by the 
curve AD, which shows that the costs of financial distress rise significantly at higher 
levels of debt.  At higher levels of debt, firms have to pay more interest and if they are 
PV Costs of 
Financial 
Distress 
PV Interest 
tax shields 
Firm value under all-equity 
financing 
optimum Debt 
Market 
value of 
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          Figure 2.1: The Static Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure. 
          Source: Myers, 1984 pp 577. 
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B 
 28 
unable to repay the debt and interest, then they are likely to go bankrupt.  As costs of 
financial distress rise, firms would prefer to stick to a ‘reasonable’ level of debt.  This 
is illustrated in the diagram above where the optimum market value of the firm is 
achieved where the present value of the interest tax shield is at a maximum. 
    The tradeoff model assumes that companies have an optimal capital structure 
and they aim to attain this through a target debt level.  This is the reason why the 
Trade-off Theory is often referred to as the ‘static Trade-off Theory’ in the literature.  
As emphasized by Myers (1984), a firm substitutes debt for equity or equity for debt 
until the value of the firm is maximized.  The Trade-off theory puts a major emphasis 
on taxes.  It explains why firms that pay taxes would prefer some amount of 
borrowing (Myers, 2001).  Interest payments are tax deductible and thus companies 
that have debt in their capital structure can benefit from an “interest tax shield.”     In 
the absence of adjustment costs, the Trade-off theory assumes that each firm’s 
observed debt-to-value ratio should be its optimal ratio. 
However, debt also has the disadvantage that it increases the probability of 
firms becoming financially distressed.  The costs of debt include potential bankruptcy 
costs. Repayment of interest on debt is an obligation that a firm has to fulfill whatever 
its financial state.  Hence, if a firm is unable to undertake its debt obligation it will 
obviously face bankruptcy as has already been discussed above.   
Another cost of debt is the agency conflicts that can arise between 
stockholders/shareholders and bondholders/debt holders (Fama and French, 2002).   
This can be explained by the fact that if an investment pays off equity holders are the 
ones to benefit as they are entitled to the residual profits after interest on debt has 
been repaid.  Risky investments are the ones that normally have higher returns and 
therefore equity holders will prefer these types of investment.  Debt holders on the 
other hand, are only concerned with their interest payments.  They would prefer firms 
to choose less profitable but safe investments.  This explains the conflict that may 
arise between stockholders and bondholders as has been discussed earlier. 
The benefits of debt include the tax deductibility of interest payments (Berens 
and Cuny 1995). As argued by Benito (2003) firms use debt as a means of 
constraining the interest of managers which may diverge from the interests of 
shareholders.  In fact, debt reduces free cash flow problems as excess cash is used to 
repay debt, rather than managers using it to consume perquisites (Fama and French, 
2002 and Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
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One of the first papers that attempted to formulate a model of optimal capital structure 
is Taggart (1977).  Taggart (1977) treats the financial decisions as ongoing ones and 
allows these decisions to be interdependent.  Like previous studies, he first illustrates 
a simple balance sheet.    This simplified balance sheet is illustrated below: 
			
 
NWA 7       
net working assets (inventories,   
 net trade credit and other assets) 
 
NK        
net capital stock (gross capital  
stock minus accumulated 
 depreciation)  
 
-LIQ       liquid assets 
SDBT    short-term debt 
 
LDBT     long-term debt 
E            equity (cumulative gross stock     
               issues minus cumulative stock  
               retirements  plus cumulative 
                retained earnings) 
A ( net assets) A (net assets) 
)*#+,: Taggart (1977) pp 1467 
Net assets that consist of net working assets (inventories, net trade credit8 and other 
assets) and net capital stock (gross capital stock minus accumulated depreciation) are 
financed by temporary capital and permanent capital.  Temporary capital is made up 
of short-term debt and liquid assets.  However, liquid assets enter the balance sheet 
with a negative sign as firms gain a source of finance when they draw down liquid 
assets. Permanent capital, on the other hand is made up of long-term debt and equity 
(cumulative gross stock issues minus cumulative stock retirements plus cumulative 
retained earnings). 
From the balance sheet proposed above, it can be seen that all the financial 
items have been placed on the right hand side while real assets appear on the left hand 
side.  Taggart (1977) uses the following sources and uses equation as the foundation 
of his model: 
 
∆A = ∆NWA + ∆NK= ∆SDBT + ∆LDBT +∆ E- ∆LIQ                            (2.1) 
                                                 
7 Net Working Assets= Accounts Receivable-Accounts Payable-Tax Accruals+ Consumer Credit+ 
Miscellaneous assets- Government Loans +Inventories. 
8 Net trade credit would here refer to debtors less creditors. 
 
  } TC (temporary      
                  capital)    
 
}        PCB             
(permanent    
capital                
at book value) 
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As its name suggests the sources and uses identity gives the firm’s ‘sources’ of 
financing and the ‘uses’ of this financing.  The right hand side gives all the financial 
variables, indicating the possible sources of financing such as short-term debt, long-
term debt and equity.  It should be noted that liquid assets are placed on the right hand 
side with a negative sign.  This is explained by the fact that firms can reduce their 
holdings of liquid assets which is regarded then as a source of funds. 
 
The change in equity, can be further broken down and written as: 
∆E= ∆ GSTK + RE – SRET       (2.2) 
which states that the change in equity is made up of gross stock issues (GSTK), 
retention of earnings (RE) and stock retirements (SRET). 
Substituting for E the sources and uses identity is thus written as: 
 
∆A- RE = ∆SDBT + ∆LDBT +∆ GSTK - SRET- ∆LIQ   (2.3) 
The right hand side of the equation gives the ‘external financing deficit’ of the firm.  
When the cash flow is not sufficient to cover the firm’s expenditure on plant and 
equipment and working capital, this shortage in funds is what is termed as the external 
financial deficit.  The decision of firms therefore boils down to how to make changes 
on the variables on the right hand side given that an external financial deficit exists. 
 
Firms can either chose to increase the book value of their permanent capital (PCB) or 
they can increase their temporary capital (TC).  PCB consists of long-term debt plus 
equity while TC is made up of short-term debt minus liquid assets.  The problem of 
firms in each period is to decide what changes they will make in the 5 right-hand side 
items given the size of their external financial deficit.  If more financing is required, 
firms can increase their book value of permanent capital or they can increase their 
temporary capital.  Changes in permanent capital will be represented by the stock 
adjustment equation. 
 
∆ PCB = δ1 (PCB
*
 -PCB-1- RE) + δ2 RT + RE                                   (2.4) 
 
Where PCB* = NK (net capital stock) + NWA (net working assets). PCB* is the target 
value of long-term debt plus equity. PCB-1 is PCB lagged one period.  The 
composition of PCB is governed by the desired debt-equity ratio which depends on 
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the market value of firms’ debt (LDM) and the market value of their equity (STOCK).  
RE refers to the retention of earnings while RT is the interest rate timing conditions.  
Equation (4) is saying that any change in permanent capital is influenced by the firm’s 
target value of the mix of debt and equity, interest rate timing conditions and the 
amount of retained earnings.  Interest rate timing conditions are important as they 
affect the financing decisions of firms.  Taggart (1977) proposes that if firms expect 
the long-term interest rates to decline, it may prefer to postpone raising long-term 
funds and borrow short-term while waiting for interest rates to fall. 
Therefore the desired debt-equity ratio PCB* is defined by: 
(LDM / STOCK)
*
 = b, where b is determined by the trade-off between tax savings and 
expected bankruptcy costs.  However, it should be noted that this ratio reflects the 
market value of debt.   To get the target book value of the long-term debt ratio 
(LDBT*), the following transformation is done: 
LDBT* = b STOCK( i / ĩ )                                         (2.5) 
Where STOCK is the market value of equity, i is the current interest rate on long-term 
debt while ĩ is the average contractual interest rate on long-term debt.   LDBT is 
affected by the permanent capital target, but is also affected by the desired split of 
PCB (permanent capital) between long-term debt and equity.  Long-term debt issues 
are affected by interest rate timing conditions while bond issues are affected by the 
timing of bond issues.  
The adjustment equation for LDBT can be written as: 
∆LDBT= α1 (LDBT*- LDBT-1) + α2 (PCB*- PCB-1-RE) + STOCKT + RT          (2.6) 
LDBT is the long-term debt level, LDBT* is the target level of long-term debt,  
LDBT-1 is LDBT lagged by one period.  PCB is permanent capital, PCB* is the target 
value of long-term debt plus equity, RE is retention of earnings, RT is the interest 
timing variable and STOCKT is the stock market timing variable. Equation (2.6) 
implies that long-term debt issues will be stimulated by a shortfall of actual LDBT 
from the long-term target level debt level (LDBT*) and also by a shortfall in the PCB 
term.  Long-term debt issues will also be influenced by the interest rate timing 
variable and the stock market timing variable.  The coefficients α1 and α2 can 
sometimes have opposing influence implying that if the target level long-term debt 
(LDBT*) grows faster than the assets in place, then the term PCB has to go up, that is 
the firm has to increase its capital (most likely by issuing equity).  This restrains bond 
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issues (debt issues) and hence curbs the firm’s ability and willingness to take more 
debt in its capital structure.  
Taggart (1977) also presents adjustment equations for liquid assets and short-
term debt and show how the change in liquid assets and short-term debt adjust to a 
target liquid ratio and a target short-term debt ratio following some of the above 
mechanisms.  Using data on non-financial US firms, Taggart (1977) constructs market 
values of long-term debt (LDBT) and equity, the stock market timing variable 
(STOCKT) and the interest rate timing variable RT.  He obtains 62 observations 
reflecting quarterly data over the 1957 Q3 to 1972Q4 period.  His findings imply that 
when the firms in his sample have a debt/equity ratio that is below target, they indeed 
issue more debt and less stock.  When permanent capital (PCB) is below target, firms 
issue more of both bonds and stock.  However, he finds that the adjustment 
coefficients are quite small implying that adjustment is slow.  He also finds that 
timing considerations have an important influence on corporate financing decisions. 
 
(ii)    !#-.%&/(
One of the very first studies dealing with financing choices of firms in the UK is the 
study by Marsh (1982).  He analyses how companies actually select between financial 
instruments.  Marsh (1982) examines a sample of UK firms making debt and/or equity 
issues and tries to explain the financing behavior of these companies.  He assumes 
that a company’s choice of financing instrument is a function of the difference 
between its current and target debt ratios as illustrated below: 
Pr (Zij=1) = Pr ( D
*
jt  - Dij< 0)                                                                                (2.7) 
 
Pr (Zij=1) states the probability that a company will issue equity at time t given that it 
will either make an issue of equity or bonds.  Where D*jt  is the firm’s target debt ratio 
and Djt  is the firm’s actual debt ratio. 
 
The model assumes that when firms need funds, they will either issue equity or bonds.   
Since D*jt  is unobservable, the model assumes that there are a number of factors that 
determine this target debt level.  The model is therefore specified as follows:  
D
*
jt  - Dij = B’ χij + µij                                                         (2.8) 
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Where χij is a vector of explanatory variables, B is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients and µij is the stochastic error term.  The final specification of the model 
therefore becomes:  
Pr (Zij=1) = Pr (B’ χij + µij < 0)                                                                             (2.9) 
This implies that the probability that a company will issue equity at time t given that it 
will either make an issue of equity or bonds depends on a number of factors.  These 
factors include variables such as company size, risk, asset composition, market timing 
conditions and a number of other factors that have been proposed in the literature.    
Marsh (1982) uses a logit analysis on a sample of 748 issues of equity and 
debt made by UK quoted companies over the 1959-1970 period.  He finds that the 
companies’ existing financial structure does not really influence the choice between 
debt and equity.  Issues of debt and equity occur at discrete intervals but when they do 
occur, the debt or equity issue is a quite large one. Marsh (1982) finds that companies 
are very concerned with market conditions and the past history of security prices, in 
choosing between equity and debt.  Companies do tend to have target levels of debt in 
mind for both the short-term and the long-term.  But these thoughts themselves are 
influenced by factors such as company size, bankruptcy risk and asset composition.  
However, Marsh (1982) does not distinguish between the three forms of finance as 
proposed in the POT.   
(iii)   !0102!34!34!##1-%&/(
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) study the financing decisions of US corporations.  In 
particular, they relax the assumption of perfect capital markets and study whether 
there is a relationship between financing decisions and the value of a firm.  Due to the 
presence of imperfections such as adjustment costs or constraints, firms may not be 
able to immediately adjust to their target levels of capital structures and will therefore 
chose to achieve at least partial adjustment in every time period.    
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) investigate a process of partial adjustment.  
Interestingly, they allow speeds of adjustment to vary by firm and over time 
depending on the size of the firm and capital market conditions.  They assume that the 
investment decision is exogenous.  In particular, they believe that the firms decision 
of how to finance will affect the cost of capital it faces.  Their second simplifying 
assumption is that all targets are specified in terms of book values rather than market 
values.  This is due to the fact that market values tend to fluctuate a lot and therefore 
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is difficult to use the values in empirical research.  For example both Marsh (1982) 
and Taggart (1977), use book values rather than market values9. 
Following Taggart (1977) they develop their model based on a stylized 
balance sheet.  They set out the following sources and uses equation: 
 
∆ At = ∆ LDt + ∆ SDt –∆ LIQAt + ∆ CPt + (Et - DIVt)                                          (2.10) 
 
Where the variables are as defined below: 
∆ is the change in a variable from t-1 to t; LD refers to long-term debt, SD is short-
term debt, LIQA is liquid assets; CP is common and preferred stock, which excludes 
retained earnings; E refers to net profit after taxes and preferred dividends; DIV 
represents cash dividends to common shareholders; while A represents firm assets, 
where A is defined as total assets less liquid assets (LIQA) and certain other liabilities 
assumed exogenous (accounts payable, accruals, deferred taxes, investment tax credits 
and minority interests). 
The ‘sources’ and ‘uses’ equation attempts to identify the ‘sources’ and ‘uses’ 
of funds.  In particular, it says that “the changes in A represent the total financing need 
of the firm which can be supplied by building up long-term debt, building up short-
term debt, drawing down liquid assets, and/or building up equity accounts through 
stock issues or earnings retention” (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984, p 129). 
Given the above sources of funding, the total need of funds can be described 
by a series of equations that make up the adjustment model as described below: 
 
∆ LDt =  δ1it[LD
*
it -  LDit-1 ] + δ’1it [ RLDit]            (2.11) 
∆ LIQAt  = δ2it[LIQA
*
it -  LIQAit-1 ] + δ’2it [ RLQit]                              (2.12) 
∆ SDt = δ3it[SD
*
it -  SDit-1 ] + δ’3it [ RSDit]                                      (2.13) 
∆ CPt = δ4it[CP
*
it -  CPit-1 ] + δ’4it [ RCPit]                                               (2.14) 
∆ DIVt = δ5it[DIV
*
it -  DIVit-1 ] + δ’5it [ RDIVit]                                (2.15) 
 
Where LD is long-term debt, SD is short-term debt, LIQA is liquid assets and CP is 
common preferred stock, DIV is cash dividends to common shareholders. 
                                                 
9 Additionally, the use of book values makes it easier to relate to changes in balance sheet asset figures 
(investment) to changes in balance sheet liability figures (financing) Jalilvand and Harris (1984)p 129. 
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A * on a variable would indicate the target level of that variable while δ and δ’ 
are adjustment coefficients.  RLD, RLQA, RSD, RCP and RDIV are measures that 
reflect the total financing needs of a firm.  These partial adjustment equations are 
basically made up of 2 parts.  Equation 2 for example, shows that a firm would adjust 
to the difference between its target level of long-term debt (LD*it) and the level of debt 
at the beginning of period t-1(LDit-1).  If there is complete adjustment (that is the debt 
level exactly matches the target debt level), the adjustment parameter δit will be equal 
to 1 and all the δ’it would be equal to zero. However, in an imperfect market, since 
adjustment is costly, only partial adjustment is expected and thus δ’it may be non-
zero. 
The variable RLD can be defined as the external financing required for the 
firm to be able to achieve complete adjustment to its financial target.  This can be 
defined as: 
RLDit = [ ∆ Ait – (Eit –DIV
*
it)]- (LD
*
it – LDit-1)                                                  (2.16) 
[∆ Ait – (Eit –DIV
*
it)] represents the firm’s total external financing need if the firm is 
able to adjust completely to all its financial targets.  (LD*it – LDit-1) represents the 
amount of long-term debt financing required to achieve complete adjustment to the 
long-term target.  The difference between these two terms is represented by RLD.  
Similar explanations hold for the rest of the financial variables LIQA, SD, CP and 
DIV. 
An interesting point to note in Jalilvand and Harris (1984) is that they also 
make allowance for the fact that speeds of adjustment can be different among 
different firms and over time.  They assume that factors such as firm size, 
management’s expectations about interest rates and management’s expectations about 
stock prices affect speeds of adjustment.  It should be noted that Jalilvand and Harris 
(1984) derive a model that shows that firms have target ratios for each and every 
financial variable.  The Trade-off Theory on the other hand focuses only on a target 
debt ratio and ignores other financing sources. 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984), use a sample of 108 manufacturing companies 
over the 1963-1978 period.  Firm’s target ratios are measured as the average of the 
actual ratios over the entire estimation period.  Following Taggart (1977), they use 
book values to calculate  target ratios.   Specifically, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) use a 
three year moving average to calculate target ratios.  Hence, the system of equations 
presented above is estimated using pooled cross-sectional time series data from each 
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of the 108 firms over the 1966-1978 period.  They find that a firm would adjust more 
quickly to its target level of long-term debt and more slowly to its equity target.  They 
also find that long-term debt, liquid assets and short-term debt are the main sources of 
firms’ financing needs. 
 
5	


Firm managers or insiders are assumed to possess private information about the 
characteristics of firm’s returns and the investment opportunities available to them 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991).  Various theories have been developed that have attempted 
to explicitly model this private information which has consequently given rise to 
theories other than the Trade-off Theory.  The Pecking Order Theory (POT) is one 
such theory that attempts to explain capital structure decisions by formally taking into 
account the inherent information asymmetry that exists between different parties.   
The pioneers that have explicitly accounted for asymmetric information in 
their work have been Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977).  However, the first 
ones to actually take into account asymmetric information in the area of capital 
structure have been Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  They show that the 
choice of capital structure mitigates inefficiencies in the firm’s investment decisions 
that are caused by information asymmetry. 
According to the POT, firms have a strong preference for internal finance 
(Myers, 1984) as it is believed to have a cost advantage over new debt and equity.  If 
external finance is required, firms first issue debt and when all other “safe” options 
are exhausted, they issue equity as a last resort.  The literature regarding the POT has 
been dormant since its inception in the early 1980’s when it was first proposed by 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984).  It is only in the late 1990’s that a new 
interest has been revived in the POT by financial theorists.  
The POT proposed by Myers (1984), prescribes a strict ordering or hierarchy 
of finance: firms use internal finance first then debt and only when such options are 
exhausted, equity finance is used.  This is explained by the fact that internal and 
external finance are not perfect substitutes.  The POT is diagrammatically illustrated 
below. 
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D1, D2 and D3 represent investment demand schedules.  When investment demand is 
low at D1, investment is financed with internal funds, which is relatively cheaper.  If 
investment demand is at D2, after exhausting the internal funds, external funds are 
used namely in the form of debt finance.  Finally, if investment demand is very high 
at D3, equity finance is used after internal funds and debt finance have been 
exhausted. 
This hierarchy can be explained by a number of factors.  These factors include 
the costs associated with each form of finance which are related to the degree of 
information asymmetry, the “safeness” of each form of finance or the signal that the 
issuance of some form of finance gives to the market. 
Internal finance is believed to be the cheapest source of finance followed by 
debt and equity.  The availability of internal funds allows firms to undertake 
investment without having to resort to external finance which is relatively more 
expensive due a number of factors.  The issuance of debt and equity usually involves 
issuance costs that are sometimes prohibitively high.  
Also the issuance of debt or equity can cause agency problems to arise.  The 
issuance of debt can cause conflicts to arise between managers and debtholders while 
the issuance of equity can cause conflicts to arise between debtholders and 
equityholders as discussed previously in section 2.1.  Furthermore, the issuance of 
external finance namely debt, involves repayment of capital and interest which the 
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firm has to pay whatever its financial state.  This increases the risk of financial 
distress.  All these factors explain why a firm would prefer internal finance over 
external finance. 
Most of the studies regarding the POT have been based on the US. The recent 
wave of theoretical and empirical literature is quite overwhelming (Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), Benito (2003), Chen (2003), Fama and French (2003)) with studies 
focusing on countries such as  Australia, China, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the 
US to name but a few.  Studies have not only tried to explain the financing choices of 
large firms but quite a number of studies have also focussed on how the POT can 
explain the financing choices of SMEs.   
Another explanation for the pecking order is provided by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) that draws from an asymmetric information framework.  The management is 
assumed to know more about the firm’s value than the potential investors.  Only 
insiders know the quality of a firm or its investment projects.  Therefore outsiders 
require a premium if they are asked to fund these projects.  The degree of information 
asymmetry regarding equity is higher when compared to debt.  Financial 
intermediaries are able to monitor the firm and gain access to information that outside 
investors cannot get.  Outsiders are normally not able to monitor firms and thus 
require a much higher premium on equity finance than debt since they are in the dark 
regarding the growth prospects of firms.   
Asymmetric information increases the cost of debt but, on the other hand, tax 
advantages have an opposing effect, which reduce the cost of debt relative to equity 
issues (Benito, 2003).  The most expensive source of finance is believed to be equity 
finance due to various costs associated with new equity issues.  These costs include 
underwriting discounts, registration fees, taxes and selling and administrative 
expenses.  Also, firms tend to issue ‘safe’ securities first, namely in the form of debt 
rather than equity. Here ‘safe’ implies that the terms are not affected by managers 
inside information (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  Debt cannot be regarded as a 
‘safe’ security as there are costs of financial distress associated with it, but it is still 
considered ‘safer’ than equity.  
Additionally, Myers (1984), explains this hierarchy by the fact that firms 
follow the rule of “issue debt when investors undervalue the firm and issue equity or 
some other security when they over-valuate it.”  Investors are aware of this and do not 
buy securities unless they are convinced that the firm has exhausted its “debt 
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capacity.”  Hence, investors typically ensure that firms follow a pecking order.  
Benito (2003) argues that support for the POT comes from the fact that most listed 
companies in the UK and Spain rarely make new equity issues.  An implication for 
the POT is that firms do not have an optimal capital structure.  The difference 
between investment and retained earnings should be met by debt issue (Viswanath, 
1993).  
 
2.3.1:  REVIEW OF EARLIER STUDIES
(i)    6,#-!34!80*7%&/( 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a model where they show how information 
asymmetry can lead equity to be mispriced as investors do not have the same 
information that insiders have.  They consider a firm that has to make an equity issue 
to raise cash to be able to undertake an investment opportunity.  They make the 
following assumptions: 
· There are no taxes, transaction costs or other capital market imperfections. 
· The firm has one existing asset and one opportunity requiring investment I.  
The various ways to finance this investment includes issuing stock, drawing 
down the firm’s cash balance or selling marketable securities.  The sum of 
cash in hand and marketable securities is described as financial slack (S). 
· Stockholders are passive, that is, they do not react if an equity issue arises. 
They consider a 3 period model.  At t=-1, the market has the same information the 
insiders of the firm have.  At t= 0, the management receives additional information 
about the value of the firm’s asset-in-place and investment opportunity and update 
their values accordingly.  The market, on the other hand does not receive this 
information until t=1. 
The firm requires an investment of I.  If the financial slack, S is less than I, 
then the firm needs to issue equity of E= I-S.  Myers and Majluf (1984), assume that 
the project considered is not divisible, therefore either the firm finances the whole 
project with equity or does not use equity at all; in other words there cannot be partial 
financing.  The firm’s existing asset has an expected future value of = E(A).  The 
distribution of A represents the asset’s possible (updated) values at t=0.  
Management’s updated estimate at t=0 is !9 the realisation of .  
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The net present value (NPV) at t=-1 of the investment opportunity is B= E(B).  
The distribution of B represents the asset’s possible updated NPVs at t=0.  
Management’s updated estimate at t=0 is :, the realisation of   To ensure limited 
liability, negative values of a and b are ruled out.  Interestingly, Myers and Majluf 
(1984), assume that management acts in the interest of ‘old’ shareholders, that is those 
owning shares at the start of t=0. They maximise Vold =V(a, b, E), that is, they 
maximise the ‘intrinsic value of the old shares conditional on the issue-invest decision 
and knowledge of the realizations a and b’.  However, the market value of these 
shares will not generally be equal to Vold.  Investors, on the other hand, know only the 
distribution of  and  and whether shares are issued. 
If stock is issued, the market value of old stockholders’ share at t=0 is P’ 
whereas if stock is not issued, the market value of their shares is P.  Since old 
stockholders are assumed to be passive, if stock is issued it goes to a different group 
of investors.  The value of slack (S) is fixed and is known by both managers and the 
market.  The model assumes that 0 ≤ S < 1.  Hence, some or the entire project must be 
financed by a stock issue.  By varying slack S, the size of the required issue is varied, 
E= I-S.  If the firm knowing the true values of a and b, does not issue then it forfeits 
the investment opportunity so that the value of the firm is still Vold= S+a. The slack 
therefore remains in cash or liquid assets.  If the firm decides to issue and invest, then 
E= I-S.  The value of the firm becomes: 
 
Vold = [ P’/ (P’+ E)] /(E+S+a+b)                                                  (2.17) 
 
Old stockholders are better off if the firm issues only when the following inequality 
holds: 
S+ a ≤ [ P’/ (P’+ E)] /(E+S+a+b)                                                     (2.18) 
which can be written as: 
[ E/ (P’+ E)] / (S+ a) ≤ [P’/ (P’+ E)] /(E+b)                                     (2.19) 
 
The above equation implies that old shareholders are only better off when the firm 
issues equity if the share of existing assets and slack going to new stockholders is less 
than the share of increment to firm value obtained by old stockholders.  This can be 
expressed as: 
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(E/ P’) (S+a) ≤ E+b                                                      (2.20) 
 
The equilibrium conditions obtained by Myers and Majluf (1984) imply that the firm 
may pass up good investment opportunities rather than sell stock to raise funds.  One 
important conclusion of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that the decision to 
issue stock always reduces stock price.  It should be noted that in their model, the firm 
never issues equity.  If it issues and invests, it always issues debt, regardless of 
whether the firm is over or undervalued.  
The decision not to issue equity will provide “good” news, implying that the 
firm has a high value while the decision to issue will send the bad signal that the firm 
has a low value and that is why it is issuing equity.  In summary, the results obtained 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that managers always act in the interest of 
existing shareholders and since an equity issue almost always causes the price of 
shares to fall, managers will try their best to avoid issuing equity.  It is this behaviour 
that results in a pecking order, whereby managers always prefer debt over equity.  
Investment opportunities would be forgone rather than financed with equity issue. 
 
(ii)  #!-;,#%&/<(
Krasker, (1986), tries to generalise the Myers and Majluf (1984) model.  In the Myers 
and Majluf (1984) model, the capital needs of the firm’s investment opportunity are 
fixed and know by investors and management’s choice is simply to raise the required 
funds or forgo the investment altogether.  However, in Krasker’s model, 
management’s decision is not whether to invest or not, but rather how much to invest. 
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), Krasker (1986) too assumes that the 
number of new shares issued by a firm affects the firm’s stock price when asymmetric 
information is a serious problem.  The announcement of an equity issue is associated 
with a drop in the corresponding share price.  This can be explained by the fact that a 
stock issue sends the signal to the market that the firm’s current assets are overvalued 
and drives down the share price.  By generalising the Myers-Majluf model, Krasker 
(1986) allows the firm to choose not only whether to issue stock or not but also how 
much of stock to issue. 
Krasker (1986), considers a 2 period model where a firm has both assets in 
place and investment opportunities.  The management must decide in the first period 
how much new stock to issue to finance new investment.  There is uncertainty about 
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the value of the firm’s investment opportunities and existing assets which managers 
can observe in the first period but investors can only observe in the second period.  He 
further assumes that the market value of the firm equals its expected value conditional 
on the market information.  The issue size is treated as a continuous choice variable.  
The model predicts that in a sample of firms that issue stock, the stock price will be 
negatively correlated with the issue size.  The model also predicts that if the 
information asymmetry is restricted to the value of the existing assets, the higher the 
uncertainty about the value of the existing assets, the higher stock prices are.  
Basically, Krasker (1986) confirms the results obtained by Myers and Majluf (1984); 
implying that an equity issue would provide a bad signal to the market and cause 
stock prices to fall. 
 
(iii)     !#!6!3!3%&&(
Following Krasker (1986), Narayanan (1990), has also tried to use a modified version 
of the Myers-Majluf (1984) model to try to provide an explanation for the use of debt 
in the capital structure of firms.  The basic premise of Narayanan (1990) model is the 
same as the Myers-Majluf (1984) model, however, he assumes that information 
asymmetry exists only regarding the new investment opportunity and  that the value 
of the firms asset-in-place is common knowledge.  Another important difference is 
that while Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that debt is risk-free, Narayanan (1990) 
assumes that debt is risky. 
In Narayanan (1990), the value of any single firm in equilibrium is the average 
value of all firms in the market.  Firms have to raise outside capital since their 
retained earnings fall short of the required investment.  He considers two scenarios.  
In one scenario, the firm is only able to raise finance through equity financing while 
in the second scenario, the firm is only able to issue risky debt.  In both scenarios, 
Narayanan (1990) shows that at least some ‘lemons,’ that is ‘bad’ firms remain in the 
market.  However, in a market where risky debt is used fewer lemons remain than in a 
market where equity is used.  The final result obtained by Narayanan (1990), seem to 
indicate that managers should use debt financing if their firms are undervalued and 
should use equity if they believe that their firms are overvalued. 
However, it is clear that in this situation, a debt issue would clearly signal to 
outsiders that the firm is undervalued while an equity issue would give the signal that 
the firm is overvalued.  For this reason, outsiders (investors) would be unwilling to 
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buy equity.  The firm would therefore be forced to finance its investment with debt or 
forgo the investment.  It is this ‘signaling’ ability of the mode of financing that 
ensures that firms follow a pecking order in their financing. 
The problem with the theoretical studies considered here is that they all try to 
provide some explanation of why internal finance is preferred over debt or why debt 
is preferred over equity.  However, none of these studies try to take into consideration 
the choice between internal finance, debt and equity finance simultaneously as 
proposed by the POT. 
 
(iv)  
$.,#$*41,-
Also, there are other theoretical studies that have built upon the Myers-Majluf (1984) 
model but which have rejected the existence of a pecking order in the financing of 
firms.  These studies include Brennan and Kraus (1987), Noe (1988) and 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989). 
Information asymmetry creates adverse selection problems for firms.  Brennan 
and Kraus (1987), propose that a firm’s financing strategy may act as a 
communication device that can help firms to overcome this information asymmetry.  
They argue that “investment opportunities may be efficiently financed by an 
appropriate choice of financing instruments” that can reveal private information of 
corporate insiders to investors.   They develop a model where they show that investors 
anticipate the choice of a particular financing strategy to have been made by the worst 
possible type.  If firms believe that investors will price financings at their worst case 
values then firms are induced to make worst case financings, confirming investors’ 
beliefs.  A worst case financing is one for which the firm can be assured that the 
market price will not be below the true, full-informational value of the financing.    
Brennan and Kraus (1987) derive their model in the case of a firm making 
both an equity issue and debt retirement. The theoretical model proposed by them 
violates the POT.  Firms in their model would issue equity and retire debt rather than 
preferring to issue debt over equity as proposed in the POT.  However, there are 
concerns as to how realistic their model is. 
Noe (1988), assesses the viability of the pecking order hypothesis within a 
signalling game context.  He proposes a model which takes into account uncertainty.  
If insiders face no uncertainty and have perfect foresight regarding the firm’s future 
cash flow then firms prefer debt financing.  However, when firms face uncertainty, 
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they fear that if they issue debt it may be mispriced.  Hence they prefer to issue equity 
when faced with uncertainty, which violates the POT.   
Likewise, Constantinides and Grundy (1989) who study the signalling ability 
of the chosen mode of financing, also derive a model where the POT is violated.  In 
their model a straight issue of debt has no signalling ability.  Only an issue of 
convertible debt or a stock repurchase can have any signalling ability, where 
managers can signal their private information to the market.  Their model inherently 
violates the pecking order model as there is no clear-cut distinction between debt and 
equity as proposed by the POT. 
 
2.4			
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Recent studies regarding capital structure have concentrated primarily on contrasting 
the two main theories of capital structure namely the Trade-Off and the Pecking Order 
theories. Most studies regarding capital structure have focused on the US.  For 
instance, Myers (2001) finds that most of the investment in the US is financed from 
internal cash flow and while external financing does form a small part of investment, 
a major portion of it is obtained from debt sources.   
· 	

Vogt (1994) examines the role of internal financial resources in firm financing and 
investment decisions.  His primary focus is whether the POT or partial adjustment to 
long run targets (as proposed by Jalilvand and Harris (1984)) can explain external 
financing behaviour of firms.  He also tries to determine how good a substitute 
external finance is for internal finance.   
Vogt (1994) uses data on manufacturing firms in the US over the 1972-1986 
period.  He uses the three stage least squares method to improve the parameter 
estimates.  The three stage least squares method is expected to take into account 
potential cross-equation correlation in the residual.  Further, he uses a fixed effect 
model to capture time and firm specific movement in the firm’s unobserved target 
capital structure.  He finds that firms indeed follow a pecking order and use finance as 
has been prescribed by it.  That is, they use internal finance first, then debt and finally 
equity.  Firms who pay low dividends and are thought to be more internally 
financially constrained seem to exhibit a stronger pecking order behaviour.  Firms that 
seem less internally financially constrained seem to be more inclined towards 
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adjusting to a target capital ratio.  Hence the results obtained by Vogt (1994) find 
evidence both in favour of the POT and the fact that firms seem to adjust partially to 
target capital structures. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), test the static Tradeoff model against the 
POT.  They perform their test on 157 US firms during the 1971-1989 period.  They 
present an equation for the pecking order model that is shown below: 
 
∆ Dit = a + bpo DEFit + eit                                                                                                                          (2.21) 
      
Where Dit is the amount of debt issued by the firm i and DEFit is the financial deficit 
of the firm. If the pecking order holds, under the null hypothesis, the pecking order 
coefficient bpo should be close to 1.  The intuition behind this is that the financial 
deficit of firms should mainly be met by debt.   The ‘financial deficit’ is defined as 
‘the sum of capital expenditures, dividend payments, the net increase in working 
capital and the current portion of long-term debt (at the start of the period) less 
operating cash flows, after interest and taxes,” (Shyam-Sunder and Myers ,1999, pp 
224).  They find that the POT is better able to explain the time series variance in 
actual debt ratios than a target adjustment model based on the static trade-off theory.  
However, their results are not statistically significant. 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) provide a critical study on the approach taken by 
Shyam- Sunder and Myers (1999).  They argue that the testing strategy of the latter is 
too simple and that factors other than the financial deficit affect the debt level of 
firms.  In particular, the regression equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), is 
not really able to distinguish between the hierarchy of sources of finance.  
Specifically, the equation is not able to distinguish cases where the financial hierarchy 
is violated and firms prefer to issue equity instead of debt. Also, they find that the 
tests of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) are not ‘powerful’ enough. Chirinko and 
Singha (2000) conclude that alternative tests are needed that would be better able to 
identify which factors influence capital structure and can discriminate among 
competing hypotheses. 
Minton and Wruck (2001) examine the phenomenon of financial conservatism 
by examining firms that adopt persistent policies of low leverage.  They define 
financial conservatism as a persistent financial policy of low leverage.  They use data 
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on non-financial and non-regulated firms from CRSP and Compustat over the 1974-
1998 period.  Their main finding is that financially conservative firms follow a 
pecking order style financial policy, where financially conservative firms are defined 
as firms who have a long-term debt ratio in the bottom 20% of the debt ratios of all 
firms for 5 consecutive years.  These low leverage, financially conservative firms are 
highly profitable, generate cash flow that is sufficient to fund discretionary 
expenditures and in addition is sufficient in to add to existing cash balances.  
Therefore, financially conservative firms stockpile financial slack or debt capacity. 
Fama and French (2002) empirical study considers 3000 US firms, with data 
over the 1965-1999 period.  While considering a larger number of firms than previous 
studies, this article also provides separate tests for dividend and non- dividend paying 
firms.  The results obtained by Fama and French (2002) support the pecking order 
model in the sense that firms always seem to prefer internal finance over external 
finance.  However, they also find that the POT fails in the assumption that firms will 
always issue debt before stock.  In the case of non-dividend paying firms with low 
levels of leverage equity issuance forms quite a major part of financing10.   
Frank and Goyal (2002), modify the empirical specification of the pecking 
order theory proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).  Their belief, similar to 
that of Chirinko and Singha (2000) is that the empirical specification of Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) is too simple and omits some important factors.  Frank and 
Goyal (2002) test the POT on a sample of large US firms over the 1971-1998 period.  
They disaggregate the financial deficit component used by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), and find empirical support for the POT in the sample of large firms in the 
earlier years of the sample.  However, in the later years of the sample, support for the 
POT declines. This is explained by the fact that the stock market in the US is lately 
dominated by small high-growth firms who prefer to issue equity and maintain their 
debt borrowing capacity.  This violates the POT. 
Byoun and Rhim (2003) investigate implications of the Tradeoff Theory and 
the POT.  They use US data over the 1981-2000 period.  Their findings suggest that 
both the Tradeoff and the POT are relevant.  They find that firms seem to have a 
target debt ratio and actual debt ratios seem to be an important determinant of the 
                                                 
10 This violation of the simple pecking order model can be explained by the fact that small high growth 
firms want to retain their ‘borrowing capacity’ by issuing equity.  They may have to fund future 
investment projects so they prefer to issue equity now and debt later. 
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amount of debt a firm is willing to take.  Moreover, they find that the POT is also able 
to explain variations in debt levels.  Interestingly, Byoun and Rhim (2003) find that 
when the financial deficit of firms is negative, the surplus is used to repay debt.  It 
also seems that the POT is more applicable to small firms and non-dividend paying 
firms.  This is due to the fact that small firms do not have easy access to external 
finance and usually face high transactions costs.  They are thus forced to abide by the 
pecking order, that is, issue debt before going for equity finance as the transaction 
costs for the latter are quite high. 
Halov and Heider (2004), empirically examine the role of risk in the capital 
structure decisions of firms. They obtain their data by merging the CRSP-Compustat 
database over the 1971-2001 period.  They argue that the traditional POT puts a lot of 
emphasis on the role of asymmetric information to explain financing decisions of 
firms.  However, an important factor that also affects financing of firms and that has 
been ignored in the literature is the role of risk.  Small and young firms face more 
severe asymmetric information problem than large and mature firms.  But the POT 
fails to explain why small firms that are supposed to face more severe asymmetric 
information problem generally issue equity.   
Halov and Heider (2004), argue that introducing risk into the pecking order 
model helps to explain why young, small firms face a more severe but also a different 
type of asymmetric information problem than large firms.  They argue that debt 
dominates equity financing as proposed by the POT, only when there is no 
asymmetric information about how risky a firm’s future investments are.  Small firms 
are likely to face more severe asymmetric information as regards the riskiness of their 
investments compared to larger firms.  Hence small firms might not find it so easy to 
obtain debt financing. According to Halov and Heider (2004), this might help to 
explain why the POT performs better for large firms and performs badly for small 
firms. 
Existing literature has found some evidence against the static Trade-off 
Theory.  For instance, Graham (2000) finds that profitable firms tend to have lower 
debt levels.  Hennessy and Whited (2004) argue that this anomaly can be resolved if 
instead of taking into account a static model, we consider a dynamic Trade-off model.  
The novelty in their study is that they solve and simulate a dynamic model of 
investment and financing under uncertainty where the firm faces ‘a realistic tax 
environment, has small equity flotation costs and financial distress costs’.  The firm 
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maximizes its value by making two interrelated decisions: how much to invest and 
also how to finance this investment.  The investment can be financed internally, with 
debt or with external equity. 
Hennessy and Whited (2004), assume in their model that debt is issued only in 
period 1 and that leverage is assumed to exhibit hysteresis.  This implies that firms 
having higher lagged debt would in fact issue more debt in the next period.  They 
present a simulation model by taking reasonable parameter values from a number of 
previous studies.  Data from Compustat is used in the simulation process.  They have 
an unbalanced panel of firms over the 1993-2001 period and they have between 592 
and 1,128 observations per year.  Their main finding is that generally firms behave in 
accordance with the static POT.  However, changes in the tax regime can cause firms 
to behave differently.   
Firms pay both corporate income tax and also pay taxes on interest income.  
When the corporate income tax level is above the tax rate on interest income, 
Hennessy and Whited (2004), find that firms prefer to finance solely with equity only 
3% of the time.  These firms issue equity as they expect they would be needing equity 
in the future.  But the rest of the firms abide by the POT, that is, they prefer to use 
more internal funds, followed by debt and finally equity.  When the corporate income 
tax rate is below the tax rate on interest income, then the firm always retains funds 
and only finances with equity.  When the corporate income tax rate is increased to 
40%, the tax benefit of debt is sufficiently great for firms to find it optimal to issue 
debt. 
The Trade-off Theory assumes that firms have a target capital structure; in 
other words, firms have a target debt ratio.  When events push firms away from their 
optimal capital structure, firms should respond by consciously rebalancing their 
leverage back to the optimal level.  However, sometimes there are significant 
adjustment costs involved and firms therefore take a long time to move back to their 
target capital structure. Leary and Roberts (2004), empirically examine whether firms 
engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly 
adjustment.   
They use data from Compustat over the 1984-2001 period and restrict 
attention to firms with at least 4 observations. They use an unbalanced panel 
containing 127,308 firms and find that debt issuance occur more frequently than 
equity issuances.  Leary and Roberts (2004) find evidence that firms consciously 
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adjust to a target capital structure and that firms engage in what they call ‘dynamic 
rebalancing.’  It should be noted that this rebalancing result obtained by Leary and 
Roberts (2004) is consistent with the previously discussed studies of Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) and Fama and French (2002).  Hence, this paper finds evidence in 
favour of the Trade-off  Theory. 
Mayer and Sussman (2004), use data from Compustat over the 1988-1998 period 
and try to study a sample of firms that have large investments during the period 
covered.  To do this, they use a filtering technique and obtain a dataset of 535 
investment events each of a fixed 5 year duration with an investment spike in the 
middle.  Their main aim in doing this is to identify situations when firms face cash 
shortages.  Specifically, they test whether firms prefer to use internal or external funds 
when they have to finance their investment.   They find that investment spikes are 
mainly funded with external funds, especially in small firms.  However, further 
investigations reveal that although in the short run firms seem to be following pecking 
order behaviour, in the long run, these same firms exhibit reversion to a target debt 
ratio that is consistent with the Trade-off Theory.  However it should be noted that 
this study only focuses on quoted companies whose shares are publicly traded. 
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Miguel and Pindado (2001) examine the capital structure of Spanish firms using an 
unbalanced panel comprising 133 non-financial companies with data over the 1990-
1997 period.  Their findings suggest that Spanish firms bear transaction costs when 
they decide to adjust their previous period debt level to the target level in the current 
period.  They also find a negative relationship between cash flow and debt that 
indicates that as Spanish firms experience an increase in cash flow they tend to reduce 
their debt levels.  It also suggests that these firms prefer to finance their investments 
with internally generated funds namely cash flow.  However, Miguel and Pindado 
(2001) also find that in the absence of asymmetric information firms suffer from the 
problem of over-investment.    In such cases, to reduce managers’ incentive to invest 
in projects with negative net present value, firms use debt to control the activities of 
managers.  In such cases, this yields a positive relationship between debt and cash 
flow.  However, overall, Miguel and Pindado (2001) find evidence in favour of the 
pecking order and free cash flow theories. 
 50 
Benito (2003) examines the capital structure decisions of firms in Spain and 
the United Kingdom using firm level data for each country. Spanish data consists of 6, 
417 companies over the 1985-2000 period.  UK data consists of 1,784 quoted non-
financial companies over the 1973-2000 period. Benito (2003) tests the Trade-off and 
POT for each country and finds that the POT is better able to explain capital structure 
in both bank-based11 Spain and market-based12 United Kingdom.  His results suggest 
that there exists a positive relationship between debt and investment and a negative 
relationship between debt and cash flow which are mainly consistent with the POT.  
He estimates both GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and random effect probit models.   
The results remain in favour of the POT.  His results imply that in both market-based 
systems (such as the UK) and bank-based systems (such as Spain), firms follow a 
pecking order. 
De Haan and Hinlopen (2003) investigate the incremental financing decision 
of a sample of 150 listed Dutch companies for the period 1984-1997.  Like previous 
studies, they distinguish between internal and external finance.  The novelty of their 
approach is that external finance is in turn broken down into bank borrowing, bond 
issues and share issues.    They estimate a multinomial logit model and an ordered 
probit model.  Using this methodology, they find that Dutch companies prefer internal 
finance to bank loans, bank loans over share issues and share issues over bond issues.  
This hierarchy is quite close to the POT except that share issues are preferred to bond 
issues.  However, this is explained by the fact that Netherlands is a bank-based 
economy and the bond market is relatively under-developed which makes the cost of 
bond issues quite high.  Hence share issues are preferred to bond issues, which are 
themselves used as a last resort. 
Panno (2003) investigates capital structure choice by analysing security issues 
made by companies in the United Kingdom and Italy between 1992 and 1996.  In 
particular, he examines how companies choose between financial instruments, which 
in this case consist of debt issues or security issues.  The reason for studying both 
United Kingdom and Italy is that since these are two very different financial systems, 
the results obtained have wide applicability.   UK is a market-based system while Italy 
is a bank-based system.  Panno (2003) estimates the coefficients of his model using 
                                                 
11 In a bank-based system, banks play a positive role in mobilising resources, identifying good projects, 
monitoring managers and managing risks. 
12 In a market-based system, markets play a positive role in encouraging competition and creating 
greater incentives for firms to undertake profitable projects. 
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logit analysis and finds that the results obtained favour the POT.  However, the 
evidence obtained by him also points to the fact that profitable companies both in the 
UK and Italy have high leverage that is not inconsistent with the Trade-off Theory. 
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Ang and Jung (1993), test the POT on a sample of Korean firms.  Korean firms are 
believed to have a unique conglomerate organizational form known as ‘chaebol13.’  
Ang and Jung (1993) argue that the implicit assumption behind Myers’ POT is the 
existence of asymmetric information.  However, it is very difficult to ‘measure’ the 
degree of information asymmetry.  To be able to investigate the extent to which 
Korean firms suffer from asymmetric information, Ang and Jung (1993) make use of 
survey data on 86 firms.   
The results obtained suggest that the information problem appears to be high 
for about 1 out of 4 or 5 firms.  Hence the information problem does not appear to be 
very significant.  In fact 80% of firms feel that their lenders do not underestimate their 
future prospects, that is, there is no information problem.  28% of firms feel that if an 
information problem exists this cannot be solved by disclosing more information.  
This would suggest that when information problems do exist it is very difficult to 
solve these problems14.   
Ang and Jung (1993), separate the firms into 2 different classes: a low 
information asymmetry group and a high information asymmetry group.  They find 
that firms in the low asymmetric information group prefer the following financing 
hierarchy:  they prefer using retained earnings first, then bank loans and finally new 
stock.  The high information asymmetry group has the following preferences: 
intermediate term bank loan, short-term bank loan, new stock and then retained 
earnings. 
The results suggest that the high information asymmetry group which 
according to Myers (1984), should be following the hierarchy as prescribed by the 
POT in fact behave completely opposite to what is expected.  Surprisingly, it is the 
low information asymmetry group that behaves according to the POT.  However, it 
                                                 
13 Korean chaebols are world class multibillion dollar conglomerates in which a holding company 
controls several, individually stock exchange-listed affiliates or subsidiaries (Ang and Jung, 1993 pp32-
33) 
14 This would further suggest that disclosing information is not really the problem.  The problem in fact 
is the interpretation of that information by the different parties involved. 
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should be noted that the study by Ang and Jung (1993) relies heavily on survey data 
which concerns only 86 Korean firms and the widespread applicability of their results 
is doubtful.   
Further, the survey deals with firms preferences of sources of financing, it 
does not actually ask the firms where they get their funding from. Asking a manager 
from where the firm prefers to get financing from is not the same as asking him/her 
from where the firm is actually financing its activities.  Therefore, even though Ang 
and Jung (1993) make a good point of showing that there are factors other than 
information asymmetry that influence capital structure decisions of firms and finds 
some evidence against the POT, the results should be interpreted cautiously. 
Chen (2003) examines the determinants of capital structure of 88 Chinese 
listed companies over the 1995-2000 period.  He finds that neither the Trade-off nor 
the POT is able to explain capital structure decisions of firms in China. He explains 
this by putting forward the reason that China is in a transitional state.  In fact, the 
Chinese government has tried to reform the large and medium-sized owned 
enterprises previously under state-control.  This process is called ‘corporatisation.’  
He further argues that theories such as the Pecking Order and Trade-off may fit in 
western settings but they do not reflect the transitional setting in which Chinese firms 
operate.   
Financial intermediaries in China operate with major financial constraints and 
there are major institutional differences that prevent them from performing their role 
fully.  All these factors affect the leverage decisions of firms that cannot be explained 
by the Trade-off model or the POT.  It should also be taken into account that the 
Trade off and the Pecking Order Theory were derived from atomistic shareholders in 
western markets.  Hence these theories might indeed not apply in China where the 
institutional and economic environment is very different than that prevailing in the 
west. 
	
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Large firms differ significantly from small and medium-sized firms.  In this section of 
Chapter 2, we mainly concentrate on firms that have no access to external equity but 
can have access to debt15.  These firms are generally small and medium-sized firms.  
More specifically, the focus will be on firms that cannot issue shares on stock markets 
                                                 
15 These firms can only have access to private debt and equity markets. 
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and we will study how this affects their financing decisions. In section 2.5 we discuss 
the various ways of defining small and medium-sized firms (SMEs).  Section 2.6 
investigates the major sources of financing of SMEs while section 2.7 reviews the 
literature on the financing of these firms.  Section 2.8 provides a survey of the 
relatively few studies that have been carried out on capital structure decisions of small 
and medium-sized firms that do not have access to stock markets. 
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	
Financial theory has largely concentrated on quoted firms, that is, firms that have 
access to stock markets. The main reason for this is that information on listed firms is 
readily available as reporting accounting and financial information, for these firms, is 
a statutory requirement.  Financial research has ultimately been concentrated only on 
firms quoted on the stock market.  As argued by Ang (1991), financial theory has 
largely ignored the small business sector.  Hulbert (2001) finds that where research 
has been conducted on ‘small firms,’ these ‘small firms’ have mainly been a group of 
listed firms having smallest market capitalization or smallest sales.  It should be noted 
that even the smallest of listed firms are quite large when compared to unquoted 
firms.  
Furthermore, as noted by Michaelas et al, (1999) most empirical studies on 
capital structure use data on firms that would be classified as large by any definition 
of business size.  According to Hulbert (2001), small firms differ from large firms in a 
number of ways.  Small firms are normally owned by the principal owner and they 
usually have limited access to capital markets. Also, small firms may suffer more 
from information problems than their larger counterparts. 
The UK has a large and sophisticated financial sector with highly developed 
financial institutions, markets and infrastructure.  Some UK firms are quoted on the 
stock market and can issue equity.   On the other hand, small and medium-sized firms 
(SMEs) who do not have access to external capital markets also play a very 
significant role in the UK economy.  According to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) in the UK, there are around 3.8 million registered SMEs out of which 
about 1.2 million SMEs employ one or more employees.  The rest are one-person 
businesses. 
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Undoubtedly, small firms play a key role in the UK economy.  According to 
the Small Business Service (SBS) which forms part of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), in the United Kingdom, in the year 2002, small businesses including 
those without employees, accounted for over 99% of the UK’s 3.8 million businesses.  
Small businesses accounted for 56% of employment, that is, around 12.6 million 
people.  The total UK turnover of these firms is around £1,100 billion which 
represents 52% of total UK turnover (Small Business Survey, 2003b). 
 In this study, we try to understand the capital structure decisions of these 
firms by investigating how firms decide to finance their activities. A major part of this 
study will concentrate on finding whether SMEs in the UK are financially 
constrained.  This allows us to better understand the financing behaviour and identify 
some problems that SMEs may face in getting access to finance. 
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One of the first issues we need to investigate is how we define SMEs and how 
different they are from large firms.  There is no one definition of an SME in the 
United Kingdom.  The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) describes a small firm 
as one that has less than 50 employees; a medium-sized firm as one that has more than 
50 but less than 250 employees and a large firm as one that has more than 250 
employees.   
The European Commission describes a small firm as having a turnover of less 
than € 7 mn, a balance sheet of less than € 5mn and less than 50 employees.  The 
medium-sized firm is described as having a turnover of more than € 7 mn but less 
than € 40 mn , a balance sheet of more than € 5mn but less than € 27mn and more 
than 50 but less than 250 employees.   
The Companies Act 1985 reviewed in the year 2004, describes a small 
company as having a maximum turnover of £ 5.6 mn and a balance sheet of not more 
£2.8 mn or a maximum number of 50 employees.  A medium-sized firm is described 
as having a turnover of more than £ 5.6 mn but less than £ 22.8 mn, a balance sheet of 
more than £2.8 mn but less than £11.4 mn and having between 50 and 250 employees.  
Any firm exceeding these values is classified as ‘large’.  The British Bankers 
Association describes small businesses as those that have a turnover of up to £1mn.   
As it can be seen, there is no one definition of what a small, medium or large 
firm is.  One factor that seems common in most of these definitions is the number of 
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employees.  However, in our study we cannot rely on the number of employees to 
differentiate among the various classes of firms. This is due to the fact that in our 
dataset, a large number of firms have missing values of employment.   Small and 
medium-sized firms are not required by law to disclose their accounts to the public.  
Due to this, some firms have missing values for employment and we have 
reservations about using employment as our classification criteria to distinguish 
between small and medium-sized firms.  However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there 
are other indicators that can be used as a measurement of size. 
In part of this study the focus is also on firms that have no access to 
external/public equity markets.  Studies that have tried to investigate SMEs have in 
some cases considered firms that were in fact able to issue external equity or gain 
access to stock markets.  It is important to consider among the class of unquoted firms 
how small and medium-sized enterprises are different from their large counterpart 
even if all of them do not have access to stock markets. 
Next, we consider how different SMEs are from large firms.   The Bolton 
report (1971) and the Wilson report (1979) have been the first studies that have 
investigated small firms in the UK.   
The Wilson report (1979) finds that: 
· SMEs are relatively risky. 
· They expect to face higher interest payments and more stringent conditions 
than large firms. 
· Banks are more cautious towards smaller and newer SMEs. 
· SMEs face a shortage of start-up capital. 
Due to the fact that these studies are dated more than 30 years from now, their 
findings may not necessarily hold true in the present.  
Hughes (1997) compares the financial structure and profitability of large and 
small companies over the 1987-1989 period both in the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sector.  He defines ‘large’ companies as those ranked in the top 2,000 
in terms of capital employed in the UK non- financial corporate sector which consists 
primarily of quoted companies.   From the remainder of the corporate sector, Hughes 
(1997), picks one out of every 300 firms and defines this sub-sample as ‘small.’ He 
finds that small companies have a low ratio of fixed to total assets, a high proportion 
of debt, more current liabilities and rely more on trade and credit debt.  He also finds 
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that manufacturing companies seem to be more geared than non-manufacturing 
companies. 
Berger and Udell (1998), argue that small businesses suffer from what they 
term as ‘informational opacity.’  Small firms are not required by law to disclose 
information about their financial situation or their growth prospects; hence they are 
regarded as being informationally opaque.  Due to this, the “lemons” problem is more 
acute for small firms and thus adverse selection and moral hazard are more 
pronounced in their case.  We next consider the major sources of funding for SMEs.   
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TABLE 2.2 : SOURCES OF FINANCE 
)*#+,-)7>*1$6
Principal owner 
Angel Finance 
Venture capital 
Other equity 
 
)*#+,-)7,:$
Financial Institutions
· Commercial Banks 
· Finance Companies 
· Other Financial Institutions 
Non Financial Business and Government 
· Trade Credit 
· Other Business 
· Government 
Individuals 
· Principal Owner 
· Credit Card 
· Other Individuals 
Source: Berger and Udell (1998) p168. 
Asymmetric information or more precisely informational opacity typically influence 
the sources of funding of firms.  Among the first studies that try to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the financing of small businesses, Berger and Udell (1998), 
find that small businesses depend on both (internal) equity and debt.  They identify 13 
sources of finance 4 of which they categorise as belonging to the equity class and the 
rest are sub-divided in 3 categories of debt.  This is illustrated in Table 2.2 above.  As 
shown in the table above, the equity group consists of finance provided by the 
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principal owner, angel finance, venture capital and other equity consisting of capital 
provided by members of the start-up team, family and friends.   
The market of angel capital consists of individuals providing risk capital 
directly to small, private and often start-up firms (Prowse,1998).  According to Berger 
and Udell (1998) angels are high net worth individuals who provide direct funding to 
early stage new businesses.  Prowse (1998) further argues that angels do not form part 
of the principal entrepreneur or in his immediate family.  Angels are often in the 
second round of financing of a start-up, that is, after the principal owner has 
exhausted her/his financing capacity and that of his family and friends.  However, 
very little is known about the market’s size, scope and the type of firms that raise 
angel finance and the types of individuals who provide it, especially as angel finance 
is provided in a very informal environment. 
Potential entrepreneurs have new ideas but lack resources as well as 
commercial experience (Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004).  Start-ups require 
considerable funds to invest in capital and to undertake research and development.  
Since entrepreneurs are not wealthy enough, they thus turn to individuals who have 
the money and the experience.  These individuals are the venture capitalists.  They 
can be regarded as investors who invest in entrepreneurs who need financing to fund a 
promising project or company (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001).  Venture capitalists do 
not normally receive the benefits of control.  Their function is limited to evaluating, 
screening, monitoring and providing advice and management expertise.  Berger and 
Udell (1998), regard venture capital as capital provided in a more formal market than 
angel finance. 
Berger and Udell (1998) regard funding provided by financial institutions as 
being the main category of debt.  These financial institutions consist primarily of 
commercial banks, followed by finance companies and other financial institutions.  
Following this, the second category of debt is debt provided by non-financial and 
government sources.  This consists primarily of trade credit16.  The third category of 
debt is debt provided by individuals.   
Using US data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, 
Berger and Udell (1998) break down the size and age of firms and find that the largest 
source of finance for the firms are from the principal owner followed by commercial 
                                                 
16 Trade credit can be defined as credit extended by a firm’s suppliers when the supplier sells the firm 
goods or services on credit. 
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banks and trade credit.  In fact these three sources account for over 70% of total 
funding of the firms studied.  The findings of Berger and Udell (1998) seem to agree 
with the findings of Pettit and Singer (1985).  They find that smaller firms tend to use 
more debt financing and they rely more on internal funds and loans from stockholders 
to finance operations and they do not use much external equity relative to large firms. 
An important source of financing for SMEs overlooked by Berger and Udell 
(1998) is factoring.  Under factoring, receivables are purchased by the factor rather 
than used as collateral in a loan.  In simpler words, the firm is able to sell its 
receivables to a factor.  The effect of this is that the firms can obtain part of financial 
resources immediately that were previously tied up in receivables.  Factoring involves 
the shift of title and ownership from the seller to the factor.  
A factoring agreement covers a broad range of issues associated with the 
relationship between the factor and the client.  Bakker, Klapper and Udell (2004) 
provide a comprehensive study of the impact of factoring in Eastern Europe17.  
Factoring can be described as a form of asset-based finance where the credit extended 
is based on the value of the payments owed by the borrower’s customers (Bakker, 
Klapper and Udell, 2004).  According to them, factoring is useful in developing 
countries especially with weak lending laws.  Since factoring is dependent on the 
quality of the borrower’s accounts, Bakker et al (2004) consider that factoring may be 
especially attractive to high-risk SMEs. 
Hughes (1997) identifies the following sources of financing for SMEs in the 
UK: banks, venture capital, hire purchase/leasing, factoring, customers/suppliers, 
partners/working shareholders, other private individuals and finance obtained from 
other sources.  He analyses the balance sheet structure, gearing and profitability of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies (excluding financial companies) in 
the UK over the 1987-1989 period. He further sub-divides the companies into ‘small’ 
and ‘large’.  He finds that small firms normally have low profitability and are thus 
heavily reliant on retentions to fund investments.  However, the most important 
source of financing for firms are banks.  The other important sources of financing of 
firms are hire purchase/leasing and funds provided by partners/working shareholders. 
                                                 
17 These issues include the effective date of agreement, initial terms, renewal options, exclusivity of the 
factoring relationship, invoices required to be factored, minimum factored volume requirement, 
maximum cash advances available to client, purchase price of invoices, percentage of purchase price to 
which the client is entitled to be paid in advance, minimum required reserve percentage or amount and 
termination provisions (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
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He also finds that factoring and trade credit are important sources of financing of 
SMEs in the UK. 
 
However, it is sometimes difficult to dissect the sources of funding of firms. 
As proposed by Berger and Udell (1998) small businesses may be thought of as 
having a financial growth cycle in which financial needs and options change as the 
business grows, becomes more experienced and more informationally transparent.  At 
the start-up stage firms are informationally opaque and thus cannot gain access to 
external capital.  They rely entirely on insider finance, trade credit and angel finance.  
As they grow and become less informationally opaque they can now gain access to 
external finance.  Therefore, according to Berger and Udell (1998) rather than looking 
at the sources of funding separately, we should focus on a sequencing of funding over 
the growth cycle of the firms.  
Baldwin, Gellaty and Gaudreault (2002), study the characteristics of new 
small Canadian firms.  They base their study on an elite group of small firms that have 
survived 10 years of operation.  They analyze a sample of 3,000 small Canadian firms 
born between 1983 and 1986 that were still in operation in 1996. They find that only 
20% of all small firms that start-up actually cross this threshold.  Baldwin, Gellaty 
and Gaudreault (2002), identify 5 financing instruments namely retained earnings, 
share capital, short-term debt, long-term debt and other.  They also identify 4 sources 
from which finance can be obtained that include internal sources, financial 
institutions, innovative sources and other.   
As illustrated in Table 2.3 below, Baldwin et al (2002), distinguish between 
internal and external sources of finance.  Internal sources consist of financing 
obtained from retained earnings, owner managers and employees.   External financing 
sources are broken down into 3 categories namely financing obtained from financial 
institutions, innovative sources and others.   
Small firms normally face capital market restrictions and thus they rely more 
extensively on internal finance.  Baldwin, Gellaty and Gaudreault (2002), find that 
over 50% of firms in their sample rely solely on internal sources of which retained 
earnings represent 39% while capital from owners and managers represent 12%.  The 
majority of the remaining financing is supplied by banks and trust companies. 
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FINANCING INSTRUMENTS FINANCING SOURCES 
 
Retained Earnings 
 
Share Capital 
 
Short-term Debt 
 
· Short-term secured and unsecured 
debt 
 
Long-term Debt 
· Long-term secured and unsecured 
debt 
Other 
· Trade Credit 
· Convertible Debentures 
· Contract Financing 
· Investment Tax Credits 
· Grants 
· Other 
Internal Sources 
· Retained Earnings 
· Owner managers 
· Employees 
 
Financial Institutions 
· Banks and Trust companies 
 
Innovative Sources 
· Related Firms 
· Joint Ventures, Strategic alliances 
· Venture Capitalists, Merchant 
banks, capital groups 
· Silent Partners 
· Public Markets 
 
Other 
· Suppliers 
· Customers 
· Pension firms and Insurance 
Companies 
· Government 
· Other 
Source : Baldwin, Gellaty and Gaudreault (2002) p3. 
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Most of the research undertaken regarding capital structure has been conducted on 
large firms, which usually have access to capital markets and therefore can issue 
equity.  In this section, we will review some of the studies that have tried to study the 
capital structure/financing decisions of SMEs both in the developed and developing 
countries. 
Romano et al (2001), study the capital structure decisions of small businesses 
and find that a large number of factors influence SME’s owner-managers financing 
decisions.  But one important factor is firms’ attitudes towards the utility of debt as a 
form of funding.  According to Roman et al (2001), cultural, entrepreneurial, personal 
preferences and attitudes play a major role in capital structure decisions of SMEs.  
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Other factors such as views regarding control, the age and the size of the firm also 
play a role. 
According to Holmes and Kent (1991), SMEs are characterised by 2 factors: 
they cannot issue equity and are concerned about ownership and control.  Small firms 
usually do not have the option of issuing additional equity to the public.  Even if they 
were able to issue private equity, managers of SMEs would restrain from doing so as 
issuing equity would lead to a dilution in ownership and control.  Therefore, managers 
of SMEs will usually prefer to go for debt financing, mainly comprising of bank 
financing.  On the other hand, managers of larger firms usually consider a broader 
range of funding options. 
Unlike large firms, SMEs are restricted in their funding options. Therefore, a 
new hierarchy of sources of finance for SMEs can be defined. In this new hierarchy of 
sources of finance for SMEs, there are three sources of finance, internal finance, debt 
finance and new capital contributions. Large firms that have access to capital markets 
are able to issue equity; however, SMEs do not normally have access to this form of 
finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to very recent studies, the POT may be pertinent to both large and 
small and medium-sized enterprises.  The theory may be able to explain the observed 
differences between the SMEs and large enterprises’ capital structures.  Hence, in the 
hierarchy of sources of finance for SMEs we replace the ‘equity issue’ term with ‘new 
Internal 
funds 
New debt 
financing 
New capital 
contributions 
Total 
investment 
financing 
Cost of funds 
Cost of new        
capital 
contributions 
  Cost of new 
 debt financing 
Cost of     
internal  
finance 
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D1 
D2 
D3 
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capital contributions’.  ‘New capital contributions’ refer to additional capital 
contributions from existing owners of the firm.   Ang (1991), proposes a pecking 
order of financing preferences for SMEs that is illustrated in Figure 2.3 above.   
D1, D2 and D3 represent investment demand schedules.  When investment 
demand is low at D1, investment is financed with internal funds, which is relatively 
cheaper.  If investment demand is at D2, after exhausting internal funds, external 
funds are used namely in the form of debt finance.  Finally, if investment demand is 
very high at D3, new capital contributions are used after internal and debt financing 
capacity have been exhausted. 
Internal finance is the cheaper source of finance as it is not plagued by 
problems of asymmetric information and this is the first preferred source of finance 
for SMEs.  Most importantly, using internal finance does not lead to a dilution in 
ownership.  As suggested by Holmes and Kent (1991), managers of SMEs are usually 
very concerned with the ownership and control of firms and they do not like to take 
actions that would lead to a dilution in ownership and control.  Following internal 
finance, the second preferred source of finance is debt financing as debt does not lead 
to a change in ownership, structure or control.  The last alternative is new capital 
contributions that rank behind debt finance.  The cost of new capital contributions is 
higher taking into account that it creates dilution in ownership and control in firms.   
This hierarchy can also be explained in terms of an asymmetric information 
framework.  SMEs are usually informationally opaque.  The cost of external finance is 
usually higher than the cost of internal finance.  Debt is cheaper than new capital 
contributions as financial intermediaries are able to screen and monitor the firms they 
lend funds to.  This relationship benefit associated with financial intermediaries is 
clearly shown in the study of Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991).   They show 
that Japanese firms that belong to a ‘kereitsu’ are able to benefit from their 
relationship with banks.  Firms with close ties with banks are able to obtain funds 
even when they are financially distressed.  Finally, the cost of new capital 
contributions is highest as the contributors are in the dark regarding the financial and 
growth prospects of the firm and thus demand a higher return on their investment.   
Berger and Udell (1998), on the other hand, propose that small business finance 
can be thought of as having a financial growth cycle, in which financial needs and 
options change as the business grows.  For small businesses, informational opacity is 
a major issue and thus smaller, younger and more informationally opaque firms 
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initially rely on sources of funds such as insider finance, trade credit, and/or angel 
finance18.  According to them firms evolve through a ‘financial growth cycle.’ 
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Research regarding the financing of SMEs is relatively new.  As mentioned before, 
research has mainly focussed on large public corporations as data is relatively easy to 
obtain for these firms while data for unquoted firms is very difficult to obtain.  The 
little research that has been done on SMEs has mainly relied on data obtained from 
surveys.  Below, we provide a review of some of the studies that have attempted to 
study the financing behaviour of SMEs. 
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Berger and Udell (1998) find that in the United States, about 40% of small business 
loan dollars are guaranteed and/or secured by personal assets.  It is often difficult to 
distinguish between personal finances and business finance of small business owners.  
The distinction between insider finance (provided by members of the start-up team, 
family and friends) and external finance is not clear-cut.  “Insiders often give personal 
guarantees or pledge personal collateral against external debt provided by financial 
institutions,” (Berger and Udell, 1998 p660).  Thus, it is difficult to distinguish in a 
clear-cut way between internal and external finance. It may therefore, not be possible 
to stratify the sources of finance of small businesses as proposed by the POT . 
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Ozer and Yamak (2000), examine the financial source preferences of small businesses 
in Turkey.  They conduct a study on 101 small hotels using a structured questionnaire.  
They focus on three main instances when a firm is in need of funds: how to finance 
the start-up, ongoing operations and future investment.  They find that unlike SMEs in 
developed economies such as the UK and the US, SMEs in developing countries such 
as Turkey do rely a lot on bank financing.  However, in the specific case of start-up, 
Ozer et al (2000) find that the main source of funding appears to be personal funds 
while ongoing operations are financed with retained earnings and future investment is 
funded by ploughing back profits.  In all three cases, it can be concluded that the 
                                                 
18 Angel finance is obtained from “angels;” individuals who provide direct funding to new businesses. 
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sample of firms prefer some form of internal finance, which give some support to the 
POT. 
Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2004), study a sample of 6,482 Spanish 
SMEs during the 5 year period covering 1994-1998.  They try to test both the Trade-
off and the POT and try at the same time to identify the main factors that influence 
SMEs financial policy. To test the Trade-off theory they use both the two stage least 
squares (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982) and GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
methodology.    Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2004) find that the Spanish SMEs 
tend to have a target or an optimum leverage ratio and they also tend to have a high 
adjustment parameter implying that they adjust quite fast to their target debt ratios.  
Additionally, the firms tend to increase debt in their capital structure when they are 
faced with increased tax rates.  
However, Sogorb-Mira and Lopez-Gracia (2004) find no evidence that firms 
increase their debt financing when they need funds. They also find that cash flow is 
negatively related to firm leverage implying that the more cash a firm has the less it is 
likely to turn towards debt financing.  Age seems to have an important influence on 
the financing decisions of Spanish SMEs.  Older SMEs are likely to have built up 
significant internal resources and do not depend on debt unlike younger SMEs. 
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Zoppa and McMahon (2004), try to examine to what extent the POT is able to explain 
the financial structure of Australian SMEs.  They use data pertaining to the 
manufacturing sector for three financial years, from 1995 to 1998.  They model the 
behaviour of financial structure on a set of control variables that include 
characteristics of SMEs.   These characteristics include factors such as profitability, 
enterprise growth, enterprise size, enterprise age and other enterprise characteristics.  
Using a logit analysis, they find that their results are consistent with the POT of 
business financing. 
Cassar and Holmes (2003) study the capital structure and financing behaviour 
of SMEs in Australia.  In their study, they use data from the Business Longitudinal 
Survey developed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  The surveys carried out in 
1994-1995 provide information on the growth and performance of Australian 
businesses.  Cassar and Holmes (2003) focus their study on a sample of 1,555 firms.  
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In particular, they try to investigate the variables that influence capital structure as 
proposed by the POT and the Trade-off Theory.  
They use five measures of capital structure namely leverage (LEV), long-term 
leverage (LONG), short-term leverage (SHOR), an outside financing measure (OUI) 
and a bank financing (BANK) measure.  LEV is total debt divided by total assets; 
LONG represents long-term leverage which by definition is debt that has longer 
maturity and duration and involves greater contractual obligations and screening 
process.  SHOR is defined as the difference between leverage and long-term leverage 
and captures short term leverage.  OUI is an outside financing measure that helps 
examine issues of agency cost and asymmetric information; BANK is a bank 
financing measure which represents the use and level of bank financing by firms. 
 
The model used is specified as: 
 
Y =   β0 +  β1 SIZE + β0 NONA + β0 ROA+ β0 RISK+ β0 GROW              (2. 22) 
 
Where SIZE is the log of total sales, NONA is non-current assets divided by total sales 
(which acts as a measure of asset structure), ROA is the return on assets before interest 
(which is a measure of profitability), RISK is the absolute coefficient of variation in 
profitability, GROW is the growth in sales.  The dependent variable Y represents the 
capital structure measure which can be either LEV, LONG, SHOR, OUI or BANK. 
The results obtained by Cassar and Holmes (2003) suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between capital structure and size, implying that the larger a firm 
is the more levered it is.   The relationship between capital structure and NONA 
seems to vary.  There is a positive and significant relationship between the measures 
of capital structure and the GROW variable. However, there is a negative relationship 
between the measures of capital structure and the ROA variable.  No support is found 
for risk in influencing either the level of debt or the financing of SMEs.  In some 
cases the relationship between risk and debt is even positive.  The results obtained 
seem to indicate that asset structure, profitability and growth are important factors that 
influence the capital structure and financing behaviour of SMEs in Australia.  Also, 
the study seems to indicate that capital structure theories like the POT and the Trade-
off Theory are applicable to SMEs. 
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Pissarides, Singer and Svejnar (2003) analyse the objectives and constraints of 
SMEs using data from a survey of 437 CEOs in Russia and Bulgaria.  This is 
interesting especially as these formerly centrally planned economies were 
characterized by a total lack of privately owned firms and the presence of SMEs is a 
relatively new phenomenon.  SMEs in these countries are normally believed to face 
economic, legal and financial obstacles.  Using data from their survey and the 
multinomial logit methodology, Pissarides et al (2003) investigate the constraints that 
entrepreneurs in Russia and Bulgaria face and try to rank these constraints.  They find 
that the lack and high cost of external financing is regarded as being the most 
important constraint while bureaucracy (extralegal payments, problems with obtaining 
licenses and dealing with government institutions) is not regarded as being important.  
In particular, the level of interest payments is regarded as being the most important.  
 A large number of factors have been identified in the literature that influence 
capital structure decisions of firms.  However, till now no consensus has been 
reached.  In this chapter we have concentrated on how among all the theories 
proposed, the POT and the TOT are able to explain financing decisions of firms.  The 
theoretical and empirical literature regarding large firms and SMEs has been 
considered separately.  The theoretical literature took off in the early 1980’s but quite 
surprisingly, the empirical literature has only taken-off quite recently.  Studies on the 
financing decisions of firms have covered a wide range of countries and both small 
and large firms.  These studies have provided mixed results.  Some studies favour the 
POT while others do not.  Our objective is to add a new dimension to the literature 
and examine how financial constraints affect the financing decisions of firms. 
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PART 1 
LISTED FIRMS 
5	
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Studies on capital structure have mainly investigated factors that influence the debt-
equity mix of firms (Myers, 2001).  Recent studies on capital structure have focussed 
on factors that affect leverage of firms as it has been widely recognised that after 
internal finance, debt is the most preferred source of finance, while equity is the last 
chosen mode of financing.  The financial constraint literature has mainly investigated 
how financial constraints affect the cash flow sensitivity of investment.  The main 
innovation in this chapter is that we merge these two strands of the literature and we 
study how financial constraints affect the relationship between leverage and cash 
flow. 
The aim of this study is twofold.  First, we investigate what factors influence 
the capital structure decisions of listed firms in the UK, namely focussing on the 
relationship between leverage and internal finance.  Second, we investigate how 
financing constraints affect the capital structure decisions of firms.  In other words, 
we examine how firms change their leverage when faced with changes in their 
internal financing depending on their financial status. 
Myers (2001) reports that in 1999, most of the aggregate investment 
undertaken by firms in the US was financed from internal cash flow and that external 
financing in most years covered less than 20% of investment.  Additionally, the major 
part of this external financing came from debt finance rather than equity finance. Our 
study innovates on prior literature. The main innovation in this paper is that we study 
the relationship between debt and cash flow, the two main sources of finance for most 
firms by taking into account financial constraints that firms might face.   
In this chapter we examine the leverage decisions of firms in the UK, while 
the majority of studies in this field have mainly examined firms in the US, due to easy 
data availability.  We study both quoted and unquoted firms in the UK and determine 
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how they decide between internal financing (using cash flow) and leverage, as these 
are the two major sources of financing of firms in the UK.  In addition to this, we use 
an adapted version of the model proposed by Almeida and Campello (2005) and 
examine how financial constraints affect the relationship between cash flow 
innovations and leverage.  In Part I of this chapter, we study the leverage decisions of 
listed firms in the UK.  In Part II, we study the leverage decisions of unlisted firms in 
the UK.  This gives an overall picture of how different types of firms make their 
financing decisions. 
To study how financial constraints affect the leverage decisions of listed firms 
in the UK, we use a number of criteria conventionally used in the literature to 
distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms.  These criteria 
include the distribution of real assets, coverage ratios and the level of indebtedness of 
firms.  We find that overall the main factors that affect the leverage of listed firms in 
the UK are internal funds, size, investment and growth opportunities.  We also find 
that financial constraints affect the relationship between debt and internal funds (cash 
flow).  Similar to the results obtained by Almeida and Campello (2005), we find that 
when real uses of funds are correlated with variations in internal funds, the sensitivity 
of debt to variations in internal funds is less negative for constrained firms than 
financially unconstrained firms.   
The rest of Part I is organised as follows: in section 3.1 we discuss the 
background of our research and explain how it is related to different strands of 
literature. Following this in section 3.2, we develop a simple theoretical model that 
illustrates why there exists a financial hierarchy in the sources of finance.  In sections 
3.3 and 3.4 respectively, we discuss the empirical background and features of our 
dataset.  In section 3.5 we discuss the classification schemes that we use to distinguish 
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In section 3.6 we explain 
our regression specification and estimation methodology.  Section 3.7 presents our 
descriptive statistics. Section 3.8 discusses our regression results.  Finally, section 3.9 
concludes. 
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Studies on the capital structure decisions of firms have mainly focussed on the US.  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal 
(2002), study the capital structure decisions of firms based in the US.  Very few 
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studies have examined the capital structure decisions of firms in the UK.  Some 
exceptions are Bennet and Donelly (1993), Marsh (1982), Benito (2003) and Panno 
(2003).  Recent studies on capital structure decisions of firms have concentrated 
primarily on contrasting the two main theories of capital structure namely the Trade-
off Theory (henceforth TOT) and the Pecking Order Theory (henceforth POT).   
Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that when capital markets are perfect and 
frictionless, firms are indifferent between alternative sources of financing.  However, 
even today, capital markets are characterised by imperfect information.  Faced with 
imperfect markets and costly external finance, firms spend a lot of time and resources 
in deciding what sources of finance to use.  Related to this literature is the literature 
on financial conservatism.  In their survey of financial managers, Graham and Harvey 
(2001) found that financial flexibility is a major objective when deciding what sources 
of finance to use.  One way for firms to be financially flexible is to use internally 
generated funds when they are able to do so and avoid the use of external finance. 
Capital structure theories have tried to explain how firms undertake financing 
decisions. Recent studies on capital structure decisions of firms have concentrated 
primarily on contrasting the 2 main theories of capital structure namely the TOT and 
the POT. The POT, first proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
prescribes a strict ordering or hierarchy of finance: firms use internal finance first, 
then debt and only when such options are exhausted, equity finance is used.  
However, according to the TOT, an optimal capital structure is achieved by “trading-
off” the costs and benefits of debt (Berens and Cuny 1995, Fama and French 2002, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999).  According to the TOT, taking debt ensures that 
managers do not use free cash flow for their own perquisites.  The TOT also assumes 
the existence of a target debt level contrary to the POT.  
The two papers closely related to this study are Benito (2003) and Almeida 
and Campello (2005).  Benito (2003) examines the capital structure decisions of 
quoted firms in the UK using firm level data over the 1973-2000 period. He tests the 
TOT and POT and finds that the POT is better able to explain capital structure in 
market-based19 United Kingdom.  His results suggest that there exists a positive 
relationship between debt and investment and a negative relationship between debt 
and cash flow which are mainly consistent with the POT.  He estimates both GMM 
                                                 
)*
 In a market-based system, markets play a positive role in encouraging competition and creating 
greater incentives for firms to undertake profitable projects. 
 70 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and random effect probit models and finds that firms in the 
UK follow a pecking order in their financing patterns. 
The study of capital structure attempts to explain the mix of securities and 
financing sources used by corporations to finance real investment (Myers, 2001).   
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that under the perfect capital markets assumption, 
financing has no material effects on the value of the firm or on the cost or availability 
of capital.  However, once we drop the perfect capital markets assumption, financing 
clearly matters.  Taxes, differences in information, agency costs matter and therefore 
the source of financing matters as well. 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the cost of capital is the central 
determinant of the level of investment.  The central proposition of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem is that how a firm finances its investment does not have an effect on 
the cost of capital.  Studies that have built upon the Modigliani-Miller theorem have 
subsequently shown that the financial structure of a firm does matter due to three 
different reasons.  Firstly, debt and equity have differential tax treatment that suggests 
that corporate tax policy does matter.  Secondly, bankruptcy considerations can be 
quite important (Robichek and Myers,1965, Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973).  Thirdly, 
the presence of asymmetric information causes decisions about financing to affect the 
value of the firm.  In this case, financing decisions convey information to the 
investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Other studies on capital structure include Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Townsend (1979) Diamond (1984) Gale and Hellwig (1985) who show that capital 
structure provides incentives to management or allocates control to someone other 
than the management.  Further studies include Ross (1976) who concentrates mainly 
on managerial incentives in the presence of informational asymmetries. 
Most research on capital structure has focussed on the proportions of debt vs. 
equity observed on the right-hand sides of corporations’ balance sheets.  However, we 
believe that what ultimately influences the amount of external financing (debt or 
equity) used by a firm is determined by the amount of internal financing.  The model 
that we develop in this chapter extends the pecking order model (Myers and Majluf, 
1984) that has been proposed in the literature.  We show that the most important 
factor that influences the amount of debt in a business is the amount of internal funds 
that the firm has at its disposal.    
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The reason why we focus on debt and not equity can be supported by many 
factors.  First, numerous studies have found that equity issues are very rare among 
quoted companies (Marsh, 1982; Benito, 2003).  Most transactions on stock markets 
are aimed at share buy-back or repurchase activities.  Also because our empirical 
study is mainly based on firms in the UK, where share issuance is very minimal 
(Benito, 2003) we think it best to ignore equity issues20. A number of empirical 
studies on capital structure have found a negative relationship between the amount of 
debt and internal funds (usually proxied by cash flow).  However, there has not been 
any significant theory to give theoretical support to this finding.  In this chapter, we 
adapt the model proposed by Almeida and Campello (2005) to try to explain why this 
negative relationship exists.   
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“Most of the aggregate gross investment by US non-financial corporations has been 
financed from internal cash flow (depreciation and retained earnings).  External 
financing in most years covers less than 20% of real investment and most financing is 
debt.  Net stock issues are frequently negative: that is, more shares are extinguished in 
acquisitions and share repurchase programs than are created by new stock issues” 
(Myers, 2001, pp 82.)  There are many established, profitable companies with 
superior credit ratings operating for years at low debt ratios, including Microsoft and 
major pharmaceutical companies.  In the framework of capital structure, the pecking 
order theory can help explain this behaviour and explain why the bulk of external 
financing comes from debt.  It also explains why profitable firms borrow less. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) find a high correlation between cash 
from old investments and the level of new investment among firms that rely on public 
debt as evidence that firms are sometimes unable to raise funds when they have good 
prospects, forcing them to rely on internal funds.  Numerous studies have tried to 
show empirically the importance of internal funds.  Many empirical studies on capital 
structure (Fama and French, 2002, Frank and Goyal, 2003) have indeed shown that 
cash flow is an important determinant of the level of debt in the capital structure of 
firms. 
 
                                                 
20 See Section 3.7 for evidence that the firms in our sample do not rely on equity issues. 
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We develop a theoretical framework that enables us to model financing behaviour of 
firms.  In the first instance, we put forward a simple theoretical outline to explain the 
financial hierarchy that firms seem to follow in the Pecking Order Theory.  In this 
section, we develop a simple framework for the Pecking Order Model along the lines 
of Johnson, Mcmillan and Woodruff (2002) that shows how a firm chooses between 
three different sources of finance available.  
Our model includes three groups of agents, firms, banks and a securities 
market. To keep matters simple we exclude exotic financial options such as venture 
capital, angel finance, discounting and many others. Firms’ capital structure choices 
are assumed to be the result of the interplay of aggregate demand and supply of funds.  
We extend the model developed by Johnson et al (2002) by including equity financing 
as a source of finance21.   
Firms’ have sources of funds and needs for funds.  They would prefer to 
finance all their needs with internal sources of funds.  The reason for this is that 
internal funds are cheaper as asymmetric information makes external funds relatively 
more expensive compared to internal funds.  There are significant costs associated 
with issuing debt or equity.  Firstly issuing debt involves the payment of interest and 
if the firm is not able to repay back the debt then it faces potential bankruptcy. Equity 
issues are quite expensive to undertake as they involve significant flotation costs, 
legal fees and it also leads to a dilution in ownership. However, it might be the case 
where the demand exceeds internal funds, in which case external funds are required to 
meet the deficit.  Externally, this deficit can be met from two possible sources which 
are from (bank) debt or by issuing securities. 
The demand of funds depends on the ability of the entrepreneurs to retain any 
profits they make.  We make the implicit assumption that firms always prefer to use 
internal finance and therefore as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984), financial slack 
can be used to avoid external financing. 
The demand for funds is given by: 
D
F
= D(π , rI, rL, T )                         (3.1) 
 
                                                 
21 Although equity finance is not really a major source of funds for firms in the UK, we include it 
nevertheless to ensure a broader application of our model to firms in other countries.  
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Where DF is the demand for funds which is itself a function of  π  (profits, retained 
earnings, financial slack or liquid resources). rI is the interest rate that entrepreneur 
can earn by investing the firm’s profits outside the firm.  It represents the opportunity 
cost of internal funds. rL is the cost of debt.  We make the usual assumption that rI < 
rL, which implies that there exists a wedge between the cost of internal and external 
debt finance.  As evidenced by studies of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1996) amongst others, the presence of information asymmetry 
and agency costs create this wedge between internal and external finance.  
 Outside lenders bear certain costs when they have to evaluate and monitor 
borrowers’ actions.  Hence the borrower has to pay an external finance premium on 
external finance.  The external finance premium is always positive and is defined as 
the difference between the cost to a borrower of raising funds from lenders and the 
opportunity cost of using internal finance.  Firms prefer internal finance since funds 
can be raised without sending adverse signal and this results in a pecking order.  Let 
the cost of issuing securities be T which includes transaction costs (brokerage costs, 
legal fees, flotation costs) dividend payments and the fact that issuing securities has a 
number of implications on firm value. 
If a firm uses all the three sources of financing then the demand for funds is 
equal to the sum of internal funds plus debt and equity financing as shown below: 
D
F
 = π +L+E                                         (3.2) 
where L represent leverage (loans or debt) and E represents equity financing. 
We  now have three different types of situations which we illustrate below: 
 
Case 1 
π=FD        if    π≤FD                (3.3) 
Here, the entire demand of funds is met from internal sources. 
 
For the purpose of our analysis we assume that firms are willing to reinvest 
100% of their retained earnings.  However, this might not necessarily be true.  For 
instance, some firms might be unwilling to invest 100% of their internal funds.  If 
internal funds are sufficient to meet the financing needs then the firm does not need to 
turn to external sources of funds. 
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However, if internal funds are not sufficient, then firms have to turn to 
external funds.  As argued by Johnson et al (2002), “the difference in the cost of 
internal and external funds leads to a discontinuity between the investment of 
internally generated funds and the decision to seek external funds,” (pp1347).  If a 
firm reinvests internal funds then the rate of return has to at least equal to rI while if 
the firm invests external funds then the firm will need to obtain a return of at least rL 
for debt finance to be viable.  Hence,  this is what according to Johnson et al, (2002) 
makes a firm’s decision to invest internally generated funds independent of the 
decision of getting access to external funds. 
The preferred source of external finance would be debt (L).  We have to take 
into account the inverse relationship between the cost and the amount of loan.  At low 
levels of indebtedness firms might find it cheap to borrow.  Lenders are also more 
willing to lend to firms that possibly are also investing internal resources as this 
signals to the lenders that the project is of good quality otherwise the entrepreneur 
would not be willing to invest internal funds in the project.  This is illustrated as case 
2 below. 
Case 2 
LDF += π   if  π>FD                          (3.4) 
As internal funds are not sufficient to meet the demand of funds, it is met by a 
combination of internal and debt finance. 
However after a certain level, lenders will no longer be willing to lend (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981).   We go a step further and assume that internal funds and the 
maximum amount of (bank) debt that a firm can have are not sufficient to meet the 
demand of funds.  Now, the firm will turn to the security market.  It will decide to 
issue securities.  Equity financing can be considered the more expensive source of 
finance.  The costs of equity financing might include the transactions costs that firms 
might have to pay when issuing equity.  The more important costs of equity financing 
that have been proposed in the literature are dilution costs as when a firm issues new 
securities, existing shareholders own a lesser proportion of the firm.  Case 3 below 
illustrates this. 
 
Case 3 
ELDF ++= π   if  π>FD +L               (3.5) 
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In this case the demand of funds is met by all the three possible sources of finance, 
internal funds, debt finance and also equity finance.  
The three cases proposed above illustrate the Pecking Order Theory as in 
Myers and Majluf (1984).  However, it can also be that in some other cases, the 
pecking order theory is violated, where firms would prefer to issue securities rather 
than using bank debt.  For the case of start-up and high-growth firms for example, it is 
usually observed that these firms have more equity in their capital structure rather 
than debt.  In this case, L is very low as the cost of obtaining bank debt is very high.  
This would violate the POT.  Banks might not be willing to lend to these firms and 
these firms would possibly choose to issue equity first and then turn to bank debt.    It 
has been shown by Hogan and Hutson (2005) that new technology based firms prefer 
to use outside equity to debt.  However, this is not very common in the real world.  If 
a firm is quoted on the stock market, this is an indication already that this firm is a 
‘good’ firm.  Banks would in fact be willing to lend to this firm.  However, since this 
is not the objective of this chapter we do not go further in this discussion.  
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We use the model proposed by Almeida and Campello (2005) to examine how the 
sensitivity of external financing to internal cash flows differ across constrained and 
unconstrained firms.  We start off from the firm budget constraint.  Formally, if we 
define LEV as the total amount of external financing (in this case leverage/debt) that 
the firm raises in the current period, we have 
 
LEV=I-W                                                                  (3.6) 
 
where I represents the firm’s investment expenditures in the current period and W 
represents the total amount of internal funds (cash flow) the firm has available to 
spend in the period. 
For (externally) financially unconstrained firms (those that do not face credit 
constraints when contracting external funds), investment spending is independent of 
the availability of profitable business opportunities.  Let those firms’ optimal 
spending be equal to IFB.  In sharp contrast, the investment spending of constrained 
firms will be a function of the availability of internal funds as costly external 
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financing makes investment spending endogenous to internal funds.  This constraint is 
denoted as I*(W). 
Let’s now consider the impact of an unexpected change in internal funds, ∆W, 
which is assumed to be orthogonal to real investment opportunities.  A positive 
income shock ie, an increase in internal funds through increases in cash flow or 
profitability would lead these firms to reduce the amount of debt they hold.  Since 
investment opportunities are unchanged unconstrained firms will absorb the shock by 
a corresponding variation in external financing of the opposing sign. 
 
∆LEV
UNCONS
=-∆W                (3.7) 
 
The above equation captures the idea that firms prefer to use internal funds.  
Therefore, if firms have high internal funds, they will demand lower external finance.  
A positive income shock, that is, an increase in internal funds through increases in 
cash flow or profitability will lead these firms to reduce the amount of debt that they 
hold. If firms are unconstrained, they will allocate the cash flow innovation towards 
paying down their debt. However, if firms are constrained in the credit market 
(financially constrained firms), a positive shock to internal funds will make them 
change their investment spending, these firms might optimally allocate the extra cash 
towards investment activities.  In this case, financial factors will affect real decisions 
as the constrained firms had to give up some of their positive NPV projects due to 
lack of funds. This implies that these firms will optimally allocate the extra cash 
towards investment.  This can be represented by: 
 
∆LEV
CONS
=-∆W+∆I*                                       (3.8) 
 
which implies that following an income shock, firms have to adjust both their external 
financing and real investment. 
According to Almeida and Campello (2005) there should be a negative 
relation between internal fund shocks and external financing.  However the magnitude 
of this negative effect will be different for constrained and unconstrained firms.  If the 
cash flow innovation is positive, then financially unconstrained firms will reduce their 
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external financing by a more significant amount than unconstrained firms22.  
Constrained firms are not able to reduce their external financing by a significant 
amount as they have to allocate part of that increase in internal finance towards 
investment (as they are financially constrained).  This idea is captured by the 
following equation where we divide equations 3.1 and 3.2 by ∆W.  We obtain the 
following inequality: 
 
W
I
W
LEV
W
LEV CONSUNCONS
∆
∆
+−=
∆
∆
<−=
∆
∆ *
11                          (3.9) 
 
The above inequality demonstrates that the sensitivity of debt to variations in internal 
funds is less negative for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms.  All that is 
required is that real uses of funds are correlated with variations in internal funds when 
the firm is financially constrained.  The hypothesis that we test is therefore: 
H1: Faced with positive cash flow innovations, financially unconstrained firms 
reduce leverage by a more significant amount than financially constrained firms.  
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As mentioned before, very few studies have studied the capital structure decisions of 
quoted firms in the UK.  Marsh (1982) focuses his study only on 748 issues of equity 
and debt made by UK companies over the 1959-1970 period and finds evidence in 
favour of the Trade off Theory (henceforth TOT).  Bennet and Donnelly (1993) use 
data on listed UK firms from Datastream over a 12 year period from 1977-1988 and 
find that long-term debt is more representative of a firm’s policy with regard to its 
capital structure.  Benito (2003) uses UK data on 1,784 quoted companies over the 
1973-2000 period and finds evidence in favour of the Pecking Order Theory 
(henceforth POT).  Panno (2003) examines a sample of 87 cash issues of equity and 
debt made by UK quoted companies over the 1992-1996 period and also finds 
evidence in favour of the TOT.   
Our study is importantly different from all these studies that have studied 
capital structure in the UK.  First, our data coverage is over the 1968-2000 period, 
                                                 
&&
 Financially unconstrained firms have already invested up to their first best level. So they have no use 
for the increase in cash flow.  Constrained firms on the other hand invest below their first best level so 
they use part of the increase in cash flow for investment purposes. 
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therefore taking into account a longer and more recent period.  Also, while Marsh 
(1982) and Panno (2003) use the Logit and Probit analyses to examine the financing 
choices of firms, Bennet and Donnelly (1993) use the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
approach and Benito uses the GMM-system approach.  In our study, we use the first 
differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and focus mainly on debt.  
Below, we survey some recent studies on capital structure decisions of firms in the 
UK. 
Bennet and Donnelly (1993) test different theories of capital structure by 
examining the cross-sectional variation in leverage among non-financial UK firms.  
They also provide some results on inter-industry variation in gearing. They use data 
from Datastream over the 1977-1988 period excluding financial and commodity 
groups and therefore their data covers 433 companies in 19 industries.  Unlike 
previous studies, Bennett and Donelly (1993) include a volatility measure in their 
empirical specification.  This volatility measure is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the first difference in earnings before interest and depreciation scaled by the 
average value of total assets employed over the period 1977-1988.  The results 
suggest that non debt tax shield, asset structure, earnings volatility, size and 
profitability are the important determinants of leverage23. 
Walsh and Ryan (1997) use data on British owned public limited companies 
over the 1984-1991 period.  They examine the impact of tax and agency 
considerations on the decision of firms to issue debt or equity.  They test a binomial 
choice model based on actual issues of debt and equity by a sample of firms.  They 
find that taken on their own, tax considerations appear to have a significant effect on 
the decisions of UK firms to issue debt or equity. However, when both agency 
considerations and tax considerations are taken into account, tax considerations seem 
to lose their importance in the choice between debt and equity issues.  In other words, 
when firms decide to issue debt or equity they would consider the firm’s free cash 
flow, its tangible assets and the volatility of its assets rather than tax considerations. 
Ozkan (2001) studies the capital structure of firms in the UK.  He uses data 
from Datastream consisting of 390 firms and 4,132 observations over the 1984-1996 
period.    He studies the partial adjustment behaviour of firms to a long-term debt 
ratio.  Hence he investigates the potential determinants of target debt ratios and the 
                                                 
23 Non debt tax shield is calculated as the potential deferred tax liability divided by total assets.  In 
other words this represents the amount of tax that was deemed not payable. 
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nature of adjustment to these targets.  He finds that firms have target debt ratios and 
they adjust to these targets relatively fast.  His main finding is that firms adjust to their 
targets as the costs of being away from their target are important.  He also finds that 
current liquidity and profitability of firms exert a negative impact on their borrowing 
decisions.  However, he finds a positive relationship between past profitability and 
debt ratio.  Other firm specific variables that influence leverage decisions in his study 
are non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities of firms while size does not seem to 
have an important effect. 
Fattouh, Harris and Scaramozzino (2007) investigate the choice of leverage 
ratios of firms in the UK using a pooled cross-section of 6,614 UK firm observations 
for the period 1988-1998.  They use the quantile regression method to examine if the 
effect of variables that affect leverage of firms are different at different quantiles of 
distribution.  They estimate the coefficients at 7 quantiles, that is, the 5th, 10th, 25th, 
50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th quantiles using the same list of explanatory variables.  They 
find that firms that experience an increase in internal funds reduce their leverage and 
this relationship is more pronounced for highly leveraged firms.  This implies that 
firms that are highly levered reduce their leverage by a more significant amount when 
they experience an increase in internal funds.  As for the effect of size, the results 
suggest that the effect of size on leverage is positive at lower quantiles while it is 
negative for firms in the upper quantiles suggesting that when smaller firms grow in 
size, they become more highly levered but as they become larger they start to reduce 
their leverage.   
 
3.4 		

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Most studies on capital structure of firms have considered all firms in the whole 
economy excluding the financial intermediation sector.  The reason for this is that the 
capital structure of firms in the financial intermediation sector is heavily influenced 
by regulatory requirements24. The most important sectors in the UK (measured by 
GDP at basic prices) are the Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail and the Financial 
Intermediation sectors.   According to the DTI (2004), Manufacturing represents a 
sixth of the UK economy and it is responsible for the majority of the UK’s exports.  It 
                                                 
&+
 For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) eliminate all financial firms 
such as banks and insurance companies from their sample because the leverage of these firms is 
strongly influenced by explicit investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance and minimum 
capital requirements. 
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is also one of the biggest employment providers and responsible for the bulk of 
business research and development.  This sector is a vital part of the economy and is 
still crucial for the country’s prosperity now and in the future.  Following Fazzari et al 
(1988) and Almeida et al (2003) we focus only on manufacturing firms while studying 
how financial constraints affect the relationship between leverage and cash flow. The 
manufacturing firms are grouped in different industrial sectors25. 
The dataset used in this study is from DATASTREAM which covers the 1968-
2000 period.  Our sample consists of 958 manufacturing firms which amount to 
13,110 firm-year observations. Our samples have an unbalanced structure and the 
number of years of observation varies between 3 and 3326.  We remove all outliers in 
the dataset by excluding observations that lie in the 1% tails of each regression 
variable (discussed in the next section).  
 
3.5			
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To examine the effect of financial constraints on leverage decisions of listed firms, we 
need to distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. To do 
this, we closely follow the literature on investment and cash flow and use a series of 
classification schemes to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms.  
Various classification schemes have been used in the literature to distinguish between 
firms.  Fazzari et al (1988) classify firms according to their dividend payout ratio, 
Whited (1992) classifies firms according to whether they have a bond rating or not.  
Carpenter and Guariglia (2003) use the number of employees to distinguish between 
firms. 
In this study, we use a number of different criteria to differentiate among 
various classes of firms.  We first divide our firms according to size where we use the 
distribution of real assets to distinguish between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms.  Second, we use the coverage ratio.  Third, we use a measure of 
the level of indebtedness of firms.  We allow firms to transit between classes and 
therefore our focus is on firm-years rather than simply years. We allow both entry and 
exit as the use of an unbalanced structure reduces to an extent potential survivor bias. 
                                                 
25 The firms are grouped in the following 9 industrial sectors as follows: Metal and Metal Goods; Other 
Minerals and Mineral products; Chemicals and man-made Fibres; Mechanical Engineering; Electrical 
and Instrument Engineering; Motor Vehicles and Parts; other Transport Equipment; Food, Drink and 
Tobacco; Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear and Other Manufacturing.   
&,
See Data Appendix for details on the structure of our panel. 
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Survivorship is of particular importance in our study especially as finance plays a very 
important role in firm survival.   
The first sample separation criterion that we use based on the size of the firm, 
is the distribution of real assets of the firms.  Almeida et al (2005) also rank firms 
based on their assets and we use this criteria to distinguish between constrained and 
unconstrained firms. As proposed by Almeida et al (2005) the argument for size as a 
good observable measure of financial constraints is that small firms are typically 
young, less well-known and therefore more vulnerable to capital market 
imperfections. We use this measure to mainly take into account the ease or the 
difficulty with which firms might have access to debt.  Firms that have a high level of 
real assets or tangible assets will be larger and have more collateral and we will 
expect these firms to have fewer difficulties in obtaining external finance as lenders 
will be more willing to lend to these firms.   
We rank firms using the percentile methodology based on several criteria and 
this ranking is done on an annual basis, thereby allowing firm to switch between 
categories. Those firms that have their real assets in the lowest 25th percentile of the 
distribution of the real assets of all firm-years are classified as financially constrained 
(CONSit) as they are likely to be smaller firms, have low collateral and find difficulty 
in obtaining external finance/debt. All firms having their real assets in the top three 
quartiles of the distribution of the real assets of all firm-years are classified as 
financially unconstrained (UNCONSit) as they are likely to be quite large in size, have 
quite high levels of collateral and should not face any difficulties in obtaining debt. 
The second classification scheme we use is the coverage ratio of firms.  We 
follow Guariglia (1999) and classify firms according to whether their interest cover 
ratio over the years is greater or smaller than five.   This is according to Milne (1991) 
study based on interviews with banking practitioners in the UK.  For the 
manufacturing sector in the UK, bankers start to feel concerned about the ability of a 
company to service or pay back its debt if its coverage ratio falls below a threshold of 
five.  A coverage ratio of five for instance indicates that with its existing level of 
profitability, a firm will be able to pay the interest on its debt five times over.  Hence 
we classify a firm that has a coverage ratio of less than five in a particular year as 
being financially constrained (CONSit) while a firm that has a coverage ratio of more 
than or equal to five in a particular year is regarded as being financially unconstrained 
 82 
(UNCONSit).  We do this classification by year and we thus allow firms to transit 
between the constrained and unconstrained category over the years. 
The third classification scheme we use is based on a measure of indebtedness. 
It is a fact that banks like to lend to firms that do not have high leverage while they do 
not like to lend to firms that are already highly levered.  This is because in practice, 
firms that have low leverage can be regarded as having spare debt capacity.  We 
classify those firms that have their leverage in the top 25th percentile of the 
distribution of leverage of all firm-years as financially constrained (CONSit) as these 
firms are already highly levered and lenders might be unwilling to lend to these firms. 
All firms having their leverage in the bottom three quartiles of the distribution of 
leverage of all firm-years are classified as financially unconstrained (UNCONSit) as 
these firms have low leverage and lenders are likely to be willing to lend to these 
firms.  
We use the above three classification schemes to distinguish between 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms that are large, have high 
coverage ratios or that have low leverage can be seen as being financially 
unconstrained firms. This implies that these firms would probably not face any 
difficulties in getting access to debt as lenders would be more willing to lend to these 
firms.  On the other hand firms that are small, have low coverage ratios and are 
already highly levered would possibly have difficulties in having access to external 
funds as lenders would be unwilling to lend to them.  The objective of our study is to 
show that when faced with positive cash flow innovations, firms that are financially 
unconstrained are able to reduce their leverage by a more significant amount than 
firms that are financially constrained.  This is because firms that already have low 
leverage can use their positive cash flow innovations to further reduce their 
dependency on leverage while firms that are already highly levered are only able to 
reduce their dependency on leverage by a lesser amount. 
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Various measures of capital structure have been considered in the literature, however 
most studies use a measure of leverage, which is a measure of the indebtedness of 
firms.  There is no consensus on what measure of leverage should be used.  A number 
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of studies consider some form of debt ratio (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Fama 
and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2002)).  Some researchers use debt or the 
change in debt, others consider only long-term debt and while some consider book 
values, others consider market values. 
Book ratios are very different from market ratios.  Book values are calculated 
at historic values and are believed to be backward looking measures while market 
values are use current values and are believed to be forward-looking (Frank and Goyal 
2002).  Barclay and Smith (2001) find that there are major differences between 
forward and backward looking measures and they should not be treated as equivalent.  
What can be observed in the literature is that older studies tend to use book measures 
while more recent studies use market measures.  For instance, Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) use both book measures and market measures.    
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use the change in debt while Fama and 
French (2002) use a total debt measure calculated at book values that includes both 
long-term and short-term debt. Benito (2003) uses different measures of leverage 
which include a total debt measure and a net book leverage measure that subtracts 
cash flow from the total debt of the firm.  Finally, he also uses a long-term debt 
measure.  Frank and Goyal (2003) use a total debt measure, long-term debt and an 
inverse coverage ratio. 
Following previous studies, in this study we consider four different measures 
of leverage which are total debt, long-term debt, short-term debt and net leverage 
(leverage net of cash).   We consider a comprehensive leverage measure, total debt, 
which considers both long-term debt and short-term debt. The total debt measure 
(LEV/A) is calculated as total borrowing repayable in less than 1 year plus total loan 
capital repayable in 1 year or more divided by total assets.  
To check for the robustness of our results we consider another measure of 
leverage that takes into account only the long-term portion of debt which is in this 
case long-term debt (debt with a maturity period of more than 1 year.)  We also 
consider a short-term debt measure (debt that has to be repaid within 1 year).  All debt 
measures in our study include loans, overdrafts, leasing and hire purchase.   
 
3.6.2 					
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Titman and Wessels (1988) propose that firms select capital structures depending on 
attributes that determine the various costs and benefits associated with debt and equity 
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financing.  Most studies on capital structure have used a model that is in essence 
similar to the return generating process assumed to hold in the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory.  Consequently, while studying capital structure, researchers have included in 
their studies, factors which they believed influenced the capital structure of firms.  
This factor analytic approach has been used in various studies and the main factors 
that can be found in a number of studies on capital structure include the variables as 
explained below. 
Our reduced form model is along the lines of Miguel and Pindado (2001) 
which is as follows: 
Let the target debt level be (LEV /A)*it.  This target debt level depends on the factors 
discussed above, which are the cash flow, log of sales, investment, growth 
opportunities and the amount of tax paid by the firm. 
 
(LEV /A)*it = λ0  + λ 1 (CashFlow /A )it + λ 2 ( Log Sales )it  + λ 3 (INV/A)it + λ 4 (Q)it  
                          + λ 5 (Tax)it + εit                                  (3.10)     
where i indexes firms, i=1,2,3….N and t indexes years, t=1,2,3….T   
LEV/A is the book leverage (short-term debt plus long-term debt) of the firm scaled by 
assets, CashFlow/A is the firm’s after tax and interest cash flow scaled by assets, Log 
Sales is the log of sales that controls for size effects, INV/A to control for the effect of 
investment.  We rely on a Tobin’s Q to control for growth opportunities and finally 
Tax controls for the effect of taxes on capital structure.  
Assuming that capital markets are imperfect, firms have to face the existence 
of transactions costs and provided that they have a target debt level, they cannot 
automatically adjust to this target debt level.  They, therefore follow the following 
target adjustment model (Gilson, 1997, Miguel and Pindado, 2001): 
 
(LEV /A)it - (LEV /A)it-1 =α ( (LEV /A)*it – (LEV /A)it-1 ) , 0< α<1                     (3.11) 
  
where (LEV/A)it is the actual debt level in the current period and (LEV/A)it-1 is the debt 
level in the previous period and (LEV/A)*it is the firm’s target debt level.  Transaction 
costs are captured by the α coefficient.  α indicates adjustment to the target debt level. 
If α=1, this indicates high adjustment due to no transactions cost. If α=0 this indicates 
low adjustment to the target debt level and therefore the presence of high transaction 
costs. 
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If α=1, (implying no transactions costs) so that adjustment is costless and 
perfect, then (LEV /A)it = (LEV /A)*it that is the actual debt level exactly matches the 
target debt level.  However, if transactions costs exist, firms will not adjust to this 
target debt level immediately but would rather aim at partial adjustment as indicated 
by α.  From equation (3.11) we find the actual debt level (given partial adjustment) as: 
 
(LEV /A)it  =α  (LEV /A)*it + (1- α)(LEV /A)it-1                                                     (3.12) 
 
we already know that the target debt level is given by equation (3.10).  Substituting in 
equation (3.11) we get the debt level as: 
 
(LEV/A)it = α λ0 + (1- α)(LEV /A)it-1 + α λ 1 (CashFlow /A)it + α λ 2 ( Log Sales )it  + α 
λ3 (INV/A)it  + α λ 4 (Q)it  + α λ 5 (TAX)it+ εit                                                         (3.13)           
                    
which can be rewritten as: 
 
(LEV /A) it  = β0 + β1 (LEV /A)it-1 + β2 (Cash Flow/A)it + β3 (Log Sales)it  + β4 
(INV/A)it + β5 (Q)it + β6 (TAX)it+ εit                                                                      (3.14) 
 
This is the specification that we use in this chapter to investigate the relationship 
between leverage and firm-specific variables.   
 
The baseline specification that we use to test our propositions is as follows: 
 
(LEV/A) it  = β0 + β1 (LEV/A)it-1 + β2 (Cash Flow/A)it + β3 (Log Sales)it  + β4 (INV/A)it  
+ β5 (Q)it + β6 (TAX)it + νi + νt + εit                                                                     (3.15) 
 
where i indexes firms, i=1,2,3….N and t indexes years, t=1,2,3….T   
 
Since we use panel data, we include both a firm specific and time specific error term.  
Hence, the error term now consists of three components: νi is a firm-specific fixed 
effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics, νt represents a time 
specific component and reflects aggregate effects common across companies to 
control for macroeconomic influences, including factors as nominal interest rates and 
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inflation, εit is an idiosyncratic error term.   In the above model of debt adjustment, the 
target level of debt is not externally determined.  In other words, unlike previous 
studies, we do not have to calculate the target debt level from historical data or some 
other dubious sources (Miguel and Pindado, 2001).  Also, in case firms do not have a 
target debt level, as proposed by the POT, the model is still applicable. 
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In this section we discuss the various determinants of leverage in details and the 
expected signs on the coefficient of these variables. 
Internal Finance (Cash Flow/A)it 
A factor that has been widely used in most studies on capital structure includes the 
internal finance of a firm, which is generally used as a measure of internal financial 
resources.  According to Benito and Vlieghe (2000), a firm fails if the value of its 
assets falls below the value of its debt.  Hence, profits are a key determinant of the 
change in asset value. A shock to the balance sheet can occur which could force a firm 
to adjust its liabilities quickly.   In such a case liquidity is vital as the firm could use it 
in any sudden adjustment process.  Benito and Vlieghe (2000) suggest that the most 
natural barometer of corporate financial health of a firm is its profitability. 
There have been conflicting theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on 
the effects of profitability on leverage.  Myers and Majluf (1984) predict a negative 
relationship while Jensen (1986) predicts a positive relationship.  The Trade-off 
Theory, predicts a positive relationship between the debt ratio and the profitability of 
a firm.  Firms normally have to pay taxes on their profits.  To avoid this, they prefer to 
take more debt in their capital structure as interest payments on debt are generally tax 
deductible.  Agency costs theories also predict that profitable firms would take more 
debt in their capital structure to restraint the activities of managers.  Hence, the more 
profitable a firm is, the more debt it will have in its capital structure. 
The POT on the other hand predicts a negative relationship between the 
profitability and the leverage of the firm.  The reason behind this is that in the 
financial hierarchy proposed by the POT, firms would always prefer to use internal 
finance before debt.  Internal funds are the cheaper source of funds and additionally 
firms do not suffer from the asymmetric information problem that they face when they 
try to access external funds. 
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We use both a profitability and liquidity measure to account for internal 
resources of firms. In our study, we mainly proxy for internal finance with the cash 
flow of the firm (CashFlow/A) calculated as the firm’s after tax and interest cash flow 
scaled by assets.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their study of firms in the G7 countries 
and Fama and French (2002) in their study of firms in the US, use a cash flow 
measure to account for the effect of liquidity on capital structure.  Long and Malitz 
(1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (2000), 
Graham and Harvey (2000) and Fama and French (2002) find a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage indicating that firms that have more internal 
resources have less debt, which is in accordance to the POT.  Other measures of 
liquidity of firms that we include in our regression specification are the cash stock 
(Cashstock), retained earnings (Retained) and Liquid (Liquid) which is the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities.  
 The other control variables that we use as suggested by prior literature are the 
investment undertaken by the firm, size of the firm, growth opportunities and taxes 
paid by the firm.  These are discussed in turn below. 
 
Size (Log Sales)it   
The impact of size on capital structure is not very clear. The TOT predicts a positive 
relationship between the size of a firm and the debt level.  This positive relationship 
can be explained by the fact that larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less 
often (Ang et al, 1982 and Petit and Singer, 1985). Also, banks (lenders) may be more 
willing to lend to large firms as they believe that the probability that these firms will 
go bankrupt is very low.  Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2002) and 
Booth et al (2001), find a positive relationship between size and leverage, which is in 
line with the TOT.   
However, it can also be that size is inversely related to leverage.  The POT for 
instance stresses the importance of internal funds.  The larger a firm is, the more 
profitable it could be and therefore the higher its retained earnings.  Firms that have 
enough retained earnings, would prefer to use their retained earnings rather than debt.  
Therefore, according to the POT we would expect that the bigger the firm, the lower 
the debt ratio.  Titman and Wessels (1988) and Benito (2003) find a negative 
relationship between size and the level of debt in a firm.  Various studies have used a 
number of measures to capture the size of firms.  Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
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Benito (2003) use the log of sales to measure size. Similarly we also find that the log 
of sales (Log Sales) seems to be an appropriate measure of size. 
 
Investment (INV/A)it   
A higher investment level means that more funds are needed.  Therefore, leverage is 
increasing in investment.  The more a firm invests, the less it is likely to be able to 
finance its investment from internal funds.  According to the POT when internal funds 
are not sufficient, debt rather than equity should meet the shortage in funds.  
However, the TOT predicts that firms that have higher investment also have less debt.  
This is largely due to agency considerations.  Firms with higher investment do not 
need to take debt to constrain the activities of managers as cash flow is allocated 
towards investment opportunities. Benito (2003) finds that firms in the UK have a 
positive relationship between leverage and cash flow indicating that firms with higher 
investment undertake more debt. 
 
Growth Opportunities (Q)it 
The relationship between growth opportunities and the debt ratio is also quite 
conflicting.  The TOT predicts that firms with more growth opportunities will have 
less debt as there is less need for the disciplining role of debt. Firms that have growth 
opportunities would prefer to retain debt capacity as they might need to borrow in the 
future.  Further, growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but 
cannot be collateralised and do not generate current taxable income (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988).  For this reason, the arguments put forth suggest a negative 
relationship between debt and growth opportunities 
However, Benito (2003) proposes the opposite.  If firms have growth 
opportunities, then they require more funds to grow.  Given that internal resources are 
not sufficient, firms would then turn to external sources of finance, which would lead 
to a higher debt level in firms.  Indicators of growth include capital expenditures over 
total assets or growth of total assets measured as the percentage change in total assets.  
Firms generally engage in research and development to generate future investments.  
Research and development over sales also serve as an indicator of the growth 
attribute. We control for growth opportunities using Tobin’s Q which is calculated as 
the value of the firm plus total loan capital minus total cash and cash equivalent 
divided by the replacement value of assets (see Benito, 2003). 
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Tax (TAX)it 
Taxes are believed to be important factors that affect the amount of debt that a firm 
has in its capital structure (Barclay and Smith, 1999).  The more profitable a firm is, 
the more taxes it would have to pay.  To avoid paying a lot out in taxes firms might 
prefer to take more debt because interest payments artificially reduce the profits of the 
firm and consequently they pay less tax on their profits.  Therefore, by taking more 
debt in their capital structure firms benefit from the ‘interest tax shield’ that debt 
provides.  This benefit of debt is mainly advocated by the TOT which predicts that the 
more taxes a firm has to pay the more debt it will have in its capital structure.  The tax 
variable (TAX) is calculated as tax paid divided by profit before tax.  See Table 3.A in 
the appendix for a survey of empirical studies and the signs obtained on the variables. 
 
3.6.4 		



 
We estimate equation (3.15) using the first-difference Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, (Arellano and Bond, 1991) rather than the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) or the Within Groups estimators.  The Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method ignores both firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of 
regressors.  The OLS estimator is likely to be inconsistent since the explanatory 
variables are positively correlated with the error term.  Due to the presence of 
individual effects, the correlation does not vanish even as the size of the sample 
increases.  Bond (2002) shows that standard results for the omitted variable bias 
indicate that (at least in large samples) the OLS estimator of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is biased upwards. 
On the other hand, the Within Groups estimator takes account of firm-specific 
heterogeneity but ignores potential endogeneity of regressors. The Within Groups 
estimator eliminates the source of inconsistency by transforming the equation to 
eliminate the individual (time invariant) effects.  However, even if the Within Groups 
estimator takes into account firm heterogeneity, it fails to take into account the 
potential endogeneity of the regressors.  Bond (2002) shows that at least in large 
samples the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable using the Within Groups 
estimator is biased downwards.  The OLS and Within Groups estimator are likely to 
be biased in opposite directions.  This implies that if the coefficient obtained on the 
lagged dependent variable using the GMM estimator lies between the coefficient 
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obtained using the OLS estimator and the Within Groups estimator, then the GMM 
estimator is the correct one to use. 
The most appropriate estimator for the above specification is the first-
difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) which takes into account both 
firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors.  We estimate 
equation (3.15) using the first-difference Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator, (Arellano and Bond, 1991) which takes into account both firm-specific 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. Our instrument set includes 
(LEV/A )it , (Cash Flow /A)it , (Log Sales)it  , (INV/A)it , (Q)it  and (Tax)it   which are 
lagged 2 to 5 times.     
We use the Sargan test and the m2 to evaluate if our model is correctly 
specified.   The J statistic is the Sargan/Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions.  
Under the null of instrument validity, the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
number of parameters. If the model used is correctly specified and the instruments are 
adequate, the variables in the instrument set should not be correlated with the 
idiosyncratic component of the error term εit.  On the other hand, the m2 test, which 
tests for second-order serial correlation, is asymptotically distributed as standard 
normal under the null of second-order serial correlation.  This test provides a further 
check on the specification of the model and on the validity of variables dated t-2 as 
instruments.  If the p-values for the Sargan test and the m2 test are both greater than 
0.05, then the instruments are acceptable. 
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Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the quoted firms in the UK.  Figure 3.2 
below shows the behaviour of leverage of quoted manufacturing firms in the UK over 
the 1968-2000 period. The graph shows that there was a rise in corporate indebtedness 
in the late 1980s (due to the economic boom) which was reduced in the recession of 
the early 1990s. 
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Figure 3.1: Leverage Behaviour of UK Firms 
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 We next consider equity issues. As stated by Benito (2003) new equity issues are 
very minimal among quoted firms in the UK.  We find evidence of the same when we 
consider Figure 3.2 below, where new equity issues represent only around 3% of 
assets for the manufacturing firms27.   
Figure 3.2: Use of Equity by UK Firms 
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As mentioned earlier, in this study we focus mainly on leverage and internal 
financing.  The financing pattern of the sample of quoted Manufacturing firms in the 
UK is captured by the (LEV/A) variable.  (LEV/A) is the book leverage (short-term 
debt plus long-term debt) of the firm scaled by assets.  The other measures of leverage 
are short-term debt over assets (STD/A), long-term leverage over assets (LTD/A)   and 
net leverage (total debt minus cash) over assets (Net Leverage/A).  (Cash Flow/A) is 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately we only have data on equity issues till 1991. 
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the firm’s after tax and interest cash flow scaled by assets which proxies for internal 
finance or cash flow innovations as stated by Almeida and Campello (2005).  
Other measures of liquidity of firms that we use include the cash stock 
(Cashstock), retained earnings (Retained) and Liquid (Liquid) which is the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities, all scaled by assets. (Log Sales) is the 
log of sales that controls for size effects. (INV/A) is the investment undertaken by the 
firm scaled by assets.  We rely on Tobin’s Q (Q) to control for growth opportunities. 
Finally (Tax) controls for the effect of taxes on capital structure.  
Figure 3.3: Leverage of Small and Large Firms 
 
Table 3.1 also gives the summary statistics of firms according to various measures of 
financial constraints.  Firms that have low real assets (financially constrained firms) 
have low leverage, are smaller in size and have less growth opportunities (column 2), 
while firms that have high real assets (financially unconstrained) have high leverage, 
are larger in size and have more growth opportunities (column 3).  However, they 
have similar cash flows and there is not much difference in their level of investment.  
Figure 3.3 above shows the behaviour of leverage across firms of different sizes.  As 
expected larger firms are much more leveraged than smaller firms.   
Next in columns (4) and (5), we classify firms as being financially constrained 
and unconstrained according to their coverage ratios.  Firms that have low coverage 
ratio (coverage ratio less than 5) are more leveraged while firms that have high 
coverage ratios are less leveraged and have much higher cash flow than firms with 
low coverage ratio.   In columns (6) and (7) of Table 3.1, we classify firms according 
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to their indebtedness level.  Firms that are highly leveraged as shown in column (6) 
have low cash flow while firms that have low leverage have quite high cash flow 
(column 7). 
 
3.8 	
 
 
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for the full sample of firms using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. We 
use the first-difference GMM estimator as it takes into account both firm specific 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of our regressors.  Overall, the results 
obtained suggest that profitability negatively influences the leverage of listed 
manufacturing firms in the UK as indicated by the negative coefficient of -0.527 on 
the internal finance variable measured by cash flow. This is in accordance with the 
POT, implying that firms always prefer to use internal finance first.  Hence when 
firms are faced with positive cash flow innovations, they tend to reduce their use of 
leverage. 
The positive coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 0.429, which 
suggests that the speed of adjustment to a target leverage is 0.571, which indicates 
that firms take around two years to move back to their target leverage28.  The 
coefficient is positive and less than one suggesting that there are significant 
adjustment costs involved for firms to move to their target debt ratios.  Therefore, 
firms try to move to their target level of leverage over time rather than adjusting 
immediately to their target.  The coefficient of 0.018 on the Log Sales variable 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between size and leverage that is in 
accordance with the TOT.  This suggests that larger firms have easier access to 
external financing as lenders are possibly more willing to lend to them.  The positive 
coefficients on the investment and Tobin’s Q variables (0.168 and 0.006 respectively) 
are according to the POT suggesting that firms that invest more and that have more 
growth opportunities are more highly levered as they require more funds.  The 
positive coefficient of 0.019 on the tax variable suggests that the more taxes firms 
have to pay the more highly levered they are.  This suggests that firms do indeed use 
the tax shield that debt provides29.   
                                                 
28 The coefficient of 0.571 is obtained as 1 less 0.429. 
29 When a firm takes debt, it has to pay interest on it.  This interest payment is usually tax deductible as 
it artificially reduces the profit of the firm.  The firm thus pays less in taxes. 
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We test for the robustness of our results in columns (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and 
(7) Table 3.2.  In column (2) of Table 3.2 we use a net leverage measure as our 
dependent variable.  This net leverage measure is calculated as the sum of short-term 
debt plus long-term debt minus cash stock.  In column (3), we use short-term debt 
(STD) as our dependent variable which consists of debt with a maturity of less than 
one year.  In column (4) we use a long-term debt measure (LTD) that only takes into 
account leverage with a maturity of more than one year.  The results obtained indicate 
that there is a negative relationship between these various forms of leverage and cash 
flow indicating that when firms experience an increase in cash flow, they tend to 
reduce their leverage.  The signs on other coefficients are as expected.  We find that 
there is a negative relationship between leverage and cash flow and find that this 
result holds when we consider alternative measures of leverage.  
 To further test whether this negative relationship is robust, we use alternative 
measures of internal finance.  Therefore, in column (5) of Table 3.2, we use a cash 
stock measure (Cashstock/A) which is calculated as the sum of cash, bank balances, 
short-term loans and deposits and short-term investments.  In column (6) we use 
retained earnings of firms (Retained/A) as our measure of internal finance. In column 
(7) we use a liquid assets measure (Liquid/A) calculated as current assets minus 
current liabilities and represent those assets such as debtors and stock that can be 
readily converted into cash.  The results obtained again indicate that firms tend to 
reduce their leverage when they experience an increase in their internal finance.   
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In this section, we discuss the regression results obtained when we examine the 
relationship between debt and cash flow innovations, taking into account financial 
constraints faced by firms. The specification that we use to test our propositions is as 
follows: 
 
(LEV/A) it= β0 + β11(LEV/A)it-1*CONSTRAINEDit + β12 (LEV/A)it-1* CONSTRAINEDit 
+β21(Cash Flow/A)it * CONSTRAINED it + β22 (Cash Flow/A)it *UNCONSTRAINED it 
+ β3(Log Sales)it+β4(INV/A)it+β5(Q)it+β6(TAX)it + νi + νt + εit                           (3.16) 
 
where i indexes firms, i=1,2,3….N and t indexes years, t=1,2,3….T  
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The instruments used therefore are (LEV/A)it*CONSit, (LEV/A)it*UNCONSit ,(INV/A)it 
,(log Sales)it, (Q)it ,(Tax)it ,(CASHFLOW/A)it*CONS and (CASHFLOW/A)it*UNCONS 
all  lagged two to five times. 
In column (1) of Table 3.3, we interact the cash flow term with two dummies: 
CONSTRAINED is a dummy that equals to one if the firm is financially constrained 
and 0 otherwise. UNCONSTRAINED is a dummy that equals to one if the firm is 
financially unconstrained and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that when faced with 
positive cash flow innovations, firms that are financially unconstrained are able to 
reduce their leverage by a more significant amount than firms that are financially 
constrained. As described earlier, we first measure financial constraints according to 
the distribution of the real assets of firms.    
The coefficients show that firms that are financially unconstrained reduce debt 
by a larger amount (-0.584) when faced with cash flow innovations than firms that are 
financially constrained (-0.476).  Testing for the equality of coefficients obtained, the 
F-statistics on the coefficients of cash flow variable interacted with the CONS and 
UNCONS firm-year dummies is (F(2, 612)= 36.57) which indicates that the 
coefficients obtained are statistically different from each other.  These results are 
similar to those obtained by Almeida and Campello (2005) who find that financially 
constrained firms in the US are not able to reduce their leverage as much as their 
unconstrained counterparts. 
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable for constrained firm-years is 
0.390 while for constrained firms it is 0.440.  This indicates that adjustment level to a 
target leverage is 0.691 for constrained firm-years while it is 0.560 for unconstrained 
firm-years30.  The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that constrained firm-years 
adjust to a target leverage much faster than unconstrained firm-years.  One reason for 
this could be that it is costly for constrained firms to be away from their target 
leverage. The F-statistics obtained on the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables in column 1, (F(2, 612)= 78.60) indicate that the coefficients obtained for 
the CONS and UNCONS firm-years are statistically different from each other.  
In column (2), we replace the cash flow measure with a profitability measure 
to check the robustness of our results. Again, the results indicate that the sensitivity of 
leverage to variations in internal funds is less negative for constrained firms (-0.375) 
                                                 
30 These coefficients are obtained as 1 minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
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than for unconstrained firms (-0.527).  This suggests that as profits rise, unconstrained 
firms reduce debt by a more significant amount than constrained firms.    The F-
statistics (F(2, 612)= 25.97) indicates that the coefficients obtained for the 
constrained and unconstrained firms are statistically different from each other. 
The results obtained are also robust when we distinguish between constrained 
and unconstrained firms using the coverage ratio.  Unconstrained firms (firms with a 
coverage ratio of more than five) are able to reduce their leverage by higher amount (-
0.523) than firms that are financially constrained (firms with a coverage ratio less than 
five with a coefficient of -0.331).  Similar results hold for firms that are classified as 
constrained or unconstrained according to their level of indebtedness as shown in 
column 4 of Table 3.3. 
Regarding the diagnostics test in all cases, we find that m2 (the test for second 
order serial correlation) indicates that we do not have the problem of second order 
serial correlation of the residuals.  The p-value associated with the Sargan test 
indicates that the instruments we are using are correct and that our model is correctly 
specified in all cases. We perform additional robustness checks using different cut-off 
levels at the 30th percentile rather than the 25th percentile for the distribution of real 
assets and indebtedness levels and the results we obtain are again robust31.  These 
results are shown in Table 3.432. 
What do these results suggest?  These results suggest that firms are dependent 
on cash flow.  When faced with cash flow innovations, both constrained and 
unconstrained firms try to reduce their leverage.  Another possible interpretation for 
this behaviour is as follows: when unconstrained firms experience a cash flow 
innovation, they can afford to use up the cash flow in debt repayments.  Because these 
firms are financially unconstrained, they can afford to take debt if other investment 
opportunities arise.   
However, when constrained firms experience a cash flow innovation they are 
not able to reduce their leverage as much as the unconstrained firms.  The 
explanations could be as follows: first, constrained firms who have difficulty getting 
access to external funds, optimally need to allocate the extra cash towards profitable 
investment opportunities.  Second, because they know they cannot get external 
                                                 
31 The results above also confirm the predictions of Almeida and Campello (2005).   
32 We do additional robustness tests.  We use employment levels and tangible assets to distinguish 
between constrained and unconstrained firms.  The results obtained, although not reported are once 
again robust. 
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finance easily, these constrained firms save part of the cash flow to undertake 
investment opportunities that might arise later.  It should be noted that the magnitude 
of the coefficients are not very different for constrained and unconstrained firms.  
This could possibly be explained by the fact that listed firms in the UK do not vary 
much in firm-characteristics and thus constrained firms are not very “constrained”33. 
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Previous studies on capital structure have mainly examined the determinants of debt 
or focused on the debt-equity mix choice of firms.  At the same time, studies that have 
taken into account financial constraints faced by firms have mainly examined 
investment-cash flow sensitivities.  In this paper, we merge these two different strands 
of literature and try to examine how financial constraints affect the leverage of firms.  
In particular, as the main innovative aspect, we examine how financial constraints 
affect the relationship between leverage and cash flow.   
First, we establish the fact that firms indeed follow a financial hierarchy as 
proposed by the pecking order when they decide what sources of finance they use.  
We find that there is a negative relationship between leverage and cash flow 
indicating that when a firm experiences cash flow innovations, it tends to reduce the 
amount of leverage in its capital structure.  This result suggests that firms always 
prefer to use internal finance when it is available and also points towards a debt 
conservatism approach of firms that has clearly been observed in the last two decades.  
Other factors that affect leverage in our study are the size of firms, their investment 
and their growth opportunities. 
Next, we use a number of criteria proposed in the literature to distinguish 
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms.  These criteria include the 
distribution of real assets of firms, coverage ratios and the level of indebtedness of 
firms.  Similar to the results obtained by Almeida and Campello (2005) who study 
firms in the US, we find that for firms in the UK, when real uses of funds are 
correlated with variations in internal funds for firms that are financially constrained, 
the sensitivity of debt to variations in internal funds is less negative for constrained 
firms than for unconstrained firms.  In other words, our findings suggest that when 
unconstrained firms experience an increase in internal finance, they are able to reduce 
                                                 
33 Listed firms in the UK possibly are less financially constrained and suffer less from information 
asymmetry.  
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their leverage by a larger amount than unconstrained firms.  Our results also suggest 
that constrained firms revert back to their target leverage faster than their 
unconstrained counterparts, possibly because it is costly for them to be away from 
their target leverage.   
Overall, the results we obtain suggest that firms in the UK are quite financially 
conservative.  The other news (not surprising) is that firms in the UK behave in a 
quite similar manner as their US counterparts.  We find that even listed firms who 
have the broadest menu of financing choices actually chose from a few sources of 
finance and among them internally generated funds and debt are the most important 
sources. 
It should be noted that in this study we have mainly distinguished between 
financial constraints by considering overall financial constraints, that is, by taking into 
account factors like real assets, coverage ratios and indebtedness levels.  These are 
mainly factors that outsiders would look at to determine whether a firm appears to be 
financially constrained or unconstrained and whether they would like to lend to that 
firm or not.  
The other set of financial constraints that have been sidelined in this study are 
internal financial constraints.  If the pecking order is true then the main factor that 
would influence whether a firm would go for external finance or not, are internal 
financial constraints. For instance, if a firm has sufficient funds then it will choose not 
to have recourse to external finance and will use its internal funds.   In this case, 
overall financial constraints are irrelevant for the firm.  On the other hand, if a firm is 
internally financially constrained and needs external funding, then obviously overall 
financial constraints are very important. This issue is considered in the next chapter 
where we examine the financing of small and medium size enterprises in the UK, as 
these firms are more likely to suffer from financial constraints than the firms studied 
in this chapter. 
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Most studies on capital structure have examined the relationship between debt and 
equity.  However, a number of firms do not have access to equity markets and a 
majority do not issue shares at all.  In this case, the two most important sources of 
financing of firms are internal funds (for instance cash flow) and debt (as the major 
form of external finance).   Firms like to be financially flexible (Graham and Harvey, 
2001) and one way for firms to be financially flexible is to use internal finance 
whenever they are able to do so. Consequently, one of the important factors that 
determine leverage, that is debt levels in firms, is the level of their internally 
generated funds.   
The main innovation in this chapter is that we study the relationship between 
debt and cash flow, the two main sources of finance for most firms by taking into 
account the internal and overall financial constraints that firms face.  As far as we 
know, this has not been studied in the literature before.  By internal financial 
constraints we are mainly referring to the level of internally generated funds which 
would determine whether or not a firm decides to go for external financing.  We 
proxy for the level of internally generated funds by mainly taking into account the 
cash flows and profitability of firms. Overall financial constraints refer to the ease 
with which firms get access to external financing. A firm might be internally 
financially constrained by the level of its cash flows but not financially constrained 
overall if it can access external financing. To proxy for overall constraints, we use 
conventionally used measures of financial constraints in the literature and take into 
account the distribution of real assets of firms and a measure of risk.  
We study unquoted firms in the UK, while the majority of studies in this field 
have mainly examined quoted firms, due to easy data availability. Unquoted firms are 
mainly Small and Medium-sized firms (SMEs) which do not have access to stock 
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markets and rely mainly on debt as their primary source of external finance.  It is 
interesting to study the financial policies of these firms regarding their debt policy 
decisions as these firms are likely to be debt-dependent. 
One of the few studies that have examined  SMEs’ access to finance in the UK 
include Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin (2006) who specifically examine firm’s access 
to bank and market finance.  They develop a model that determines how firms’ 
characteristics such as size, risk and debt determines their access to bank or market 
finance.  Bougheas et al (2006) also examine how firms’ characteristics influence 
their access to credit when there is a change in the interest rates.  Using data on 
16,000 manufacturing firms in the UK over the 1989-2000 period, Bougheas et al 
(2006) find that smaller, more risky and younger firms are noticeably affected by 
monetary tightening than larger, secure or older firms. 
Debt levels might affect the growth and survival of firms as there are quite a 
number of problems associated with debt, for example repayment of interest and 
capital, costs of financial distress or more importantly, costs of bankruptcy. It is 
therefore important to study how internally generated funds affect debt levels in firms. 
Additionally, most capital structure theories have been developed to explain the 
capital structure of large firms and the question whether these theories apply to SMEs 
is still a puzzle.  
Our results suggest that firms follow a financial hierarchy when deciding what 
sources of finance to use.  Internal financial constraints are important factors that 
influence the amount of debt that a firm has in its capital structure.  The results 
obtained also seem to suggest that however large a firm might be and however easy it 
is for a firm to have access to debt, firms inherently do not like to increase debt in 
their capital structure.  This implies a major reliance of firms, especially unquoted 
ones, on cash flow.  Hence these firms might be constricting their performance 
according to their cash flows.  This has important implications on growth as it 
suggests that if these firms had been less debt averse perhaps they could have 
achieved higher growth.  
Part II is organised as follows:  we present some background information on 
the financing decisions of firms in section 3.11.  In section 3.12, we discuss the 
theoretical implications of our study.  In section 3.13, we describe our dataset and 
present other relevant information. In Section 3.14 we elaborate our empirical 
specification and in section 3.15 we introduce financial constraints in our empirical 
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specification and discuss our classification scheme. Following this in section 3.16, we 
present summary statistics for the full sample and according to the various 
classification schemes we use.  In section 3.17, we discuss our empirical results.  
Section 3.18 concludes.  
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Very few studies have studied the capital structure decisions of firms in the 
UK and even fewer studies have examined the capital structure decisions of small and 
medium-sized firms.  Some exceptions are Bennet and Donelly (1993), Marsh (1982), 
Benito (2003) and Panno (2003) who study the behaviour of quoted firms in the UK 
while  Hughes (1997) and Michaelas et al (1999) study the capital structure decisions 
of small and medium-sized firms in the UK.   
In Part II of this chapter we study unquoted firms.  Unquoted firms are 
obviously likely to suffer from the problem of information asymmetry as unlike 
quoted firms, information on these firms are not made available to market participants 
as compared to quoted firms.  Unquoted firms are more likely to face difficulties to 
obtain external finance as they may have short track record, poor solvency and low 
real assets (Guariglia, 2006).  Because of this we believe that cash flow might be of 
particular importance to these firms and therefore it will have a major impact on the 
leverage decisions of these firms. 
We also investigate the relationship between debt and cash flow by taking into 
account the degree of internal and overall financial constraints that a firm might face. 
Most of the financial constraint literature has only studied how financial constraints 
affect firms’ investment decisions. Financial constraints could possibly affect capital 
structure decisions, that is, the amount of debt that a firm holds.  For instance, the 
degree of financial constraints that a firm faces might well affect the amount of 
internal finance that a firm uses or more importantly the amount of debt that a firm 
has in its capital structure. 
 Unlike the previous chapter, we focus on both internal and overall financial 
constraints.  The reason for doing this is that SMEs are likely to suffer more from 
financial constraints and distinguishing between internal and overall constraints 
enables us to understand which constraints are more important. Internal constraints 
refer to those constraints that determine whether or not a firm would go for external 
financing.  Hence in this case, the level of internally generated funds (mainly cash 
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flow) would determine the amount of debt that a firm has in its capital structure.  The 
other factor that would determine the amount of debt in the capital structure of firms 
is the overall financial constraints that firms might face, which refer to how easy or 
how difficult it is for firms to have access to external financing.                                                                                          
We account for firms having different levels of cash flow and profitability to 
take account of internal financial constraints while we take into account the real assets 
and a measure of risk to account for overall financial constraints and try to show how 
these affect the relationship between debt and cash flow at unquoted firms in the UK.   
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The POT predicts a negative relationship between debt and cash flow, for instance, if 
firms experience an increase in cash flow, they are likely to reduce debt in their 
capitals structure. It is likely that the POT would better explain the financing 
behaviour of unquoted firms as factors like tax advantages would not really be 
relevant for these firms who are much more likely to be cash constrained and debt 
dependent.  If these firms experience an increase in their cash flows they are more 
likely to reduce debt from their capital structure rather than try to shield income from 
taxation as proposed by the TOT. 
The upper portion of the pecking order (new equity financing) is obviously 
irrelevant for unquoted firms as they cannot issue public equity.  Hence the two 
important sources of financing are internal finance and debt. It is likely that a negative 
relationship would exist between debt and cash flow for unquoted firms. Firms that 
have positive cash flows would obviously try to reduce the debt levels in their capital 
structure as smaller firms are more likely to be debt averse.  Therefore the predictions 
of the POT would hold for these firms.  
However, this negative relationship is unlikely to hold throughout.  Many 
firms operate with negative levels of cash flow and they might make losses in a 
number of years.   Firms that have negative cash flows are likely to be more debt 
dependent and would therefore have more debt in their capital structure. In this case 
there is likely to be a positive relationship between the debt level and the negative 
cash flows in these firms.   
 On the other hand, it might also be the case that these firms have negative 
cash flows but still prefer to have low debt levels.  This reasoning can be explained by 
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the fact that undertaking debt implies that interest has to be paid on it.   Obviously 
firms that have negative cash flows would not be able to undertake debt servicing and 
might therefore prefer to have less debt in their capital structure. 
It is true that in many cases internal financial constraints are not binding.  
Firms can get access to external financing if they are large enough or can supply the 
required collateral.  This can be taken into account by considering the overall 
financial constraints that firms face.  If firms still reduce the amount of debt in their 
capital structure despite being large enough this will further point towards the debt 
averse behaviour of firms and give more support to the POT. We use different 
classification schemes (discussed in section 3.16) to distinguish between different 
levels of internal and overall financial constraints that firms might face. 
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Most studies on capital structure of firms have considered all firms in the whole 
economy excluding the financial intermediation sector.  The reason for this is that the 
capital structure of firms in the financial intermediation sector is heavily influenced 
by regulatory requirements34. Instead of analysing firms in the whole economy as has 
been done in a number of studies, we follow Fazzari et al (1988) and study firms only 
belonging to the Manufacturing sector35. This sector is a vital part of the economy and 
is still crucial for the country’s prosperity now and in the future.   It is more likely that 
firms that belong to one sector are more similar than firms belonging to different 
sectors. 
The dataset used is a sample extracted from the Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME) database.  The FAME database is collected by Jordans Bureau Van Dijk for 
commercial use and is constructed from the profit and loss and balance sheet data. 
The database consists primarily of unquoted companies.36   It contains information on 
                                                 
34 For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002) eliminate all financial firms 
such as banks and insurance companies from their sample because the leverage of these firms is 
strongly influenced by explicit investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance and minimum 
capital requirements. 
35 According to the DTI (2004) Manufacturing represents a sixth of the UK economy and it is 
responsible for the majority of UK exports.  It is also one of the biggest employment providers and 
responsible for the bulk of research and development in the UK. 
36 It also contains information on some companies that are quoted on alternative exchanges such as the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Off-Exchange Market (OFEX) however the majority of 
companies do not have access to any stock markets.  To keep our study focussed on unquoted firms, we 
drop some types of firms from the dataset.  These include “Unlimited”, “Public AIM”, “Guarantee” and 
“Public, Not Quoted.” 
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companies in detailed format over the 1994-2003 period.  Our sample covers the same 
period and we have data on 13,556 unquoted manufacturing firms that adds up to 
81,556 firm-year observations. Our sample has an unbalanced structure and the 
number of years of observation varies between 3 and 10.   
We remove all outliers in the dataset by excluding observations that lie in the 
1% tails of each regression variable (discussed in the next section) and also drop all 
firms that appear less than 3 times in the survey.  We allow firms to transit between 
classes and therefore our focus is on firm-years rather than simply years. We allow 
both entry and exit as the use of an unbalanced structure reduces to an extent potential 
survivor bias. Survivorship is of particular importance in our study especially as 
finance plays a very important role in firm survival.   

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Similar to Part I of this Chapter we use the following specification: 
 
(LEV /A) it = β0 + β1(LEV /A)it-1 + β2(Cash Flow /A )it + β3(Log Sales)it  + β4(Sales 
Growth)it+  β5(Structure)it+  β6 (Tax)it + νi + νt + εit                                                     (3.17) 
 
As in the earlier part of the chapter, we consider a comprehensive leverage 
measure, total debt, which considers both long-term debt and short-term debt37. The 
total debt measure (LEV/A) is calculated as total borrowing repayable in less than 1 
year plus total loan capital repayable in one year or more divided by total assets. All 
debt measures in our study include loans, overdrafts, leasing and hire purchase.   
Additionally, we mainly proxy for internal finance with the cash flow of the 
firm (Cash Flow/A) calculated as the firm’s after tax and interest cash flow scaled by 
assets. We use the log of sales (Log sales) to control for size.  We rely on a sales 
growth measure (Sales Growth) to control for growth opportunities as unlike quoted 
firms we cannot calculate Tobin’s Q for unquoted firms. 
Since we use panel data, we include both a firm specific and time specific 
error term.  Hence, the error term now consists of three components: νi is a firm-
                                                 
37 The reason why we limit our study to an overall debt measure is because we are interested in the 
relationship between debt and cash flow.  Considering the components of debt separately eg short-term 
debt and long-term debt would make the analysis more complicated as there are reasons to believe that 
the factors that affect the amount of long-term debt in a firm might not affect the short-term debt and 
vice versa (Titman and Wessels,1988). 
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specific fixed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics, νt 
represents a time specific component and reflects aggregate effects common across 
companies to control for macroeconomic influences, including factors as nominal 
interest rates and inflation, εit is an idiosyncratic error term.  
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We believe that financial constraints are important factors that influence capital 
structure decisions of firms. There are two main factors that we believe would affect 
whether or not a firm goes for external financing (in this case debt).  First it depends 
on whether the firm really needs external financing and this would be determined by 
the amount of internal funds.  In this case internal constraints would influence the 
amount of debt that a firm ultimately needs.  For instance an internally financially 
constrained firm is likely to have more debt in its capital structure than a firm that is 
not internally financially constrained.  As far as we know, there have been no studies 
that have implicitly accounted for the effect of financial constraints on capital 
structure decisions. 
The second factor that would affect the external financing is whether or not the 
firm can have access to external financing (whether or not lenders are willing to lend 
to this firm.)  This issue can be addressed by taking into account overall financial 
constraints, that is, how easy it is for a firm to get external finance.  Factors like firm 
size and the amount of collateral that a firm can provide would provide a good 
measure of overall constraints. 
In this section, we study how the presence of both internal and overall 
financial constraints affects the sensitivity of leverage to cash flow.  It is not possible 
to explicitly include a variable in our empirical specification to account for the 
presence of internal and overall financial constraints on firm behaviour.  We therefore 
have to rely on the use of proxies as discussed below and we make extensive use of 
various classification schemes to capture these two types of constraints. 
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We use a number of different criteria to differentiate among various classes of firms.  
We first divide our firms according to measures of cash flow to capture internal 
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financial constraints.  As a robustness check we use a profitability measure.   We then 
divide our firms in size classes by using the real assets of firms.  As robustness 
checks, we use a riskiness measure.  
Our first sample separation criterion, motivated from Guariglia (2006) and to a 
certain extent from Povel and Raith (2002) is the distribution of real cash flow of the 
firms which we use as a measure of internal financial constraint.  We first divide 
firms-years into two classes, those that have positive cash flows and those that have 
negative cash flows38.  We then move on to further sub-divide firm-years that have 
positive cash flows into 2 separate classes so that we end up with three distinct classes 
of firms. 
We therefore classify those firms that have negative cash flows in any firm-
years as INTERNALLY VERY FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (IVFCit)
39. Next we 
classify firm-years that have positive cash flows.  Firms that have their positive real 
cash flows in the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution of the positive real cash 
flows of all firm-years are classified as POSSIBLY NOT INTERNALLY 
FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (PNIFCit). All firms having their real cash flow 
above the 25th percentile of the distribution of the positive real cash flows of all firm-
years are classified as NOT INTERNALLY FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (NIFCit). 
As a robustness check we use the profitability of firms and classify them according to 
the similar criteria as discussed above. 
To distinguish between internal financial constraints from overall financial 
constraints, the sample separation criterion that we use based on the size of the firm, is 
the distribution of real assets of the firms.   We use this measure to mainly take into 
account overall financial constraints which capture the ease or the difficulty with 
which firms might have access to debt.  This is in line with conventionally used 
measures of financial constraints as used in the literature.  Firms that have a high level 
of real assets or tangible assets would be larger and have more collateral and we 
would expect these firms to have fewer difficulties in obtaining external finance as 
lenders would be more willing to lend to these firms. It should be noted that these 
financial constraints measures also capture internal constraints as a firm will only turn 
towards external financing if alternative cheaper internal financing is not available.  
                                                 
38 By focussing on firm-years we allow firms to transit between classes, therefore a firm can have 
negative cash flow in one year and positive cash flow in another year and so on… 
39 Note that all the firms are classified by industry and year. 
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Hence our financial constraint measures account for both internal and external 
constraints and can be assumed to be an overall measure of financial constraints.  As 
above, we consider three different categories of firms.   
Those firms that have their real assets in the lowest 25th percentile of the 
distribution of the real assets of all firm-years are classified as FINANCIALLY 
CONSTRAINEDit (FCit), as these firms would have insufficient internal finance and 
additionally face difficulties to get access to external finance.  Firms that have their 
real assets between the 25th and the 75th percentile of the distribution of the real assets 
of all firm-years are classified as LESS LIKELY TO BE FINANCIALLY 
CONSTRAINED it (LLFCit) as it is unlikely that these firms would have any 
difficulties to get access to external financing. All firms having their real assets in the 
top 25th percentile of the distribution of the real assets of all firm-years are classified 
as NOT FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED it (NFCit) as lenders would be more willing 
to lend to these firms.  
To capture financial constraints (both internal and external), we use another 
measure of sample separation criterion which is the Quiscore40, a measure of the 
riskiness of firms.  The Quiscore is a measure of the likelihood of company failure in 
the twelve months following the date of calculation and we again use this measure to 
account for overall financial constraints. The Quiscore is based on statistical analysis 
of a random selection of companies41. To ensure that the model is not distorted, three 
categories are screened out from the initial selection: major public companies, 
companies that have sort insignificant amounts of unsecured trade credit and 
liquidated companies that have a surplus of assets over liabilities. The QuiScore is 
given as a number in the range 0 to 100.   
Companies that have Quiscore value between 40 and 0 are unstable and high 
risk companies and we classify these companies as RISKYit.  It is more likely that 
risky companies are smaller. Companies that have Quiscore between 80 and 41 tend 
to be stable and normal companies and we classify these companies as SAFEit.  
Companies that have Quiscore in the range 81-100 are believed to be secure 
companies and we classify these companies as SECUREit. 
                                                 
40 See Data Appendix for further details on how this measure is calculated. 
41 The QuiScore is intended to be an aid to the financial part of the overall assessment, and has to be 
considered in conjunction with other information such as seasonal trends, product life cycles, 
competition, interest rates and other micro and macro-economic factors. The stability of many 
companies is reliant of that of holding companies or other associates on which separate enquiries 
should be made. 
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Table 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the unquoted firms. The financing 
pattern of the sample of unquoted manufacturing firms in the UK is captured by the 
(LEV/A), (STD/A), and (LTD/A) variables.  (LEV/A) is the book leverage (short-term 
debt plus long-term debt) of the firm scaled by assets, (STD/A) is short-term debt 
while (LTD/A) is long-term debt, both scaled by assets.  (CF/A) is the firm’s after tax 
and interest cash flow scaled by assets, (Log Sales) is the log of sales that controls for 
size effects. We rely on a sales growth measure (Sales Growth) to control for growth 
opportunities. (Structure) is an asset structure variable that controls for the level of 
collateral and finally (Tax) controls for the effect of taxes on capital structure.   
As expected, unquoted firms have quite high overall leverage at 33% with 
long-term debt representing 15% of assets and short-term debt at 20.8% of assets.  
The reliance of unquoted firms on debt can be explained by the fact that unlike their 
quoted counterparts, these firms cannot issue shares on the stock market.  They are 
therefore constrained in their financing choices.   Cash flow is also quite high at 10% 
of assets. 
In Table 3.6 we present the descriptive statistics of the firms according to their 
degree of internal financial constraints as measured by the different levels of cash 
flow. Firms with negative levels of cash flow have much higher overall debt (45%), 
compared to that of firms with positive cash flows.  These summary statistics suggest 
an inverse relationship between debt and cash flow; however, this has to be further 
investigated.  They also point out that unquoted firms are much more debt dependent.  
The summary statistics also suggest that firms do not face any problems in getting 
access to debt finance.  Firms that have negative cash flow have high debt.  However 
is this relationship as straightforward as it seems?  We analyse this issue in the next 
section.  
  In Table 3.7, we consider overall financial constraints, measured by the level 
of real assets.  As can be observed, there is not a very pronounced difference in cash 
flows in unquoted firms of different sizes.  However, larger unquoted firms have 
higher long-term debt at 19% of assets, indicating perhaps that these firms can afford 
to have higher debt because they are larger in size and can secure debt more easily. 
We estimate equation (3.17) using the first-difference Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, (Arellano and Bond, 1991) which takes into account both 
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firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. Our instrument 
set includes (LEV/A )it ,(CF /A)it, (Log sales)it , (Sales Growth)it , (Structure)it  and 
(Tax)it   which are lagged 2 to 5 times.   
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The results obtained for the unquoted firms using the GMM estimator as shown in 
Table 3.8, give more support to the POT.  The empirical evidence points towards a 
negative relationship between debt and cash flow. Firms that have more internal funds 
(cash flow) have less debt in their capital structure (indicated by the negative and 
highly significant coefficient on the cash flow variable of -0.259) which is consistent 
with the POT.  A one standard deviation change in cash flow is likely to bring about a 
3% change in the debt level. 
 Larger firms have less debt indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient of -0.106 on the sales variable suggesting that larger firms are less debt-
dependent.  This is again in accordance to the POT.  The coefficient on the growth 
variable is not significant indicating that retaining debt capacity is not really a priority 
for unquoted firms.   This might also suggest that these firms are myopic and they 
cannot perfectly foresee growth opportunities.  The tax variable is also insignificant 
suggesting that tax considerations are not very important for firms in the UK as most 
of them normally benefit from low tax rates.  The coefficient on the structure variable 
is insignificant suggesting that the amount of collateral that a firm can provide has no 
influence on its debt level.  Although this seems strange, it can be explained by the 
fact that manufacturing firms have assets that are “specialised” and cannot really 
serve as collateral (see Schaller, 1993 and Guariglia, 2006). 
Regarding the results of our first difference GMM estimations, we find that 
m2 (the test for second order serial correlation is 0.237) indicates that we do not have 
the problem of second order serial correlation of the residuals.  The p-value associated 
with the Sargan test is 0.934, indicating that the instruments we are using are correct 
and that our model is correctly specified.  
As a robustness check, we use another proxy for the level of internally 
generated funds by considering the profitability of firms.  The results (shown in 
column 2 of Table 3.8) are robust to the ones obtained previously and point towards a 
negative relationship between the debt level and profitability. 
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We now investigate how different levels of cash flow at firms affect the relationship 
between firm leverage and cash flow. We use the IVFC, PNIFC and NIFC dummies 
in our leverage regressions as interactions on the cash flow term, the aim being to 
investigate how having different levels of cash flow influences the relationship 
between debt and cash flow.  In this way, we also allow firms to transit between 
classes. The use of interaction terms on the cash flow variable also allows us to avoid 
running separate regressions on sub-sample of firms with different levels of cash flow.   
Additionally, we avoid problems of endogenous sample selection and gain degrees of 
freedom (Guariglia, 2006). The following specification is used: 
 
(LEV /A) it  = β0 + β11 (LEV/A)it-1* IVFC it+ β12 (LEV/A)it-1*PNIFC it + β13 (LEV /A)it-1* NIFC it  
+ β21 (Cash Flow /A)it *IVFC it +β22 (Cash Flow /A)it*PNIFC it +β23(Cash Flow/ )it * NIFC it + 
β3(LogSales)it+ β4(Sales Growth)it + β5(STRUC)it +β6 TAX)it+ νi + νt + εit                   (3.18) 
 
where the variables are as defined previously and the lagged dependent variable and 
the cash flow variable are interacted in turn with the dummy variables IVFC, PNIFC 
and NIFC42.  As discussed previously, IVFC firms (firms with negative cash flow) 
would possibly have more debt in their capital structure leading to a positive 
relationship between debt and negative cash flow for these firms.  However, it might 
also be the case that these firms would avoid taking debt (due to inability to service 
debt) in which case the relationship between leverage and negative cash flow would 
be negative.  For the PNIFC and NIFC firms (firms with positive cash flow), we 
would expect the relationship between leverage and cash flow to be positive if the 
TOT holds but negative if the POT holds. 
                                                 
42 IVFC firms are VERY INTERNALLY FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (negative cash flow).  PNIFC 
firms are POSSIBLY NOT INTERNALLY FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (cash flow in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution).  NIFC firms are NOT INTERNALLY FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED (cash 
flow in the top 3 quartiles of the distribution of all positive cash flows.) 
We also separate our firms in two classes, those that have positive cash flows and those that have 
negative cash flows. The results are reported in Table 3.11. 
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To check the robustness of our results, we use a similar regression but the cash 
flow variable is replaced with a profitability measure. 
 
(LEV/A) it  = β0 + β11 (LEV/A)it-1*IVFC it+ β12 (LEV/A)it-1* PNIFC it + β13 (LEV/A)it-1* NIFC it  
+ β21 (PROFIT /A )it * IVFC it + β22 (PROFIT /A )it * PNIFC it + β23 (PROFIT /A )it*NIFC it + 
β3(Log Sales)it+β (Sales Growth)it + β5 (Structure)it +β6(Tax)it+ νi + νt + εit              (3.19) 
 
where the variables are as defined previously and the lagged dependent variable and 
the profitability variable are interacted in turn with the dummy variables IVFC, 
PNIFC and NIFC, this time classified by industry and year according to their level of 
profits. 
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In this section, we go a step further and examine the impact of both internal and 
external constraints on debt policy decisions of firms.  In this way, we capture overall 
financial constraints which refer to how easy or difficult it is for a firm to get access to 
debt.  It would be interesting to study the behaviour of firms depending on how easily 
they can get access to debt finance.  The POT, for instance suggests that firms that 
have low cash flows would have more debt in their capital structure while firms that 
have high cash flows would have lower debt.  
 But we also have to consider the fact that in some cases firms might not have 
easy access to debt in which case the presence or absence of overall (both internal and 
overall) financial constraints would affect the relationship between leverage and cash 
flow.  This would give rise to three scenarios as illustrated below: 
Scenario 1: If a firm is internally financially unconstrained, in this case access 
to debt will not matter. Hence overall the firm is financially unconstrained. 
Scenario 2: If a firm is internally financially constrained, in this case access to 
debt matters.  If the firm has easy access to debt, then overall, the firm is financially 
unconstrained. 
Scenario 3: If a firm is internally financially constrained, in this case access to 
debt matters.  If the firm has no access to debt, then overall, the firm is financially 
constrained. 
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 To account for the presence of overall financial constraints, we interact the 
cash flow term with size measures.  First, we distinguish among firms by classifying 
them according to the distribution of their real assets (see section 3.15).   In other 
words, we investigate if the size of a firm affects the relationship between debt and 
cash flow using the following empirical specification: 
 
(LEV /A) it  = β0 + β11 (LEV/A)it-1* FC it +β12 (LEV /A)it-1* LLFC it+β13(LEV /A)it-1* NFC it + 
β21(Cash Flow /A )it*FC it +β22 (Cash Flow /A )it*LLFC it +β23 (Cash Flow/A)it*NFC it + 
 β3 (Log Sales )it + β4 (Sales Growth)it + β5 (Structure)it +β6 (Tax)it  + νi + νt + εit          (3.19) 
 
where the variables are as defined previously but the cash flow variable is interacted 
in turn with the dummy variablesFC it, LLFC it and NFC
43
 it . These dummies are used 
in the leverage regressions as interactions on the cash flow term to control for access 
to external finance.    The reason for doing this is that we want to investigate what 
happens to the relationship between debt and cash flow at unquoted firms when we 
take into account firms’ access to external finance. 
To check for the robustness of our results, we use the following specification:   
  
(LEV /A) it = β0 β11 (LEV/A)it-1* RISKY it+β12(LEV/A)it-1*SAFE it+β13 (LEV/A)it-1* SECURE it  + 
β21 (Cash Flow/A)it*RISKYit+β22(Cash Flow/A)it*SAFE it+ β23 (Cash flow /A )it* SECURE it + 
β3 ( Log Sales)it  + β4 (Sales Growth)it + β5 (Structure)it +β6 (Tax)it  + νi + νt + εit       (3.20) 
  
where the variables are as defined previously but the cash flow variable is interacted 
in turn with the dummy variablesRISKY it, SAFE it and SECURE it  based on firms’ 
Quiscore measures are as defined in section 3.15. 
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In column 1 of Table 3.9, we investigate how internal financial constraints affect the 
debt level in unquoted firms.  The results generally point towards a negative 
relationship between debt and cash flow for all the three categories of firms defined in 
section 3.15.    There is a negative relationship between negative cash flow and debt. 
                                                 
43 FC firms have their real assets in the bottom quartile of the distribution of all real assets while LLFC 
firms have their real assets in the middle quartile of the distribution of all real assets, finally NFC firms 
have their real assets in the top quartile of the distribution of all real assets, all classified by industry 
and by year. 
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This suggests that as negative cash flow goes up (that is there is a deterioration in the 
internal finance of the firm) firms reduce debt in their capital structure. What this 
result essentially says is that the higher the negative cash flows of a firm, the less debt 
it will have in its capital structure.  This would imply that debt servicing is a very 
important factor that firms take into account while deciding what sources of finance to 
use.  Firms that have negative cash flows might be debt dependent but they might also 
be debt conservative as they might not want high debt levels which can possibly lead 
to bankruptcy. 
As negative cash flow decreases, the firm starts to borrow (possibly due to an 
improvement in its balance sheet situation) and consequently has higher debt in its 
capital structure.  The coefficient on the cash flow variable for firms with medium 
cash flows (PNFC firm-years) although positive (0.108) is insignificant.  Hence, we 
cannot really say what is happening to debt levels in these firms.  It could possibly be 
the case that these unquoted firms being more debt dependent cannot really reduce 
debt in their capital structure even when they have positive but low levels of cash 
flows.   For firms that have high cash flows (NFC firm-years), there is a negative and 
significant relationship between cash flow and debt (-0.251) that confirms the POT 
suggesting that firms that have positive cash flows tend to reduce debt in their capital 
structure as they experience an improvement in their internal financing capacity.   
If we look at the magnitude of coefficients -0.651 for IFC firms, and -0.251 for NFC 
firms, the results suggest that firms that have negative cash flows are much more debt 
conservative as a deterioration in their balance sheet would lead them to reduce debt 
by a more significant amount than firms that have positive cash flows.  Firms with 
positive cash flows tend to reduce debt in their capital structure when they experience 
an increase in cash flows but they still remain quite debt dependent.    
Similar results are obtained when as robustness check; we consider 
profitability as a measure of internal finance (column 2 of Table 3.9).  The other 
robustness check we try is that instead of considering three classes of firms, we 
consider two classes of firms, those with negative cash flows and others with positive 
cash flows.  The results shown in Table 3.11 are robust, indicating that the negative 
relationship between leverage and cash flow holds across the distribution of cash 
flows of firms possibly leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship between these 
two important sources of finance for firms. 
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These results suggest that although unquoted firms are a more debt dependent, 
they avoid taking debt when they have high negative cash flows and repay debt when 
they experience an increase in their cash flows.  This points towards a debt-
conservative behaviour of firms in that internally generated funds are the most 
preferred source of financing of firms whatever the level of their cash flows.  It also 
indicates that firm are financially conservative and they inherently do not like debt.   
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The results when we consider overall financial constraints are given in Table 3.10.  
The negative relationship between debt and cash flow still holds when we take into 
account the ease or difficulty with which firms get access to external financing. The 
coefficients obtained on the FC, LLFC and NFC dummies are -0.274, -0.301 and -
0.393 respectively that indicate that overall constraints do not really influence the 
negative relationship between leverage and cash flow.  However, when we look at the 
magnitude of the coefficients it seems that firms that get the easiest access to external 
finance are the most debt-conservative firms.  This can be explained by the fact that 
many large firms in the real world operate with very low levels of leverage while 
some do not have any leverage at all.  
 The fact that a firm can borrow does not seem to affect the negative 
relationship between debt and cash flow. The result makes sense if we consider the 
fact that the major factor that affects whether or not a firm takes debt is the ability of 
the firm to service debt, which in turn depends on the cash flows of the firm,  that is 
its internal financial constraints.  Therefore it is not surprising that the size of firms; 
the overall financial constraint, does not seem to affect the relationship between debt 
and cash flow.  Therefore, small, medium and large unquoted firms avoid taking debt 
in their capital structure.  This result seems to suggest that firms have an inherent 
characteristic that makes them avoid debt.  It also suggests that internal constraints are 
much more relevant and they influence overall constraints. 
As a robustness check, we consider another measure of overall financial 
constraints which is the Quiscore measure.  The Quiscore is a measure of the 
likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the date of calculation 
and this measure is used to account for overall financial constraints (see section 3.15).  
Once again, the results we obtained as shown in column 2 of Table 3.10, are robust to 
those obtained previously and indicate that however easy it is for a firm to get access 
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to external financing, it would not take debt in its capital structure unless if faces a 
shortage of internal funds.  It is obvious that in a developed financial system as in the 
UK, firms would not face problems in obtaining external finance if they really need it 
and therefore not surprising that internal financial constraint matter more than overall 
financial constraints.   
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We examine the relationship between firm leverage and cash flow at unquoted firms 
in the UK since these are the two most important sources of finance of most firms.  
Our results suggest that the relationship between debt and cash flow can be better 
explained by the POT.  Cash flow is a vital source of financing of firms and they seem 
to follow a financial hierarchy when deciding what sources of finance to use.  If firms 
experience an increase in cash flow, they tend to reduce the amount of debt they hold, 
possibly by paying off debt but if cash flow falls firms would increase leverage in 
their capital structure.  
We further investigate this negative relationship by taking into account 
internal financial constraints and overall financial constraints. We find that internal 
financial constraints are the main factors that influence the amount of debt that a firm 
has in its capital structure.  Even if firms have negative cash flows they do not 
increase their leverage, although these firms are likely to be more debt dependent. The 
results obtained when firms are distinguished according to the level of overall 
financial constraints, seem to suggest that however large a firm might be and however 
easy it is for a firm to have access to debt, firms inherently do not like to increase debt 
in their capital structure. The crux of the problem is then whether managers want to 
go for external financing.  Our results seem to indicate that firms in the UK are 
financially conservative.  They prefer to pay back debt when they experience an 
increase in their cash flows rather than borrowing more say to invest and they prefer 
to have less debt when they have negative or low cash flows, possibly to avoid the 
risk of bankruptcy. 
All of this implies a major reliance of firms, especially unquoted ones, on cash 
flow.  Hence these firms might be constricting their performance according to their 
cash flows.  This has important implications on growth as it suggests that if these 
firms had been less debt averse (both when cash flows are negative or positive) 
perhaps they could grow more.  An interesting and related issue that could be 
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investigated here could be the reason why cash flow is so important and what are the 
factors that influence firms to hold cash.  Another interesting study would be to 
investigate the relationship between cash flow and the various components of debt for 
instance short-term debt and long-term debt.  These issues would be investigated in 
future research. 
Part I of this chapter focussed on listed firms in the UK while Part II examined 
the leverage decisions on unlisted firms in the UK.  We compare and contrast, in 
detail, the results obtained for listed and unlisted firms in Part I and Part II of this 
chapter in Chapter 7.  At first glance, the results obtained seem to suggest that the 
leverage decisions of listed firms in the UK can be explained to some extent by both 
the Trade off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory.  On the other hand, the leverage 
decisions of unlisted firms in the UK seem to be better explained by the Pecking 
Order Theory.  Hence we can conclude that SMEs in the UK face a more pronounced 
hierarchy in their sources of finance, among which their most preferred source of 
financing is internal finance. 
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TABLE 3.A: MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Number 
of years 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
4 179 1.37 1.37 
5 237 1.81 3.17 
6 198 1.51 4.68 
7 242 1.85 6.53 
8 220 1.68 8.21 
9 246 1.88 10.08 
10 186 1.42 11.50 
11 324 2.47 13.97 
12 433 3.30 17.28 
13 435 3.32 20.59 
14 305 2.33 22.92 
15 354 2.70 25.62 
16 453 3.46 29.08 
17 433 3.30 32.38 
18 589 4.49 36.87 
19 540 4.12 40.99 
20 461 3.52 44.51 
21 375 2.86 47.37 
22 316 2.41 49.78 
23 158 1.21 50.98 
24 187 1.43 52.41 
25 219 1.67 54.08 
26 288 2.20 56.28 
27 326 2.49 58.76 
28 464 3.54 62.30 
29 552 4.21 66.51 
30 671 5.12 71.63 
31 671 5.12 76.75 
32 1,358 10.36 87.11 
33 1,690 12.89 100.00 
    
Total 13,110 100.00  
 
The data source for this analysis is the Datastream advance database provided by 
Thompson financial.  The database contains accounting data for approximately 1,800 
UK firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange.  The database lists all the firms with 
available accounting data at the time of downloading.  Data is collected over the 
1968-2000 period. We focus only on manufacturing firms that operate in the 
following industries: Metal and Metal goods, Other Minerals and Mineral products, 
Chemicals and man-made fibres, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical and Instrument 
Engineering, Motor Vehicles and Parts, Other Transport Equipment, Food, Drink and 
Tobacco, Textiles, Clothing, Leather and Footwear and Other Manufacturing. We 
exclude firms that have less than 3 consecutive years of observations. 
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DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES USED 
 
(LEV/A) : net book leverage (LEV), calculated as total borrowing repayable in less than 1 year 
plus total loan capital repayable in 1 year or more divided by total assets. 
 
(CF/A): cash flow, calculated as profit after tax and preference dividends plus depreciation 
divided by total assets. 
 
(Cashstock/A):  stock of cash calculated as the sum of cash, bank deposits, short-term loans 
and deposits and investments shown under current assets. 
 
(Current Assets):  includes stocks, work in progress, trade and other debtors, cash equivalent 
and any other current assets. Trade accounts receivable after 1 year are also included. 
 
(Liquid/A): liquid assets calculated as current assets minus current liabilities scaled by assets. 
 
(Profit/A): profit after tax scaled by assets. 
 
(Log Sales): log of real sales. 
 
(INV/A):  investment scaled by assets. 
 
(Retained/A): retained earnings scaled by assets. 
 
(Q): Tobin’s Q calculated as the enterprise value plus total loan capital minus total cash and 
cash equivalent divided by the replacement value of assets. 
 
(TAX/PROFIT): tax paid as a ratio of profit before tax. 
 
New equity:  Net equity issued for cash and acquisition. This is only available up to 
1991, until the introduction of the cash flow standard FRS1 and FRS1(Rev) which 
became compulsory in March 1992. Figures are net of share repurchases. 
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TABLE 3.1:SUMMARY STATISTICS (Listed Firms) 
 Full 
Sample 
 
 
(1) 
Low 
Real 
Assets 
 
(2) 
High 
Real 
Assets 
 
(3) 
Low  
Coverage 
 
 
(4) 
High  
Coverage 
 
 
(5) 
High 
Leverage 
 
 
(6) 
Low 
Leverage 
 
 
(7) 
(LEV /A)it 
 
0.146 
(0.100) 
0.109 
(0.101) 
0.157 
(0.096) 
0.213 
(0.084) 
0.119 
(0.092) 
0.183 
(0.082) 
0.023 
(0.029) 
(STD)it 
 
0.077 
(0.071) 
0.072 
(0.078) 
0.078 
(0.068) 
0.111 
(0.075) 
0.063 
(0.064) 
0.096 
(0.070) 
0.014 
(0.020) 
(LTD)it 
 
0.069 
(0.073) 
0.037 
(0.056) 
0.079 
(0.074) 
0.102 
(0.079) 
0.056 
(0.066) 
0.087 
(0.073) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
(Net LEV)it 
 
0.017 
(0.143) 
-0.014 
(0.151) 
0.026 
(0.139) 
0.129 
(0.103) 
-0.072 
(0.101) 
0.064 
(0.123) 
-0.140 
(0.076) 
(Cash 
Flow/A)it  
0.132 
(0.070) 
0.130 
(0.080) 
0.133 
(0.067) 
0.084 
(0.055) 
0.170 
(0.055) 
0.122 
(0.067) 
0.165 
(0.067) 
(Profit/A)it 0.093 
(0.067) 
0.088 
(0.079) 
0.094 
(0.064) 
0.045 
(0.053) 
0.131 
(0.050) 
0.083 
(0.064) 
0.127 
(0.065) 
(Cashstock/A)it 0.069 
(0.086) 
0.072 
(0.102) 
0.068 
(0.080) 
0.049 
(0.065) 
0.077 
(0.091) 
0.056 
(0.073) 
0.114 
(0.107) 
(Retained/A)it 0.034 
(0.041) 
0.035 
(0.044) 
0.034 
(0.039) 
0.007 
(0.045) 
0.045 
(0.033) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.051 
(0.037) 
(Liquid/A)it 0.240 
(0.140) 
0.269 
(0.156) 
0.231 
(0.133) 
0.189 
(0.126) 
0.260 
(0.140) 
0.218 
(0.130) 
0.313 
(0.146) 
(Log Sales)it  6.659 
(1.526) 
4.980 
(0.664) 
7.160 
(1.342) 
6.776 
(1.585) 
6.613 
(1.500) 
6.869 
(1.525) 
5.925 
(1.282) 
(INV/A) it 
 
0.040 
(0.043) 
0.039 
(0.045) 
0.040 
(0.042) 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.034 
(0.044) 
0.040 
(0.042) 
0.040 
(0.043) 
(Q) it 
 
2.817 
(2.492) 
2.564 
(2.500) 
2.892 
(2.484) 
2.385 
(1.936) 
2.986 
(2.659) 
2.886 
(2.434) 
2.583 
(2.665) 
(Tax) it 
 
0.415 
(0.242) 
0.394 
(0.273) 
0.421 
(0.231) 
0.336 
(0.288) 
0.471 
(0.182) 
0.401 
(0.241) 
0.461 
(0.217) 
Sample size 
 
11761 2579 
 
8661 
 
3225 
 
8015 
 
8628 
 
2612 
 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the 
sample means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1968-2000.  
(LEV/A) is the sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by assets.  The other measures of leverage 
are long-term debt over assets (LTD/A), short-term debt over assets (STD/A) and net leverage (Net 
LEV/A).  (CF/A) is cash flow divided by assets, our main measure of liquidity. Other measures of 
liquidity of firms that we use include the cash stock (Cashstock/A), retained earnings (Retained/A) and 
Liquid (Liquid/A) which is the difference between current assets and current liabilities.  (Log Sales) is 
the log of sales and (INV/A) is the firm’s investment as a percentage of assets, we use a Tobin’s Q (Q) 
to proxy for growth opportunities and (TAX) is the proportion of tax paid as a percentage of profit  that 
proxies for tax rate.   In column (2) and (3) descriptive statistics are presented for firm-years that have 
their real assets in the lowest 25th percentile of the distribution of the real assets, classified by industry 
and year and firm years having their real assets in the top 3 quartiles of the distribution of all assets, 
classified by industry and year, respectively. In columns (4) and (5) descriptive statistics are presented 
for firm-years according to their coverage ratios. In column (6) and (7) descriptive statistics are 
presented for firm-years according to their level of indebtedness. 
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TABLE 3.2: REGRESSION RESULTS (Listed Firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(LEV /A)it-1 
 
0.429*** 
(0.031) 

0.259*** 
(0.023) 
 
0.325*** 
(0.032) 
 
0.489*** 
(0.036) 
 
0.505*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.452*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.439*** 
(0.030) 
 
(INTERNAL 
FINANCE/A)it 
-0.527*** 
(0.055) 
-1.437*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.373*** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
 
-0.109* 
(0.059) 
 
-0.574*** 
(0.073) 
 
-0.345*** 
(0.036) 
 
(Log Sales)it 
 
0.018* 
(0.010) 

0.022** 
(0.011) 
 
0.019*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
 
0.015 
(0.014) 
 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
 
(INV/A) it 
 
 
0.168*** 
(0.075)
0.220*** 
(0.076) 
 
0.106 
(0.070) 
 
0.042 
(0.060) 
 
-0.169 
(0.128) 
 
0.121 
(0.081) 
 
-0.106 
(0.077) 
 
(Q) it 
 
 
0.006*** 
(0.002)
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
(TAX) it 
 
 
0.019* 
(0.012)
0.010 
(0.012) 
 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
 
0.019*** 
(0.008) 
 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
 
Sample size 3809 

3776 
 
3809 
 
3809 
 
3809 
 
3809 
 
3809 
 
J 0.341 

0.304 
 
0.443 
 
0.388 
 
0.126 
 
0.462 
 
0.510 
 
m2 0.942 0.144 0.740 0.752 0.579 0.716 0.424 
 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  The J 
statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument 
validity.   Instruments used are (LEV/A )it, (Cashflow/A)i ,(INV/A)it ,(log Sales)it, (Q)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two 
to five times. Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments. In column (1), we 
use an overall debt level as the dependent variable,  measured as short term debt plus long term debt. In column 
(2) we use the net debt measure as the dependent variable.  In column (3) we use long-term debt as the 
dependent variable while in column (4) we use short-term debt as the dependent variable.  In columns (1), (2), 
(3) and (4) we use cash flow as our measure of internal finance.  In columns (5), (6) and (7), we check for the 
robustness of our results by considering alternative measures of internal financing. In column (5), we use a cash 
stock measure (Cashstock/A) as our measure of internal finance.  In column (6) we use retained earnings of 
firms’ (Retained/A) as our measure of internal finance. In column (7) we use a liquid assets measure (Liquid/A) 
calculated as current assets minus current liabilities and represent those assets such as debtors and stock that can 
be readily converted into cash. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Also see notes to Tables 3.1. 
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TABLE 3.3: EFFECT OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS (Listed Firms) 
Financial 
Constraints 
Measured by 
Real Assets 
(1) 
Real Assets 
(2) 
Coverage  
Ratio 
(3) 
Indebtedness 
(4) 
(LEV /A)it-1*CONS 
 
 
0.390*** 
(0.051) 
 
0.464*** 
(0.075) 
 
0.396*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.387*** 
(0.035) 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*UNCONS 
 
0.440*** 
(0.035) 
 
0.442*** 
(0.038) 
 
0.457*** 
(0.038) 
 
0.463*** 
(0.057) 
 
(Log Sales)it 0.004 
(0.013) 
 
0.005 
(0.013) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
0.007 
(0.012) 
 
(INV/A) it 
 
 
0.160*** 
(0.088) 
 
0.224*** 
(0.092) 
 
0.196*** 
(0.093) 
 
0.118* 
(0.081) 
 
(Q) it 
 
 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
 
(TAX) it 
 
 
0.013 
(0.013) 
 
0.013 
(0.013) 
 
0.007 
(0.013) 
 
0.011 
(0.012) 
 
(CASHFLOW/A)it*CONS it 
 
 
-0.476*** 
(0.086) 
 
-- 
 
 
-0.331*** 
(0.083) 
 
-0.349*** 
(0.059) 
 
(CASHFLOW/A)it*UNCONS it 
 
 
-0.584*** 
(0.069) 
 
-- 
 
 
-0.523*** 
(0.063) 
 
-0.647*** 
(0.063) 
 
(PROFIT/A)it*CONS it 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-0.375*** 
(0.091) 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
(PROFIT/A)it*UNCONS it 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-0.527*** 
(0.074) 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
Sample size 3809 3809 3809 3809 
J 0.166 0.062 0.044 0.165 
m2 0.950 0.869 0.878 0.960 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. In column (1), we interact the cash flow term with a dummy that 
equals to one if the firm is financially constrained, zero otherwise and a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is 
financially unconstrained, zero otherwise. The cut-off points are at the 25th percentile.   The instruments 
used therefore are (LEV/A)it*CONSit,, (LEV/A)it*UNCONSit,,(INV/A)it ,(log Sales)it, (Q)it ,(Tax)it 
,(CASHFLOW/A)it*CONSit and (CASHFLOW/A)it*UNCONSit all  lagged two to five times. In column 
(2), we replace the cash flow measure with a profitability measure to check the robustness of our 
results. The instruments used therefore are (LEV/A)it*CONSit,, (LEV/A)it*UNCONSit  ,(INV/A)it ,(log 
Sales)it, (Q)it, (Tax)it, (PROFIT/A)it*CONS and (PROFIT/A)it*UNCONS all  lagged two to five times. In 
column (3), we distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms according to their coverage 
ratio while in column (4), we distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms according to 
their level of indebtedness.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and 
instruments. When we test for the statistical significance of the coefficients on the lagged dependent 
variables and the cash flow variables interacted with the constrained and unconstrained dummies, the 
F-statistics obtained suggest that the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable for constrained and 
unconstrained firms in all cases are statistically different from each other, suggesting that constrained 
and unconstrained firms indeed behave differently. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Also see notes to 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Table 3.4:Financial Constraints (Listed Firms) 
Robustness Checks 
Financial Constraints Measured by Real Assets 
(2) 
Indebtedness 
(3) 
(LEV /A)it-1*CONS it 
 
 
0.416*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.387*** 
(0.035) 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*UNCONS it 
 
0.450*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.463*** 
(0.057) 
 
(Log Sales)it 0.005 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
(INV/A) it 
 
 
0.154*** 
(0.089) 
0.118 
(0.081) 
(Q) it 
 
 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
(TAX) it 
 
 
0.017 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
(CASHFLOW/A)it*CONS it -0.529*** 
(0.083) 
-0.349*** 
(0.059) 
(CASHFLOW/A)it*UNCONS it -0.569*** 
(0.069) 
-0.647*** 
(0.063) 
Sample size 3809 
 
3089 
 
J 0.189 
 
0.165 
 
m2 0.971 0.960 
 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 we interact the cash flow term 
with a dummy that equals to one if the firm is financially constrained and 0 if the firm is financially 
unconstrained. The instruments used are therefore are (LEV/A)it*CONSit,, (LEV/A)it*UNCONSit 
,(INV/A)it ,(log Sales)it, (Q)it  , (Tax)it , (CASHFLOW/A)it*CONS and (CASHFLOW/A)it*UNCONS all  
lagged two to five times.  In column (1) we distinguish between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms using the distribution of real assets but a cut-off point at the 30th percentile rather 
the 25th percentile.  In column (2), we use the distribution of leverage to distinguish among financial 
constraints and again the cut-off point used is at the 30th percentile rather than the 25th percentile.  Time 
dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  * indicates significance at the 
10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Also 
see notes to Tables 3.3. 
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Number of 
Observations Freq. Percent Cum. 
3 673 0.83 0.83 
4 1,306 1.6 2.43 
5 1,651 2.02 4.45 
6 1,637 2.01 6.46 
7 2,859 3.51 9.96 
8 3,234 3.97 13.93 
9 14,950 18.33 32.26 
10 55,153 67.63 99.89 
11 93 0.11 100 
Total 81,556 100  
 
FAME is a database that contains information for companies in the UK and Ireland.  
The FAME database is collected by Jordans Bureau Van Dijk for commercial use.  
The Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publication Database is developed by a group of 
specialised researchers based in Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing’s Brussels 
office.  This database includes balance sheet data, profit and loss statements and some 
other complimentary information.   This amounts to over 1.3 million companies.  
FAME allows detailed financial analysis and credit risk assessment, corporate 
finance, venture capital and mergers and acquisitions research, research and business 
development and also academic study and teaching. 
 
 
			

	
(LEV/A) : net book leverage, calculated as total borrowing repayable in less than one 
year plus total loan capital repayable in one year or more divided by total assets. 
 
(LTD/A): long-term debt ratio, calculated as total borrowing repayable in one year or 
more divided by total assets. 
 
(STD/A): short-term debt ratio, calculated as total borrowing repayable in less than 
one year divided by total assets. 
 
(Cash Flow/A):cash flow, calculated as profit after tax and preference dividends plus 
depreciation divided by total assets. 
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(Log Sales): log of real sales. 
(Sales Growth): sales growth calculated as the change in log of real sales. 
(Tax/Profit): tax paid as a ratio of profit before tax. 
(Structure/A): ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
QUISCORE 
The Quiscore is a measure of the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months 
following the date of calculation.  It is basically a measure of how risky a firm is and 
is calculated using a number of criteria by Qui Score Assessment Ltd. The quiscore 
measure of risk can be categorised in 5 bands as shown in the table below, however 
for our analysis, we categorise firms using the Quiscore measure in three categories.  
Firms in the first band are called SECURE, firms in the Stable and Normal band are 
called SAFE while firms in the Unstable and High Risk Band are called RISKY (see 
main text for more details). 
!34!B,

+)#, !34,-+#1C$1)3
Secure Band  81-100 Companies in this band tend to be large and successful public 
companies. Failure is very unusual.  
Stable Band  61-80 Company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about if 
there are major company or marketplace changes.  
Normal Band 
  
41-60 The sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some 
that do. 
Unstable Band  21-40 Companies in this band are on average four times more likely to 
fail than those in the Normal Band.  
High Risk Band  0-20 Companies in the High-Risk band are unlikely to be able to 
continue trading unless significant remedial action is undertaken. 
Source: Qui Score Assessment Ltd. 
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!:0,5SUMMARY STATISTICS (UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
(LEV / A )it 0.330 
(0.206) 
(LTD / A )it 0.150 
(0.162) 
(STD / A )it 0.208 
(0.202) 
(Cash Flow / A )it 0.117 
(0.112) 
(Profit/ A )it 
 
0.051 
(0.086) 
(Log Sales)it 8.978 
(1.177) 
(Sales Growth) it 0.077 
(0.318) 
(Structure)it 0.300 
(0.192) 
(Tax/Profit)it 0.341 
(0.428) 
Real Assets 11102.83 
(26267.61) 
Employees 177.721 
 
No. of observations 80718 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample 
means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1994-2003.  (LEV/A) is 
the sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by assets.  The other measures of leverage are long-
term debt over assets (LTD/A), short-term debt over assets (STD/A).  (Cash Flow/A) is cash flow divided 
by assets, (Log Sales) is the log of sales and (Structure) is the ratio of tangible assets to assets,  we use a 
sales growth measure (SalesG) to proxy for growth opportunities and (Tax/Profit) is the proportion of tax 
paid as a percentage of profit.  
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Table 3.6:SUMMARY STATISTICS(UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
 
 Internally Very 
Financially 
constrained 
Negative cash flow 
 
(1) 
Possibly not 
Internally 
Financially 
Constrained 
Medium cash flow 
(2) 
Not Internally 
Financially 
constrained 
High cash flow 
 
(3) 
No. of observations 8727 16283 50591 
 
(LEV / A )it 0.454 
(0.227) 
0.379 
(0.218) 
0.293 
(0.183) 
 
(LTD / A )it 0.187 
(0.200) 
0.165 
(0.179) 
0.137 
(0.145) 
 
(STD / A )it 0.330 
(0.258) 
0.246 
(0.211) 
0.171 
(0.165) 
 
(Cash Flow / A )it -0.071 
(0.069) 
0.043 
(0.029) 
0.173 
(0.083) 
 
(Profit/A )it 
 
-0.100 
(0.065) 
0.004 
(0.029) 
0.091 
(0.061) 
 
(Log Sales)it 8.914 
(1.177) 
8.949 
(1.152) 
9.019 
(1.179) 
 
(Sales Growth) it -0.214 
(1.182) 
-0.061 
1.057 
0.043 
1.034 
 
(Structure)it 0.275 
(0.195) 
0.284 
(0.195) 
0.309 
(0.187) 
 
(Tax/Profit)it 0.229 
(0.366) 
0.258 
(0.677) 
0.383 
(0.321) 
 
(Real Assets) it 
 
13791.87 
(28747.11) 
13245.22 
(29954.65) 
11487.49 
(24085.79) 
 
Employees 185 
 
164 
 
182 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the 
sample means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time and t=1994-2003.  
Descriptive statistics are presented for firm-years that have negative cash flow that is are  Internally 
Very Financially Constrained (cash flow<0), firm years that are Possibly not Internally Financially 
Constrained (positive cash flow in the lowest quartile of the distribution of all positive cash flows, 
classified by industry and year) and firms that are Not Internally Financially Constrained (all firms 
having the cash flow in the top three quartiles of the distribution of all positive cash flows of all firms, 
classified by industry and year). Also see notes to Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.7:SUMMARY STATISTICS(UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
 Small 
Firm-years 
(real assets) 
 (1) 
Medium 
Firm-years 
(real assets) 
 (2) 
Large 
Firm-years 
(real assets) 
 (3) 
Number of observations 22552 48624 22680 
( LEV /A)it 0.293 
(0.195) 
 
0.314 
(0.198) 
0.390 
(0.219) 
(LTD/A) it 0.123 
(0.138) 
0.141 
(0.151) 
0.191 
(0.193) 
 
(STD/A) it 0.202 
(0.202) 
0.194 
(0.188) 
0.239 
(0.222) 
 
(Cash Flow / A )it 0.126 
(0.126)) 
0.117 
(0.109) 
0.110 
(0.109) 
 
(PROFIT / A )it 
 
0.057 
(0.099) 
0.051 
0.082 
0.046 
0.083 
(Log Sales) it 7.658 
(0.546) 
8.695 
(0.658) 
10.226 
(0.908) 
 
(Sales Growth) it -0.204 
(1.835) 
-0.000 
(0.943) 
0.054 
(0.642) 
 
( Structure/ A)it 
 
0.264 
(0.184) 
0.313 
(0.193) 
0.308 
(0.191) 
 
( Tax /profit)it 0.303 
(0.403) 
0.348 
(0.413) 
0.351 
(0.467) 
 
(Real Assets) it 
 
1099.182 
(488.162) 
 
4162.246 
(2463.931) 
 
35930.05 
(44977.63) 
 
 
Employees 
 
 
42 
 
 
91 
 
 
404 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the 
sample means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time and t=1994-2003. 
Descriptive statistics are presented for firm-years that are SMALL it (real assets in the lowest 25
th 
percentile of the distribution of the real assets, classified by industry and year), firm years that are 
MEDIUM it (real assets between the 25
th and the 75th percentile of the distribution of the real assets, 
classified by industry and year) and LARGE it (all firms having the real assets in the top 25
th percentile 
of the distribution of all assets, classified by industry and year). Also see notes to Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.8:REGRESSION RESULTS (UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS 
  
(1) 
Robustness Checks 
(2) 
( LEV /A)it-1 0.486** 
(0.026) 
 
0.492*** 
(0.026) 
 
(Cash Flow / A )it -0.259*** 
(0.082) 
 
 
(PROFIT/A )it 
 
 -0.372*** 
(0.113) 
 
(Log Sales)it -0.106*** 
(0.025) 
 
-0.104*** 
(0.025) 
 
(Sales Growth) it -0.018 
(0.021) 
 
-0.204 
(0.022) 
 
(Structure)it 0.043 
0.107 
 
0.038 
0.106 
 
(Tax/Profit)it 0.014 
(0.020) 
 
0.005 
(0.020) 
 
Sample size 14955 
 
15102 
 
J 0.934 
 
0.944 
 
m2 0.237 
 
0.403 
 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (LEV/A )it  ,(Cash Flow /A)i ,(Log Sales)it 
,(Sales Growth)it ,(Structure)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to three times.  Time dummies are included in 
all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to Table 3.5. * indicates significance at 
the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table  3.9:FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS: 
ACCOUNTING FOR  INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS(UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
 (cash flow) 
(1) 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 (profitability) 
(2) 
( LEV /A)it-1*IVFC it 
 
( LEV /A)it-1*PNIFC it 
 
( LEV /A)it-1*NIFC it 
 
0.339*** 
(0.075) 
 0.363*** 
(0.059) 
0.375*** 
(0.041) 
0.342*** 
(0.066) 
 0.409*** 
(0.056) 
 0.411*** 
(0.044) 
 
(Cash Flow /A )it *IVFC it 
 
(Profit/ A )it *IVFC it 
 
-0.651*** 
(0.237) 
 
 
 
-0.676*** 
(0.237) 
(Cash Flow/ A )it *PNIFC it 
 
(Profit/A)it*PNIFC it 
0.108 
(0.384) 
 
 
-1.098 
(0.953) 
(Cash Flow / A )it *NIFC it 
 
(Profit/ A )it *NIFC it 
-0.251*** 
(0.083) 
 
 
-0.519*** 
(0.125) 
(Log Sales)it -0.086*** 
(0.021) 
-0.094*** 
(0.213) 
(Sales Growth) it 0.005 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
(Structure)it 0.148** 
0.077 
0.090 
(0.078) 
(Tax)it 0.013 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
 
Sample size 14995 15102 
m2 0.365 0.862 
J(p-value) 0.553 0.894 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used in column 1 are (LEV/A )it-1*IVFC it,  (LEV/ A )it-
1 *PNIFC it, (LEV /A)it*NIFCit-1, (CF /A )it*IVFC it, (CF /A)it *PNIFC it,  (CF/A )it*NIFC it, (Log Sales)it , 
(SalesG)it ,(Structure)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five times. In column 2, the instruments used are 
(LEV/A)it-1*IVFC it,  (LEV/A)it-1 *PNIFCit, (LEV /A)it-1*NIFC it-1, (Profit/A)it*IVFC it,(Profit/A)it*PNIFC 
it,  (Profit/ A)it*NIFC it, (Log Sales)it , (SalesG)it ,(Structure)it  and (Tax)it  Time dummies are included in 
all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to Table 3.5 and 3.6.* indicates 
significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. The F-statistics obtained on the lagged dependent variables in column 1, (F(3, 4798)= 
34.39) indicate that the coefficients obtained for the IVFC, PNIFC and NIFC firm-years are statistically 
different from each other. The F-statistics obtained on the cash flow variable in column 1 interacted 
with the IVFC, PNIFC and NIFC firm-years (F(3, 4798)= 7.28) again indicate that the coefficients 
obtained are statistically different from each other. 
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Table 3.10: FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS: 
ACCOUNTING FOR OVERALL CONSTRAINTS(UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
 (REAL ASSETS) 
(1) 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
(Quiscore) 
(2) 
(LEV /A)it-1*FC it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*LLFC it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*NFC it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*RISKY it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*SAFE it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*SECURE it 
 
 
0.397*** 
(0.077) 
0.386*** 
(0.044) 
0.459*** 
(0.052) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.401*** 
(0.088) 
0.399*** 
(0.040) 
0.541*** 
(0.100) 
(Cash Flow /A)it *FC it 
 
(Cash Flow /A)it *RISKY it 
-0.274** 
(0.108) 
 
 
-0.568** 
(0.314) 
(Cash Flow /A)it*LLFC it 
 
(Cash Flow /A)it*SAFE it 
-0.301*** 
(0.069) 
 
 
-0.347*** 
(0.067) 
(Cash Flow /A)it *NFC it 
 
(Cash Flow /A)it *SECURE it 
-0.393*** 
(0.087) 
 
 
-0.652*** 
(0.134) 
(Log Sales)it     -0.081*** 
(0.023) 
-0.065*** 
(0.020) 
(Sales Growth)it -0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
(Structure)it   0.078 
(0.078) 
0.055 
(0.079) 
(Tax)it 0.015 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
Sample size 14955 14927 
m2 0.323 0.334 
J(p-value) 0.574 0.933 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used in column 1 are (LEV/A )it-1*FC it , (LEV/A)it-1 
*LLFC it ,(LEV/A)i-1t *NFC it , (CF /A)it*FC it , (CF /A)it*LLFC it , (CF /A)it*NFC it, (Log Sales)it , 
(SalesG)it ,(STRUC)it and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five times. Instruments used in column 2 are 
(LEV/A)it-1*RISKYit , (LEV/A)it-1*SAFEit , (LEV/A)it-1*SECUREit , (CF/A)it*RISKYit, (CF/A)it*SAFEit, 
(CF/A)it*SECUREit , (Log Sales)it , (SalesG)it ,(Structure)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five times. Time 
dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to Tables 3.5 
and 3.8. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.11:FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS: 
ACCOUNTING FOR  INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS(UNQUOTED FIRMS) 
 (cash flow) 
(1) 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 (profitability) 
(2) 
(LEV /A)it-1*NEGCF it 
 
(LEV /A)it-1*POSITIVECF it 
0.411*** 
(0.103) 
0.442*** 
(0.051) 
0.434*** 
(0.085) 
0.457*** 
(0.051) 
(Cash Flow / A)it *NEGCF it 
 
(Profit/ A )it *NEGCF it 
-0.506*** 
(0.372) 
 
 
 
-0.760*** 
(0.331) 
(Cash Flow /A)it *POSITIVECF it 
 
(Profit /A )it *POSITIVECF it 
-0.226 
(0.083) 
 
 
-0.361*** 
(0.125) 
(Log Sakes)it -0.078*** 
(0.032) 
-0.086*** 
(0.031) 
(Sales Growth) it -0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
(Structure)it 0.146** 
(0.104) 
0.093 
(0.102) 
(Tax)it 0.019 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.020) 
Sample size 15185 15335 
m2 0.499 0.849 
J(p-value) 0.696 0.935 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used in column 1 are (LEV/A)it-1*NEGCFit  , 
(LEV/A)it-1*POSITIVECFit   , (Cash Flow/A)it *NEGCF it,  (Cash Flow/A)it *POSITIVECFit, (Log Sales)it  
,(Sales Growth)it ,(STRUC)it  and (TAX)it  all  lagged two to five times. Instruments used in column 2 are 
(LEV/A)it, (Profit/A)it*NEGCF it,  (Profit/A)it*POSITIVECF it , (Log Sales)it ,(Sales Growth)it 
,(Structure)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five times.  Time dummies are included in all specifications 
as regressors and instruments.* indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 
5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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DETERMINANTS EXPECTED SIGNS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Liquidity (profitability and non-debt 
tax shield) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-ve (POT) 
 
 
+ve (TOT) 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), Miguel 
and Pindado (2001), Fama and 
French (2002), Benito (2003) 
 
Size  
 
-ve (POT) 
 
+ve (TOT) 
 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Fama and French (2002), 
Frank and Goyal (2002) Benito 
(2003) 
 
Growth Opportunities 
 
+ve (POT) 
 
-ve (TOT and complex POT) 
 
Benito (2003) 
 
Fama and French (2002) 
 
Investment 
 
+ve (POT and TOT) 
 
Benito (2003) 
 
Tax 
 
 
+ve (TOT) 
 
Bradley et al (1984) 








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Most research on capital structure and financing decisions of firms have mainly 
focussed on large firms in western developed countries such as the UK and the US.  
Consequently there is a gap in this literature where some aspects of capital structure 
decisions have not been addressed.  One of these is the capital structure decisions of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developed countries, which was 
studied in the previous chapter. The second aspect is the capital structure of firms in 
developing countries or more specifically in transition economies, which has not been 
very prominent in this literature.   
China is regarded as the largest developing and transitional economy in the 
world.  It has one of the highest growth rates in the world.  Most of this growth comes 
from the private sector despite the relative underdevelopment of the Chinese financial 
and legal system. The literature has recognised that a well developed financial system 
is necessary for growth.   Despite the underdeveloped financial and legal system, the 
private sector is the catalyst of China’s growth.  We believe that by studying the 
capital structure of Chinese firms we will be able, to a certain extent, to explain this 
phenomenal growth. 
Sources of external finance are limited in economies in transition.  Firms in 
these economies can be heavily dependent on financing sources such as bank credit.  
Factors that affect the capital structure of firms in developed countries might not have 
the same effect on the capital structure of firms in transition economies.  Due to the 
availability of good quality financial data, China is the ideal case to study these issues. 
In this chapter, we provide a historical account of the Chinese reforms and focus 
mainly on the reforms undertaken in the financial sector. 
The chapter is organised as follows:  in sections 4.1 and 4.2 we discuss the 
transition and reform process in China.  Next, in section 4.3, we discuss finance and 
growth in the Chinese context.  We then provide a detailed description of the Chinese 
financial system where we focus mainly on the banking sector and the stock market. 
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In section 4.5 we discuss the importance of foreign direct investment as this is the 
factor that has received a lot of attention especially in the Chinese case. 
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The People’s Republic of China is the largest developing and transitional economy in 
the world.  China is administratively divided into 23 provinces, 5 autonomous 
regions, 4 centrally administrative municipalities and 2 special administrative regions.  
The currency used is the Yuan.  China’s transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy began at the end of 1978.  The reform has been characterised as 
piecemeal, partial and even experimental as opposed to the big bang approach taken 
by Eastern European countries. 
The traditional planned Chinese economy was characterised by a distorted 
macro policy characterised by artificially low interest rates and overvalued exchange 
rates.  There were some serious problems with the system as capital was limited and 
the market interest rate was too high; foreign exchange was scarce and expensive 
because exportable goods were limited and primarily consisted of low-priced 
agricultural products; the economic surplus was small and scattered due to the nature 
of a poor agrarian economy (Lin, Cai and Li, 1996).  The macropolicies created a total 
imbalance in the economy.  Suppression of competition was prevalent and profits 
could not be used as a measure of the efficiency.  Managers had no autonomy as all 
decisions were made by an administrative allocation system.  Profit remittances by 
state enterprises were the norm. 
In December 1978, the party leaders decided to undertake a program of 
gradual but fundamental reform of the economic system. First, they understood that 
being a centrally planned economy was not really working.  Economic growth was 
stagnating and this had caused China to fall far behind not only the industrialized 
nations of the West but also their rivals, the new industrial powers of Asia: Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, while 
Japan and Hong Kong could boast of rivaling European countries in modern 
technology, China was in a completely different situation.  Second, the Chinese had to 
make do with barely sufficient food supplies, rationed clothing, inadequate housing, 
and a service sector that was inadequate and inefficient.   Third, on the international 
platform China had no say in any matter. 
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Deng Xiaoping thoroughly changed Mao's course for China with a new catch-word, 
"reform," and a new aphorism, "To get rich is glorious."(Li, 2001) 
China’s reform process has been highly successful.  When the reform began in 1978, 
it clearly had the "mandate" of the Chinese people. Turning away from an emphasis 
on revolutionary campaigns against "class enemies" of the Mao era, Deng and his 
associates stressed economic development and social stability (Li, 2001).  Moving 
from a planned economy to a more market-oriented one created an economic success 
unparalleled by any countries.Between 1979 and 1997, the growth rate of China's 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 9.8 percent annually, about three times greater 
than the world average.  During the same period, 170 million people were lifted out of 
poverty. Chinese citizens' bank savings increased 220-fold, from 21 billion yuan 
(roughly U.S. $2.5 billion) to 4,628 billion yuan (about $560 billion).  Below, we 
provide a survey of the main stages of this reform process. 
The leaders at that time had no intention to leave behind communism, but they wanted 
to integrate the best features of capitalism and create what would be latter called 
‘socialism’.  The major objective of the reform was to increase the role of the market 
and reduce state intervention and control.    The major goals of the reform process 
were to increase exports and sort out the ailing industries such as transport, 
communications, coal, iron, steel, building materials, and electric power.  Another 
objective was also to reduce investment in the heavy industry and increase investment 
in the light industry. 
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Private entrepreneurship and free market activities were legalized and encouraged in 
the 1980s, although the central authorities continuously had to fight the efforts of 
local government agencies to impose excessive taxes on independent merchants.  
First, agricultural production was targeted with a series of reforms.  Farmers were 
encouraged to establish free markets.  Some families were allowed to produce and sell 
at a profit.  In industry, the main policy innovations increased the autonomy of 
enterprise managers, reduced emphasis on planned quotas, allowed enterprises to 
produce goods outside the plan for sale on the market, and permitted enterprises to 
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experiment with the use of bonuses to reward higher productivity.  Some enterprises 
were allowed to pay a tax on their profits and retain the balance for reinvestment and 
distribution to workers as bonuses.        
 The establishment of collectively owned enterprises and private enterprise was 
actively encouraged to create employment which was a first since the Cultural 
Revolution.  Enterprises were also allowed to engage in foreign trade and engage in 
direct negotiations with foreign firms.  On the legal side, a wide range of cooperation, 
trading, and credit arrangements with foreign firms were legalized so that China could 
enter the mainstream of international trade.      
 To encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) four coastal economic zones 
were set up in 1979 where the FDI would receive special treatment. Three of the four 
zones--the cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou--were located in Guangdong 
Province, close to Hong Kong. The fourth, Xiamen, in Fujian Province, was directly 
across the strait from Taiwan.  
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Managers could hire and fire workers (although this still caused problems with 
bureaucrats and party cadres.)  By 1985, most firms were allowed to pay taxes and 
retain the rest of their profits.  This period also marked the shift from government 
budget allocations to interest bearing loans (which would later lead to the big problem 
of Non Performing Loans) but anyhow at least this was the first step towards a more 
market administered mechanism of credit allocation. 
This period also marked the emergence of foreign trade.  The value of trade 
(exports plus imports) rose steadily from 15% in 1980 to 21% in 1984 and to 35% in 
1986. Under Deng Xiaoping foreign trade was regarded as an important source of 
investment funds and modern technology.  Joint venture with foreign investors was 
made legal and even fully foreign owned businesses were possible. 
In April 1984, more economic development zones were set up in the fourteen 
largest coastal cities - including Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou-all of 
which were major commercial and industrial centers. These zones were to create 
productive exchanges between foreign firms with advanced technology and major 
Chinese economic networks.   Additionally, domestic commerce also was stimulated 
by the reform policies, which were aimed to encourage a more market-based 
allocation of goods and services. (Source: U.S. Library of Congress) 
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The reforms in the late 1980s and the early 1990s further focused on creating a pricing 
system and decreasing the role of the state in resource allocations.    In the labour 
market especially, significant changes have occurred in the past 2 decades, including 
yielding more discretion to enterprises for wage-setting and permitting the retention of 
profits (Yueh, 2004).  By the late 1990s, recruitment quotas for state enterprises were 
abolished and firms were largely allowed determine their own employment.  
Additionally, the 1990s was largely dominated by FDI. In 1992, the Chinese 
government decided to significantly liberalise its FDI regime.  The government 
removed a number of sectoral and regional restrictions on FDI.  The reforms of the 
late 1990s also focused on closing unprofitable enterprises and dealing with the 
insolvency in the banking system (which is discussed in more details below).
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Obviously, the reform process is far from complete.  More needs to be done at the 
governmental level: increase the transparency and consistency in the policy-making; 
reduce administrative interference in concrete matters; exercise correct public 
management in the economy and in society and reduce the burden that State-owned 
enterprises impose on the economy. Reforms in the financial sector is now of prime 
importance44. The financial system and security market system have shortcomings 
that result in inefficient allocation of finance resources, high percentage of bad debts, 
poor supervision of finance industry and high financial risk.  The legal system has to 
be further reformed as legal systems protecting private assets are still incomplete, 
related tax policies, financial policies and investment service systems are still poor.  
Finally, the distribution system of social income is not reasonable while social 
security system is backward, endowment insurance, employment insurance and 
medical insurance not yet complete.
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Levine (2002) lists a number of functional reasons to link finance with improved 
economic performance.  Financial systems facilitate the trading of risk, allocate 
capital, monitor managers, mobilise savings and ease the exchange of goods, services 
                                                 
44 This is elaborated in the next section. 
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and financial contracts.  Developed financial intermediaries facilitate the mobilisation 
of domestic capital.  The legal based view proposed by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Sheifer and Vishny (1999), predicts that the overall financial development defined by 
the legal system is what actually matters for growth.   
Finance is defined as a set of contracts and these contracts are defined and 
made effective by legal rights and enforcement mechanisms.  A well-functioning legal 
system facilitates the operation of both markets and intermediaries.  Levine (2002), 
further argues that the quality of financial services as determined by the legal system 
improves the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. 
This view has been further exploited in the law, institutions, finance and 
growth literature. However, Allen, Qian and Qian (2004) demonstrate how China is a 
counter-example to the belief that law, institutions and finance matter for economic 
growth. Despite its poor legal and financial systems, China has one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world. 
Country-level studies consistently show that less secure property rights mean 
lower aggregate investment and slower economic growth.  Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002), study if in addition to external finance, secure property rights are 
necessary for entrepreneurs to invest.  They use monthly data from survey sources in 
1997 from post-communist countries like Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine.  They find that in countries like Russia and Ukraine, where property rights 
are least secure, entrepreneurs are reluctant to reinvest their profits.  In Poland, on the 
other hand, property rights are more secure which explain the high rates of 
reinvestment of retained earnings. 
The main sources of finance in China are government grants and bank loans.  
Other sources of finance include foreign investment, issuing domestic stock or 
domestic debt, borrowing from other companies, investment by other enterprises and 
retained funds.  Retained funds comprise retained earnings, depreciation, major repair 
funds and ‘other enterprise’ retained funds (Cull and Xu, 2005).   
 “A penny saved may be a penny earned, but in China a penny saved is usually 
invested in an infrastructure project or an increase in manufacturing capacity.” 
(IMF,2006) .  The gross domestic savings rate in China has averaged 40% in the 
1990’s while recently it has risen to around 50%.  Part of this saving has been 
invested abroad (mainly in US Treasury bonds) thereby funding the US current 
account deficit and keeping US interest rates low.  The majority of this saving has in 
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fact been invested in the Chinese economy which has increased gross capital 
formation to around 45% of GDP that has led to a growth rate of around 9.5%.   
 The following chart taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook shows 
that Chinese firms have a high savings rate.  This saving is mainly in the form of 
retained earnings.  Additionally, the government is also a net saver.  Due to this high 
savings from the household, government and firms, China has been able to sustain a 
high rate of investment. 
FIGURE 4.1 

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Pre-reform period, Chinese firms were state-owned and received all financing from 
government bureaux. The interdependence between state and enterprises created a soft 
budget constraint for firms.  Constraints on state-owned firm spending were not 
totally binding because the state could readily reallocate funds to cover additional 
expenditures. The state used its network of administrative bureaux to control resource 
flows throughout the economy.  It could thus redistribute funds from profitable firms 
to those that were not performing well.  China’s market-oriented reforms were 
accelerated after the communist party reached a consensus in 1992 where it decided to 
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establish a “socialist market economic system” as the main goal of the reform (Lu and 
Yu, 1998).   

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In the pre-reform period, all Chinese firms were state-owned and received all 
financing from government bureaux.  All loans to firms were authorized and approved 
by the State Council.  Financial markets were non-existent and banks existed only as 
state agencies responsible for enacting and enforcing government monetary policy.  In 
the late 1970’s, Deng Xiaoping opened China to the world.  Chinese banks have been 
almost entirely responsible since then to channel the high savings of the people 
towards productive activities and have therefore played a major role in the high 
growth achieved by the economy.   
In 1978, Chinese policy makers started to implement extensive economic and 
industrial reforms which included the reform the domestic banking system. In 1978, 
the People's Bank of China (PBC) was separated from the Ministry of Finance which 
was a first step towards setting up a free banking system.  Furthermore, in 1981 the 
China Investment Bank (CIB) was established to channel World Bank loans to China. 
In 1983, the State Council granted the PBC the authority of a central bank who 
in turn transferred its commercial operations to four specialized banks: the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for the rural sector; the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) for the industrial sector, the People's Construction Bank of 
China (PCBC) for long-term investment, and the Bank of China (BOC) for foreign 
exchange. Affiliated with the ABC are rural credit cooperatives whose main lending is 
to rural households' farming and township-village enterprises 
Two additional universal banks were established in 1988: the Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM) and CITIC Industrial Bank. By 1990, the six banks had 
vast national networks, with more than 120,000 branches and more than 1.3 million 
employees. In addition, rural and urban credit cooperatives had 60,000 branches and 
more than half a million employees (China State Statistical Bureau, 1992). 
The PBC still remains an important player.   More significantly, major saving 
sources have been shifted from the government to households and enterprises. A remarkable 
phenomenon of the years of economic reform is the sustained and rapid increase of 
household financial savings. China's national savings increased from 30% of GNP in 
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1980 to around 35% in 1991 and 120% in 1999. The China Construction Bank45 
(CCB) is in fact more valuable than either Barclays, American Express or Deutsche 
Bank. 
The Chinese economy is dominated by bank-based financing, which accounts 
for more than 75% of all financial assets.   The retail banks are the source of most 
corporate finance, though in practice, although they do not really have any say in the 
governance procedures of the firm. 
The banking sector in China is characterised by a high number of non-
performing loans (NPLs).  In the mid 1990’s although SOEs accounted for 1/3 of 
GDP, they accounted for 2/3 of total domestic loans (Lu and Yu, 1998).  In 2001, 
NPLs amounted to ¼ of bank assets (Lu, 2006).  Until 1994, Chinese banks were 
obliged to make policy loans (that were granted based on political considerations or 
other policies).  In 2005, the figure of bad debts was estimated to be at around 20-25% 
of all loans. 
As the government decided to develop the banking system what ultimately 
happened was that the burden of financing unprofitable state-enterprises moved from 
the state-budget to the state-owned banks.  The state intervention in the banking 
business at various levels adversely affected the autonomy of the SOBs and resulted 
in low quality loans to unprofitable projects and firms.  The government is not the 
only one to blame for this.  It seems that banks simply do not know how to price risk 
or spot a dodgy borrower (The Economist, 2005) 
Until 1994, (State Owned Banks) SOBs were obliged to provide policy loans 
to (State Owned Enterprises) SOEs.   Using its influence on the SOBs, the state 
pressed them to grant credit and to bail out the SOEs.  Due to the fact that China 
wanted to accede to the WTO46 to secure its export markets, one of the conditions 
imposed on China was that it had to open its banking sector to foreign competition.  
Obviously, this was a serious issue considering the disastrous situation in which the 
banking sector was.  The Chinese government reacted by injecting a huge amount of 
funds to recapitalise the major SOBs.  Since 1998, Beijing has injected more than 
$260 billion into its banks via straight handouts and by allowing the 4 biggest banks 
                                                 
45 The CCB raised $8 billion from foreign investors for 12% of its shares. 
46 Without WTO membership, for instance, the continuity of China’s normal trading relationship with 
the US was subject to annual reviews by the congress.  Hence, China’s export trade was vulnerable to 
the whims of the American domestic politics. 
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to shift bad loans to separate state-backed companies.   Most of the bad loans of the 
SOBs were written off and debt-for-equity swaps were conducted.  
China has benefited from rapid financial deepening.  The ratio of savings to 
GDP increased from 26% in 1985 to 120% in 1999.  Domestic credit has increased 
from 94.7% of GDP to132.7% of GDP in 2000.    However, in spite of all this, the 
Chinese financial system suffers from deep rooted structural problems. 
Figure 4.2 below shows the structure of the Chinese financial sector.  After the 
state council, the People’s Bank of China is at the head of the banking system and it 
controls the policy lending banks, commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks, 
non-financial institutions and foreign banks.  These banks in turn control several 
branches. 
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Source: Shirai (2002) 
 
China’s financial system is relatively underdeveloped and inefficient.  Despite the 
very high savings rate, financial resources are not channelled effectively towards 
productive investment.  Only the state-owned enterprises find accessing bank finance 
easy while non-state enterprises cannot access the domestic bank credit and have to 
rely more on internal finance or the informal credit market. 
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The Chinese government knows that it has to sort out the banking system to 
secure the country’s future.  Currently China needs $5 to produce $1 of output, a ratio 
far worse than western countries and even India (The Economist, 2005).  Investment 
is at 54% of GDP, higher than the savings rate and this is clearly unsustainable.  
Positive steps have been taken towards sorting out the banking system.  In 2003, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was created that now holds the role 
of the central regulator.  Banks will have to abide by the Basel I regulations by 2007, 
otherwise they will face sanctions.  Most of the commercial banks have introduced 
better governance, shareholding and incentive structures and have added independent 
directors to their board (The Economist, 2005). 
However, to reform its banks properly, China must allow foreign takeovers 
and its banks must be allowed to merge and fail- something that the government has 
been unwilling to do so far.  Even if foreign ownership limits are increased, it is 
unlikely that the government would be willing to give up control of the major banks. 
Re-organisation of the remainder of the banking system is still needed and would be 
best accompanied by a growing marketisation of the banking sector. Almost 30% of 
the banking sector remains to be recapitalized (OECD, 2005). 
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China began to introduce the shareholding system on a pilot basis in the 1980s as part 
of its efforts to reform state-owned enterprises. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
founded in 1990 and then the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991.  They have been 
growing very fast since their inception in 1990 but compared to the banking sector, 
they are still very small. Many state-owned enterprises that had adopted the 
shareholding system have gone public with some of their shares acquired by private 
capital.  In 2001, the total number of listed companies was 1160.  Of the total shares 
outstanding 46.2% were state-owned shares and 36.6% were tradable shares.   
Shares of listed Chinese firms can be broadly classified in two main groups.  
These are non-tradable shares and tradable shares.  There are three main types of 
shares traded on the 2 exchanges: state shares, legal person shares and other minority 
shares.  These types of shares are discussed in details below. 
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(i) NON-TRADABLE SHARES 
a) State Shares 
State shares designate the holdings in the SOEs by the central government, local 
governments or solely government-owned enterprises.  These shares are obtained by 
the state institutions in exchange of the capital contribution made by the state.  State 
shares are not normally tradeable although they are transferable under the approval of 
the China Securities Commission (CSRC). SOEs have to issue shares to the state to 
preserve the socialist structure of the economy and thus state shares represent a quite 
substantial amount at around 30% of total shares on average (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
 
b) Legal Person Shares 
Legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions.  A legal person share 
in China is defined as non-individual legal entity or institution.  Legal persons are 
usually business agencies or enterprises of local governments that help to start-up the 
public company or provide the resources needed towards the start-up expenses of the 
company. These include stock companies, non-bank financial institutions and SOEs 
that have at least one non-state owner.   Legal person shares are non-tradable but they 
are transferable to domestic institutions, once again upon approval from the CSRC.  
According to Sun and Tong (2003), legal persons can be quite effective in monitoring 
the activities of firms as they are normally large block holders in one or very few 
companies. 
 
c) Other Minority Shares 
A subgroup in this category is employee shares.  Employee shares are offered to 
workers and managers of a PLC, usually at a substantial discount.  After a holding 
period of up to 6 or 12 months, the company may file with the CSRC to allow its 
employees to sell the shares in the open market.  However, the directors, supervisors 
and the general managers may not transfer such shares during their term time in 
office.  Employee shares account for less than 2% of the total shares and purely as an 
incentive scheme rather than providing ownership control of any kind. 
 
(ii) TRADABLE SHARES 
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Around 25% or so stake in the listing firm is sold to individuals and institutions and 
listed on an exchange.  Individual shares can be classified into three categories: 
 
(a) A-shares–shares that are freely traded by mainland individuals 
A shares are similar to ordinary equity shares except that they are exclusively 
available to Chinese citizens and domestic institutions.  They are mostly held and 
traded by individuals.  A-shares are required to be at least 25% of total outstanding 
shares when the company makes its initial public offering. 
 
(b) B-shares-shares traded by foreign individuals and institutions and domestic      
individuals in China. 
B-shares are issued and traded in the two Chinese stock exchanges. B shares are 
quoted and traded in either US dollars on the SHSE or Hong Kong dollars on the 
SZSE.  B shares can only be subscribed for, owned by, and traded amongst foreigners 
and people of ethnic Chinese origin (people from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.)  
In 2001, the B share market was also opened to local Chinese investors who held 
foreign currency accounts with brokerage firms.  On average, foreign shares account 
for less than 2.5% of the total shares of all companies (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
 
(c) H/N shares-shares listed abroad 
 
China’s stock market has been primarily used to provide large state firms undergoing 
restructuring with capital and new shareholders.  Some 90% of the listed firms are 
former SOEs. 47 When the government embarked on restructuring of its SOEs, by the 
end of 2002, tens of thousand of SOEs had been incorporated and were operating with 
board of directors, shareholder meetings and budgetary autonomy from their local 
government (Deutsche Bank, 2004).  The best of these SOEs- 1,200 in total were 
allowed to issue and list shares publicly. 
Sun and Tong (2003) study the performance changes of 634 state-owned 
(SOEs) listed on the 2 exchanges upon share issuing privatisation (SIP) in the period 
1994-1998.  An important component of the economic restructuring process is the 
reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  This reform has brought down the SOE 
                                                 
47 By 2002, only 67 private firms had succeeded in winning a listing in their own right.  Even these 
private firms have to issue non-tradable shares to their founding owners. 
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share in China’s gross domestic product from 77.6% to less than 30% during this 
period.  Share issue privatisation (SIP) in the 1990’s became a very important strategy 
to vitalise the highly inefficient state-owned enterprises.  Even then privatisation was 
only partial, as the state still remained the largest single block holder in most SOEs.  
There is not even a single SOE that has been completely privatised.  The value of the 
shares held by the government still amounts to around 17% of GDP.   
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A number of reforms have been undertaken to free up the financial sector, however, 
more reforms need to be undertaken to avoid the problem of non-performing loans 
from arising again.  Banks need to be made more efficient, financial markets need to 
be further developed and deepened that would provide firms with alternative sources 
of funds and provide households with alternative investment opportunities (Prasad 
and Rajan, 2006).  Interest liberalization and exchange rate flexibility is also an 
important ingredient in this reform process.   
Retail banks are the source of most corporate finance, though in practice, they 
do not play any role in firm governance especially as banks are not allowed to hold 
equity in non-financial operations (Deutsche Bank, 2004).  Similarly, the stock 
exchanges are unable to act as a market for corporate control as the bulk of issued 
shares have restrictive covenants that limit their transfer (OECD, 2005).   The 
government seems to be moving towards the liberalisation of the market as it has 
decided to ease restrictions on the sale of state-owned shares in quoted companies. 
Undoubtedly, the equity market has to be further developed as the market 
value of freely tradable shares represented just 9% of GDP in 2004.  Nearly all the 
quoted companies are state-controlled (OECD, 2005) while outstanding corporate 
bonds were equivalent to 1% of GDP in 2003.  Moves have been made by the 
government to remove restrictions on the sale of state-owned shares in quoted 
companies.   The pricing of initial public offers is on a more market driven basis.  
However, the listing of state-owned enterprises is still determined by the State 
Council. For quoted state-controlled companies, which earn returns on assets 
comparable with those of listed companies worldwide, the government has announced 
that there will be a progressive lifting of the non-transferability of state and local 
government owned shares, an initiative that could ease mergers and acquisitions 
(OECD, 2005). 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues)
The graph above shows different measures of stock market development in China.  
The first measure of stock market development that we consider is the Market 
Capitalisation ratio calculated as the Market capitalisation divided by GDP.  The 
second measure that we use is the Turnover ratio which is the value of shares traded 
divided by GDP.   The third measure is the amount of capital raised on the stock 
market through stock issues.  As can be seen from the graph above, the stock market 
is relatively under-developed.  Market capitalisation and Value Traded are both below 
50% of the GDP indicating that the stock market is quite shallow. The peak in 2001 in 
both Market Capitalisation and Value Traded could be probably be explained by the 
fact that China joined the WTO in 2001. 


					
During the Mao period (1949-1976), China spurned foreign investment and paid back 
all its foreign loans (mostly to the Soviet Union) by 1965.  After taking over 
economic policy at the end of 1978, Deng Xiaoping opened up China to foreign trade 
and investment and in the early 1980s the first Special Economic Zones were set up to 
absorb direct investment from Hong Kong and elsewhere.   In China, foreign equity 
capital inflows are classified as FDI only if they lead to a foreign equity stake at or 
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above 25% (Huang, 2003).  Thus, the Chinese set a more stringent threshold for FDI 
and for corporate controls.  
China has been the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among 
developing countries in the 1990’s.  The literature has recognised that there are 
several important channels through which inward FDI benefits innovation activity in 
domestic firms in the host country.  There are several ways in which FDI is beneficial 
to the host economy.  Local firms learn about products and technologies used by 
foreign investors.  Also, spillovers can arise when workers move from the foreign-
owned companies to the domestic owned ones, thereby bringing their knowledge with 
them.  Additionally, domestic firms can be inspired by the foreign firms to develop 
new products and processes.  The diagram below illustrates the amount of FDI 
entering China.  Because not all FDI is actually utilised, we also show the amount of 
FDI actually utilised. 
Figure 4.4 FDI IN CHINA 

                      Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 
During the 1980s, FDI inflows grew steadily but remained relatively low, confined 
largely to joint ventures with Chinese state-owned enterprises. After the Beijing 
Massacre in 1989, western and Japanese companies withheld investment in China, but 
the momentum was maintained, partly by a new influx of capital from Taiwan.    
From 1979 to 2001, China absorbed a total of $346.2 billion in FDI.  Most of the FDI 
is a significant source of investment financing in China. 
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Deng Xiaoping toured Guangdong and Shanghai in early 1992, encouraging a further 
and much more massive wave of foreign direct investment, increasingly in the form of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign companies, which contributed towards 
acceleration in GDP growth and inflation. In 1997-98, FDI inflows peaked at over                                   
US$45bn a year.  As China acceded to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) there 
was another peak in FDI in December 2001, promoting China to top position as an 
FDI destination in 2003.  In the early 1990s, contracted FDI exceeded actually used 
FDI by a large margin. This gap narrowed in the second half of the decade as the 
authorities became more realistic in registering inflows (IMF, World Economic 
Outlook). 
However, as proposed by Havrylchyk and Poncet (2006), the large inflow of 
FDI is not only the consequence of good policies, but also results from certain 
distortions in the Chinese banking market and in state investment policies.  Huang 
(2003) proposes that FDI resulted as a consequence of institutional imperfections in 
the Chinese economy.  China’s domestic and financial institutions have largely 
favoured SOEs to the detriment of private firms.  The latter found getting access to 
external debt quite difficult and therefore turned to FDI.  FDI financed efficient 
private entrepreneurs and alleviated China’s inefficient political pecking order of 
firms.  It provided a privatisation function that would otherwise have been impossible. 
Huang (2003) proposes that SOEs are at the top end of the political pecking 
order.  SOEs hence benefit from easier access to bank credit, foreign exchange, 
business opportunities, political support and legal protection.  Therefore, the firms 
that rely more on FDI are the private firms.  Figure 4.5 below illustrates this “Political 
Pecking Order.”  Private firms are at the end of the political pecking order as they do 
not have political connections and therefore they find it very difficult to obtain 
external finance.  However, an alternative view is proposed by Cull and Xu (2005) 
who find evidence that banks are more likely to lend to profitable private firms 
despite all the incentive problems that these banks face. 

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In this section we provide a survey of studies that have investigated the capital 
structure decisions of firms in transition economies.  The literature in this field is quite 
sparse as data availability is a serious issue.  Consequently not much is known about 
the financing behaviour of firms in transition economies, especially China. 
Booth et al (2001) examine the financial structures of firms in a sample of 10 
developing countries to determine if corporate financial decisions vary between 
developed and developing countries.  Developing countries operate in different 
institutional environment than that of developing countries.  Booth et al (2001) use 
data on 10 developing countries namely India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan and Korea.  Data is used over the 1980-1990 
period from the 100 largest companies in each country where possible.  The findings 
by Booth et al (2001) suggest that variables that explain capital structure of firms in 
the US and European countries, are also able to explain capital structures in the 
developing countries mentioned above. 
 
 
 
SOEs 
Collective  
Firms 
Private 
Firms 
Firm-level Efficiency 
Status 
Source: Huang (2003) 
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Keister (2002) proposes that during economic transition, firms must dramatically 
reduce their financial dependence on the state and begin to borrow from nonstate 
capital sources.  Some basics of firm behaviour indeed apply to firms in China, for 
instance retained earnings do affect a firm’s borrowing.  Some studies have found that 
the informal credit market plays a very significant role in explaining the growth of 
private firms. According to Chow and Fung (2000), entrepreneurs in China get initial 
capital mainly from three sources: personal savings, loans from friends or relatives 
and personal loans from other people.  Blanchard (1997) finds that financial 
institutions in the formal banking system also participate in the underground loan 
market as the black market interest rates are quite high. 
Cull and Xu (2003) investigate the sources of financing of Chinese firms over 
the 1980-1994 period.  The sources of finance include retained earnings, bank finance 
and government transfers.  They also study the relationship between profitability and 
bank loans.  Bank loans have increasingly been used as a substitute for state loans 
especially as most banks were state-owned and the banks had give out lots of policy 
loans. 
The economic conditions in economies in transition are significantly different 
from those of more developed market-oriented economies.  Finance is very important 
for firms and western theorists have proposed a number of theories to explain the 
capital structure of firms.  However, these theories might or might not be relevant in 
the Chinese context.  For instance, as proposed by Chow and Fung (2000), internal 
finance has a more pronounced role to play in determining the level of investment in 
an economy like China than other developed economies. 
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According to Chow and Fung (2000), while accessing external finance, small Chinese 
firms rely more heavily on bank loans than their larger counterparts in any economy 
in transition.  They set out to demonstrate the relationship between firm size and 
investment financing in the Chinese economy.  They focus on small manufacturing 
firms in Shanghai over the 1989-1992 period.  Their empirical results are quite 
interesting as they suggest that the firms in their sample are actually less liquidity 
constrained than their larger counterparts in financing their fixed investment.  The 
primary reason for this is the fact that small Chinese firms are the ones that are the 
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fastest growing, efficient and more successful.  These firms that belong to the non-
state sectors can rely on the informal credit market although they are excluded from 
the state banking system. 
  The International Financial Corporation (IFC) finds that firms in China tend to 
rely mainly on internal sources of financing.  These include retained earnings and 
principal-owner financing which are used both for start-up capital and subsequent 
investments.  The results obtained by Aziz and Duenwald (2002) suggest that the 
level of financial development has not played a key role in contributing to growth 
within China.  Rather, bank loans appear to have been channelled to provinces with 
heavy concentration of state-owned enterprises. Consequently, firms in other 
provinces had to rely more on retained earnings rather than bank loans. It was these 
provinces which received fewer bank loans that actually achieved the higher growth 
rates.  Therefore, Aziz and Duenwald (2002) put forward the argument that financial 
system development might not have played a very significant role in promoting the 
growth of the Chinese economy. 
Keister (2002) uses survey data of 769 formerly state-owned firms over the 
1980-1989 period to study the ‘financial trajectory’ of Chinese firms in the post-
reform period.   She finds that in the first decade of reform, the higher the retained 
earnings the larger the sum of funds borrowed externally from all sources. The reason 
for this is that internal funds like retained earnings were regarded as state assets and 
managers were restricted in what they could do with the retained earnings.   
Managers wanted to gain independence from the state and thus avoided using 
retained earnings.  Instead, they used the existing retained earnings to attract external 
funding which they could use in any way they wanted.  Hence, Keister (2002) 
proposes that the capital structure of Chinese firms might better be explained by a 
financial trajectory.  Firms which pre-reform period relied entirely on the state started 
to move to non-state sources of finance, mainly borrowing from banks.  Following 
this, they moved to non-bank sources of finance. 
Chen (2003) uses data on 88 listed Chinese companies over the 1995-2000 
period.  He finds that a major difference between the capital choices of listed Chinese 
firms as compared to that of firms in developed economies is that listed Chinese firms 
prefer short-term finance and have substantially lower amounts of long-term debt.  
This finding suggests that there is a limit to which capital structure theories explain 
the capital structure of firms in China.  Some factors that influence capital structure of 
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firms in the western world do influence the capital structure of firms in China while 
the rest are not relevant in the Chinese context.   
Chen (2004) also examines whether the Trade-off or Pecking Order Theory 
might be able to explain the financing choices of Chinese firms.  He finds that none of 
these theories come close to explaining the capital structure of these firms.  Instead he 
proposes that Chinese firms seem to follow a ‘new pecking order,’ in that firms prefer 
retained profit then equity and finally debt. The reason why managers prefer equity to 
debt is that equity is less binding than debt. 
Allen, Qian and Qian (2004) demonstrate that China is a significant 
counterexample to the findings of the existing literature on law, institutions, finance 
and growth considering the fact that it is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world.  They study firms that belong to the three different sectors: the state sector, the 
listed sector (publicly traded firms) and all other firms (privately owned firms). Data 
used for the listed sector consists of 1100 firms listed on the SHZE and SZSE.    For 
the private sector, the data used is from a survey of 17 entrepreuneurs and executives 
in the Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, 2 of the most developed regions in China. 
Allen et al (2004), find that most of the bank credit is issued to firms that 
belong to the state and listed sectors.   However, they find that poor financial and 
legal framework restricts their growth while private firms grow much faster than these 
two other sectors.  Hence, Allen et al (2004), find that it is likely that there exist 
alternative financing channels and corporate governance mechanisms that instead of 
relying on say, the legal framework, rely more on reputation and relationships.  The 
role played by reputation and relationships ensures that these privately held firms 
have access to finance that in turn explains the higher growth rates as compared to the 
state or the listed sector.  
Guenip (2005) examines the extent to which Chinese banks extend loans to 
firms on the basis of commercial criteria.  Because bank level data is not available, he 
studies 371 firms listed on the Shenzhen stock exchanges to see what are the factors 
that affect the amount of leverage used by a firm.  By doing this, he is able to infer 
what factors banks use to give out loans.  He finds that growth and size are positively 
related to the amount of leverage that a firm has.  This indicates that firms in China do 
consider commercial criteria when determining who gets loans.  However, he also 
finds that the amount of collateral used by a firm is not important for loan extension 
which would indicate that banks do not consider the amount of collateral that a firm 
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can provide as being important.  He explains this by the fact that due to its legal 
framework collateral is hardly executable in China.  Hence, mixed evidence is found 
about the soundness of loan extension in China. 
Kam, Citron and Muradoglu (2005), examine the causes of financial distress in 
the case of China.  They examine a sample of 100 distressed firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Firms are classified as financially distressed 
if they are unable to cover their interest expenses, that is they have a negative interest 
coverage ratio or they are unable to pay off their debts.  They also use the 
classification scheme used by the exchanges where firms that have negative profits in 
2 consecutive years are classified as “special treatment” (ST).  They find that prior to 
distress these firms have high leverage and they significantly reduce their capital 
expenditure.  The existence of soft budget constraints has often been used in the 
literature as an excuse that Chinese firms operate in a protected environment.  
However, Kam, Citron and Muradoglu (2005) find that these so-called soft budget 
constraints do not save these firms as being distressed.  Poor firm operating 
performance is the main cause that they believe causes financial distress.  
Huang and Song (2005) use data on 1200 listed Chinese firms over the 1994-
2003 period.   They try to study if financial leverage decisions made in Chinese-listed 
firms are different from firms in other economies. They find that similar to other 
countries, firm size and the asset structure of Chinese firms are positively related to 
leverage, while there is a negative relationship between leverage and variables like 
profitability, non-debt tax shields and growth opportunities. Their findings are in 
essence similar to those of Chen (2003), as they find that Chinese firms seem to have 
much lower long-term debt as compared to firms in other countries. 
All these studies suggest that although the legal and financial system in China 
is relatively underdeveloped, this has not restricted the access of funds to Chinese 
firms.  Even if most of the bank credit is directed towards state-owned or formerly 
state-owned firms, privately owned firms have relied mostly on the informal credit 
market to obtain funds.  Regarding the capital structure of Chinese firms, most studies 
have found that similarities can be drawn between Chinese firms and firms in other 
developed and developing countries. 
In the next chapter, we investigate the various sources of financing of listed 
Chinese firms.  We use good quality financial data and focus on the factors that 
influence the leverage decisions of firms. 
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Most research on capital structure and financing decisions of firms has mainly 
focussed on large firms in western developed countries such as the UK and the US.  
Two important studies in this area are Rajan and Zingales (1995) (henceforth RZ) and 
Booth et al (2001).  RZ (1995) study the leverage decisions of G7 countries while 
Booth et al (2001) study the leverage decisions of firms in 10 developing countries48.  
Our study adds to the literature on leverage as we consider the case of China, which is 
the largest developing and transition economy in the world49.  
Sources of external finance are limited in economies in transition.  Firms in 
these countries are very dependent on financing sources such as bank credit.  
Obviously, factors that affect the leverage decisions of firms in developed countries 
might not have the same effect on the leverage decisions of firms in transition 
economies. Using good quality financial data, we study the leverage decisions of 
Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  The stock and 
bond market in China are still relatively under-developed and a number of restrictions 
have been imposed on listed firms that do not really allow them to use the stock 
market as a means of raising finance.  Hence most of the listed firms are still very 
much debt dependent.  
The main issue we investigate in this paper is whether the leverage decisions 
of listed firms in China are significantly different from those made by firms in other 
parts of the world.  Listed manufacturing firms in China have quite low overall 
leverage at around 22% of assets compared to Anglo-American firms and firms in 
Continental Europe and Japan (RZ, 1995).   The leverage of listed Chinese firms is 
also quite low even when compared to firms in the sample of developing countries 
                                                 
48 The G7 countries include United States, Germany, Canada, Italy, France, Japan and the United 
Kingdom.  The sample of developing countries include  India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan and Korea. 
49 China has one of the highest growth rates in the world and most of this growth is believed to be 
coming from the manufacturing sector.  The manufacturing sector now ranks 4th in the world after the 
US, Japan and Germany.  China has a 50% share of the world-wide camera market, a 30% share for air 
conditioners, a 25% share for washing machines and a 20% share for refrigerators (People Daily,2002). 
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used by Booth et al (2001)50.  However, Chinese firms in our sample seem to use 
disproportionately more short-term debt than long-term debt, possibly due to the 
relative under-development of the bond market.  Poor property rights and the 
relatively weak legal system51 in China possibly explains this behaviour and also 
suggests that even listed firms that should suffer the least from information 
asymmetry greatly suffer from it. 
This study uses a relatively new database which is the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). Using data on listed manufacturing firms, 
we find that some factors that affect the leverage decisions of firms in the rest of the 
world (such as profitability and size) also affect the leverage decisions of listed 
Chinese firms.  However, we also find that other factors that influence leverage 
decisions in other countries (such as collateral and growth opportunities) do not affect 
the leverage decisions of these firms. 
 We innovate on existing research by studying whether the leverage decisions 
of Chinese firms could be affected by China specific variables such as the location of 
a firm.  Moreover in the context of China, we investigate whether regions with 
different amounts of FDI and the amount of subsidies that firms receive from the state 
might affect the leverage of firms in our sample.  Further, we investigate if WTO 
accession has had any effect on the leverage decisions of firms.  Overall, we find that 
some firm characteristics such as profitability and size affect the leverage decisions of 
these firms, while other characteristics such as collateral and growth opportunities do 
not.  
Additionally, we find no important differences in the financing of listed firms 
across eastern (coastal), central regions and western regions. However, we find 
evidence that the leverage of firms located in high FDI recipient provinces and who 
receive more subsidies from the state is not influenced by their profitability. Finally, 
when we consider whether WTO accession affects the leverage of firms we find no 
strong evidence to support this claim.  However, these results should be interpreted 
cautiously as we are here focussing solely on the behaviour of listed manufacturing 
firms which are a tiny sample out of the population of Chinese firms who are likely to 
be more dynamic than the firms we have considered in our study. 
                                                 
50 See Table 5.A in Appendix  5.10 for a survey of leverage ratios across a sample of countries. 
51 Although the legal framework in China is quite developed, enforcement mechanisms are poor which 
makes the legal system inefficient. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows:  in section 5.1, we discuss some 
theoretical considerations and set the background of our research.  In section 5.2, we 
present our data and in section 5.3 we discuss why regional variation might be an 
important issue.  Following this, in section 5.4 we develop six main testable 
hypotheses.   In section 5.5, we consider an empirical specification, following which 
we present our summary statistics in section 5.6.  The regression results are discussed 
in section 5.7 after which we give attention to the results obtained when we consider 
regional variation in section 5.8.  Section 5.9 concludes. 
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If capital markets were perfect, then there would be no difference between internal 
and external funds (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  However, capital markets are far 
from perfect.  Internal and external finance are not perfect substitutes as asymmetric 
information creates a wedge between the cost of internal and external funds.  
Consequently, external funds are more expensive.  Reason why, firms spend much 
time and resources on deciding what source of finance to use as this has important 
implications for the firm.  Recent studies on capital structure decisions of firms have 
concentrated primarily on contrasting the two main theories of capital structure 
namely the Trade-off Theory (henceforth TOT) and the Pecking Order Theory 
(henceforth POT).   
According to the TOT, an optimal capital structure is achieved by “trading-
off” the costs and benefits of leverage (Berens and Cuny 1995, Fama and French 
2002, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999).  In the trade-off model, companies equate the 
costs and benefits of leverage and choose a leverage level that optimises the value of 
the firm.  The TOT also assumes the existence of a target leverage level and proposes 
that there is a positive relationship between leverage and internal funds.  Firms that 
have high internal funds would normally pay high taxes.  To avoid this, firms might 
take leverage in their capital structure to benefit from the interest tax shield that debt 
provides52.  This is referred to as a tax shield as it reduces profits of the firm, given 
that interest has to be paid. 
                                                 
52 Interest payments are usually tax deductible, and therefore taking debt enables firms to benefit from 
interest tax shield. 
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The POT, first proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) 
prescribes a strict ordering or hierarchy of finance: firms use internal finance first, 
then debt and only when such options are exhausted, equity finance is used.   The 
POT proposes a negative relationship between leverage and internal funds.  If firms 
follow the financial hierarchy as proposed by the POT then they will only have 
recourse to debt when there is a shortfall in internal funds.  When internal funds 
increase, firms would reduce the amount of leverage in their capital structure. 
In this paper, we do not intend to investigate which theory of capital structure 
better explains the financial behaviour of Chinese firms, but rather if factors that 
affect the capital structure of firms in other parts of the world affect the leverage 
decisions of listed Chinese firms at all.  We mainly limit our analysis to studying what 
determines the overall leverage of listed Chinese manufacturing firms.  
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


RZ (1995) study the leverage decisions of G7 countries during the year 1991.   They 
identify four key independent variables to analyse the determinants of capital 
structures across the G-7 countries which include profitability, the logarithm of sales 
that controls for size, tangibility of assets and the market-to-book ratio of the firm.  
Following in their steps, Booth et al (2001) assess the extent to which capital structure 
theories are portable across countries with different institutional structures by 
studying the capital structure choices of firms in 10 developing countries.  They 
provide evidence that these decisions are affected by the same variables as in the 
developed countries. The factors that affect the capital structure of firms in most 
countries are profitability, size, growth opportunities, asset structure and tax.   They 
conclude that factors that affect the capital structures of firms in the US and European 
countries also affect the capital structures of firms in developing countries, although 
the direction of causality might be different in different countries.   
There is a gap in this literature where some aspects of capital structure 
decisions have not been addressed.  This includes the capital structure decisions of 
firms in transition economies.  China is regarded as the largest developing and 
transition economy in the world.  It has one of the highest growth rates worldwide.  
The literature has recognised that a well developed financial system is necessary for 
growth; however the Chinese case contradicts this.  We believe that by studying the 
capital structure of Chinese firms we will be able, to a certain extent, to investigate the 
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financial behaviour of these firms and compare to what extent they are similar to 
firms in other parts of the world. 
Keister (2002) proposes that during economic transition, firms must 
dramatically reduce their financial dependence on the state and begin to borrow from 
non-state capital sources.  Some basics of firm behaviour indeed apply to firms in 
China, for instance retained earnings do affect a firm’s borrowing as shown in the 
studies by Chen (2003) and Huang and Song (2005), the two studies that are related to 
our study. 
Chen (2003) uses data on 88 listed Chinese companies over the 1995-2000 
period.  He finds that a major difference between the capital choices of listed Chinese 
firms as compared to that of firms in developed economies is that listed Chinese firms 
prefer short-term finance and have substantially lower amounts of long-term debt.  
This finding suggests that there is a limit to which capital structure theories explain 
the capital structure of firms in China.  Some factors that influence capital structure of 
firms in the western world do influence the capital structure of firms in China while 
the rest are not relevant in the Chinese context.   
Huang and Song (2005) use data on 1200 listed Chinese firms over the 1994-
2003 period.   They study if leverage decisions made in Chinese-listed firms are 
different from firms in other economies. They find that similar to other countries, firm 
size and the asset structure of Chinese firms are positively related to leverage, while 
there is a negative relationship between leverage and variables like profitability, non-
debt tax shields and growth opportunities. Their findings are in essence similar to 
those of Chen (2003), as they find that Chinese firms seem to have much lower long-
term debt as compared to firms in other countries. 
Another study by Gennip (2005) is indirectly related to the issues examined in 
this paper.  He examines the extent to which Chinese banks extend loans to firms on 
the basis of commercial criteria.  He studies 371 firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange to see what factors affect the amount of leverage used by Chinese firms.  
By doing this, he is able to infer what factors banks use to give out loans.  He finds 
that growth and size are positively related to the amount of leverage that a firm has.  
This indicates that to a certain extent, firms in China do consider commercial criteria 
while determining who gets loans.  However, he also finds that the amount of 
collateral used by a firm is not important for loan extension which would indicate that 
banks do not consider the amount of collateral that a firm can provide as being 
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important.  He explains this by the fact that due to its legal framework collateral is 
hardly executable in China.  Hence, mixed evidence is found about the soundness of 
loan extension in China. 
These studies suggest that although the legal and financial system in China is 
relatively underdeveloped, this has not restricted the access of funds to Chinese firms.  
Even if most of the bank credit is directed towards state-owned or formerly state-
owned firms, privately owned firms have relied mostly on the informal credit market 
to obtain funds.  Regarding the capital structure of Chinese firms, most studies have 
found that similarities can be drawn between Chinese firms and firms in other 
developed and developing countries. 
In this paper, we mainly examine the factors that affect the leverage decisions 
of firms in China.  This is interesting as property rights are not well- defined and the 
financial system is not very efficient in China.  The bond market is relatively under-
developed and while these firms are listed firms they cannot really issue new shares to 
raise capital.  Although these firms are very much dependent on leverage, we expect 
that Chinese firms would suffer more from (external) financial constraints as they 
would find it difficult to obtain external funding.  Hence, they would probably have 
less debt in their capital structure.  Furthermore, this would directly address the issue 
if financial system development is important for growth.  
Compared to other papers, we study the leverage decisions of firms across 
regions characterised by differences in FDI and state intervention (measured by 
subsidies). The Chinese economy is characterised by a high level of state intervention.  
Most of the firms in our sample started out as State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  
Although state intervention has been greatly reduced since China undertook banking 
reforms in the early 1990s, it is clearly not completely out of the picture.  Using the 
amount of subsidies that firms receive from the state, we study how state intervention 
in the form of subsidies affects the leverage decisions of firms.  We also study 
leverage decisions across time when we consider WTO accession.  All these give a 
broader picture of leverage decisions of listed Chinese manufacturing firms. 
 
5.2 
The paper uses a relatively new database which is the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) that is developed and maintained jointly by 
the Centre for China Financial Research at the University of Hong Kong and the 
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Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co.  The CSMAR-A Database has collected 
the data available in all the annual reports of A-share companies listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges since 1990.  No other existing financial 
database on China listed companies is as comprehensive.  The data is collected from a 
number of first- hand sources such as Securities Times, Shanghai Securities daily and 
China Securities Daily. It contains the financial data (including the balance sheet, 
statement of profit and profit distribution, statement of changes in financial position, 
cash flow statement and asset impairment provision statement (since 2001) of all 
companies listed on both exchanges.   
Unlike previous studies, we focus on firms in the manufacturing sector for 
many reasons.  Klapper, Sarria-Allende and Sulla (2002) find that a characteristic 
common to all transition economies is the concentration of firms in the 
industrial/manufacturing sector.  Moreover, most of the listed firms in China operate 
in the protected sectors and account for around 40% of the total of listed firms.  
Manufacturing firms operate mainly in the non-protected sector53 and therefore 
financial decisions of these firms are most likely not to be interfered with by the state. 
In the case of China, most of the growth comes from the manufacturing sector and it 
will undoubtedly be interesting to study the financing behaviour of these firms. 
 Between 1978 and 1991, the State tried to improve SOE performance through 
measures such as reducing government intervention, providing management with 
greater autonomy and inducing SOEs to operate on a more commercial basis (Shirai, 
2002).  However, when these measures failed to improve SOE performance, the State 
decided to reform property rights namely by converting largest SOEs into limited and 
joint stock companies.  
 However, this privatisation process did not really take off as listed firms have 
by and large remained state-owned as the state still owns the majority of shares in 
these firms.  Hence, listed firms in China are quite unique.  As documented by Green 
(2004), 95% of China’s 1,278 listed firms in 2003 began their lives as traditional 
SOEs and many spent only a few months as limited companies before being listed.  
These SOEs were among the best performing ones in the country and through a listing 
were allowed to issue and list shares publicly mostly in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
However the state has remained in control of most of these firms by retaining the 
                                                 
53 Firms that operate in the protected sectors include petrochemicals and energy and raw materials.  
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majority of shares in these firms.  Similarly, Allen et al (2004), find that most of the 
bank credit is issued to firms that belong to the state and listed sectors.  Consequently, 
listed Chinese firms can be said to be under ‘disguised’ state-ownership, as the state 
still holds huge amounts of shares in these firms. 
 
5.3	
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We use four different criteria to separate firms in our sample consisting of listed 
manufacturing firms.  The first two are based on regional variation as we classify 
firms based on their geographical location and the amount of FDI that the provinces in 
which they are found receive. The FDI data is obtained from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks and is provincial level FDI.  The third criterion that we use is based on the 
amount of “help” that firms receive from the state.  We use a crude proxy for state 
intervention by taking into account the amount of subsidies that firms in our sample 
receive from the state by using firm-level data on subsidies.  The fourth one is based 
on a time dimension where we consider whether joining WTO has had any effect on 
the leverage decisions of firms.   
Recent studies have documented growing regional imbalance in China in 
terms of labour migration and growth (Xu, 2000).  Huang and Song (2005) state that 
China has huge development gaps in different provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities.  Companies head-quartered in different regions might therefore have 
different levels of leverage.  Another study by Liu and Li (2006), find that the use of 
financial resources also varies across the different regions in China. As far as we 
know the impact of regional variation on leverage decisions has not been investigated 
before. 
Regional divisions in China can be made using different criteria.  A broad 
geographical grouping is the division between Eastern, Central and Western regions.  
China consists of different provinces where each province can operate as an 
independent state.  Hence it is quite interesting to study if financing patterns vary 
across regions.  The Eastern region (the coastal provinces) for instance, due to its 
advantageous geographical positioning attracts much more productive financial 
resources.  Firms in the eastern (coastal) provinces might find it easier to get access to 
funds while firms located in the central and western provinces might find that lenders 
are not willing to lend to them because of where they are located.  Liu and Li (2006) 
for instance find that domestic bank loans are important to coastal provinces while 
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state appropriation and self-raised funds are important to inner provinces.  First, we 
group the firms in our sample in 3 different regions54 namely the Eastern region, 
Central region and Western region.  
 The second geographical grouping that we use is according to the level of FDI 
that different provinces receive.  Unfortunately, we do not have firm level data on FDI 
so we use a proxy for this.  We use provincial level annual FDI obtained from the 
China Statistical Yearbooks to distinguish among provinces that receive high FDI 
relative to GDP and those that receive low FDI relative to GDP.  We construct a 
dummy variable that indicates if a particular province in a particular year was a high 
FDI or low FDI province.  Using the percentile methodology, we use a cut-off point 
of 75%, hence all provinces that are in the bottom 3 quartiles of the distribution of 
FDI/GDP of all provinces are classified as low FDI while all provinces that are in the 
top quartile of the distribution of FDI/GDP of all provinces are classified as high FDI.  
We therefore allow provinces to switch between a high FDI province category to a 
low FDI province category. 
  Figure 5.1 in Appendix 5.10 shows the FDI to GDP ratio for firms in the year 
1995 across provinces, while Figure 5.2 shows how the use of FDI has evolved over 
the years and across provinces.  It suggests that although the use of FDI has become 
more widespread (inward movement of FDI to interior of China), the proportion of 
FDI relative to GDP used has actually fallen. We then merge the dummy variable 
indicating ‘high FDI’ or ‘low FDI’ from the provincial level annual FDI data obtained 
from the China Statistical Yearbooks with the CSMAR data.   
The third criterion that we use is the amount of subsidies that firms receive.  
Although government intervention is said to have been greatly reduced since China 
undertook its reforms, there is a subsidy variable in our dataset that suggests that state 
intervention is not zero55.  This subsidy variable is described as “various subsidies 
received by a company such as subsidy for loss due to government policies and refund 
of value-added tax.”  When scaled by assets, the amount of subsidies is quite 
                                                 
54 Eastern region: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong,  
Guangdong, Hainan; 
Central region: Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan; 
Western region: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet. 
55 China applies a series of measures that allow for refunds, reductions, or exemptions from taxes and 
other payments owed to the government.  These appear designed to subsidize exports of manufactured 
goods or to support the purchase of domestic over imported equipment and certain other manufacturing 
inputs. 
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insignificant; however, when scaled by net profit, the amount of subsidies received is 
up to 10%.   
Using the percentile methodology again, we rank the subsidies/profit received 
by firms by year and by industry.  All firm-years that are in the bottom 3 quartiles of 
the distribution of subsidy/profit of all firm-years are classified as low subsidy while 
all firm-years that are in the top quartile of the distribution are classified as high 
subsidy.  We therefore allow firms to switch between being a ‘low subsidy’ firm-year 
category to a ‘high subsidy’ firm-year category.  Subsidies could also be an industry 
specific variable.  In particular, some industries could be benefiting from higher 
subsidies from the state, however as shown in the summary statistics in Table 5.B, 
Appendix 5.10, there does not seem to be an industry influence on the amount of 
subsidies received. 
Figure 5.3 in Appendix 5.10 shows the evolution of the subsidies variable 
across the time period considered.  The subsidies variable is positive in all years and 
peaked in 1999 after which it dropped sharply and then rose again.  This behaviour 
could possibly be related to China joining the WTO in 2001.  China had to comply 
with some regulations before joining the WTO and one of them included that it would 
not provide subsidies to its firms that would thereby allow them to compete unfairly 
against firms in other parts of the world.  However, it is clear from the diagram above 
that subsidies are still being used.  The trend of the subsidies variable scaled by profit 
exhibits an upward trend until 1999 and drops sharply just before 2001, the year in 
which China joined the WTO. After 2001, subsidies are on the rise again indicating 
that even among listed firms state intervention still exists. 
The fourth criterion that we use incorporates a time dimension.  China joined 
the WTO in 2001.  This has obviously been an important event for China.  To 
investigate if this has had any effect on the leverage decisions of firms, we split our 
sample into pre-WTO and post-WTO.  Pre-WTO group consists of those firm-years 
preceding 2001, while the post-WTO group consists of those firm-years after and 
including 2001.  By splitting the sample in this way we are able to study if accession 
to WTO has had any effect on the leverage decisions of Chinese firms.  We therefore 
generate two dummy variables.  Pre-WTO is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
year is less than 2001 and zero otherwise.  Post-WTO is a dummy variable that equals 
to one if year is greater or equal to 2001 and zero otherwise.  This enables us to 
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examine whether leverage decisions of firms have changed before and after China 
joined the WTO. 
 
5.4 

 Firms in China operate in a unique financial environment.  The country has 
undertaken extensive economic restructuring since the late 1970s.  Many State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) have been privatised and steps have been taken to reform the 
highly inefficient banking sector and deal with the problems of Non Performing 
Loans (NPLs) (Lu, 2006).   Shirai (2002) finds that Chinese listed firms tend to 
depend more heavily on debt rather than other sources of finance, for instance equity.  
However, the firms hardly issue corporate bonds and mostly borrow short-term. Thus, 
among external sources, they rely more on short-term debt than long-term debt 
indicating that their maturity mismatch is substantial.  Their ratio of equity to total 
liabilities has hardly changed suggesting that the financing behaviour of these firms 
has remained quite static.  Despite being listed firms, they have not really turned to 
equity financing as a significant source of financing. 
As mentioned earlier, we do not intend to investigate which theory of capital 
structure better explains the financial behaviour of Chinese firms but rather if factors 
that affect the capital structure of firms in other parts of the world affect the decisions 
of listed Chinese firms at all.  If despite the extensive reforms undertaken, factors that 
affect the financing decisions of firms in other parts of the world do not affect the 
financing decisions of firms in China this implies that the reforms have not been 
successful.  State intervention still exists and firms still benefit from preferential 
treatment.  If the financing decisions of listed Chinese firms are affected by factors 
like profitability, size, asset structure and growth opportunities, then this implies that 
reforms in the financial sector have been successful and firms operate in a more 
competitive environment. 
Hence the first hypothesis we test is: 
H1: Factors that affect the financing of firms in other parts of the world also affect 
the financing of listed manufacturing firms in China. 
 Barclay and Smith (1995) find that firms with higher information asymmetries 
issue shorter-term debt and also tend to roll over debt.  Many studies that have 
investigated the financing patterns of listed Chinese firms have found that these firms 
tend to use short-term debt disproportionately more than long-term debt.  This leads to 
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what can be referred to as maturity mismatching as short-term debt is possibly being 
used to finance long-term investments.   The capital structure literature has also found 
that factors that affect long-term debt are quite different from factors that affect short-
term debt.  Profitability for instance has been found to be an important factor that 
influences the amount of short-term debt (but not long-term debt) of firms in many 
countries (Benito, 2003).  Similarly, the amount of collateral that a firm can provide 
has also been found to be positively related to the amount of long-term debt that firms 
have as banks are more willing to lend to firms that have more collateral.   
Therefore the second hypothesis we test here is: 
H2: Listed manufacturing firms in China suffer from maturity mismatching. 
The other issue we investigate is whether regional variation matters.  China is 
a very large country and comprises of many provinces. The east coast provinces for 
instance are more developed and the central provinces are in the middle while the 
western provinces are less developed. Some provinces behave like small independent 
states (similar to the US).  It is a fact that the western provinces face geographic 
disadvantages and they also have poor infrastructure.  Since the beginning of the 
reform period in the late 1970’s, policy preference has been geared towards the east 
which has benefited from more international trade and foreign direct investment, the 
main forces behind the regional disparity.  The reason for this can be cheaper labour 
costs, better infrastructural facilities, close relations with overseas Chinese but most 
importantly favourable geographic location. 
Since listed firms are by nature large and well-known firms (ie they would 
suffer less from asymmetric information problems), we do not expect the financing 
patterns of firms to differ much across regions.  However, if regional variation is 
important and firms that are located within a region behave differently from firms in 
other regions this implies that location plays an important role in financing of firms in 
China. The third hypothesis we test is: 
H3:  Regional variation does not matter for listed manufacturing firms in China. 
 We exploit the geographical elements in our dataset by further investigating 
the leverage decisions of firms across regions that receive a high level of FDI and a 
low level of FDI.  FDI has been a very important source of financing for Chinese 
firms since the government allowed FDI to enter the country.  Unfortunately we do 
not have firm level data on FDI and we do not know how much the firms are actually 
utilizing FDI as a source of finance.  To proxy for the use of FDI, we use provincial 
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level annual data on FDI from the China statistical yearbooks.  We match these data 
with our firm level data so that we know whether our firms are located in high FDI 
provinces or low FDI provinces. As expected, most of the provinces that receive high 
FDI are located on the coastal regions (FT, 2005) and include amongst others Beijing, 
Guangdong, Guangzhou, Fujiang, Hainan, Jiangsu, Shangdong, Shanghai and Tianjin.   
 Firms that are located into High FDI provinces have an extra source of finance 
(Huang, 2003) while firms located in Low FDI provinces have to rely only on 
restricted sources.  We hypothesize that the leverage of firms located in High FDI 
provinces would be less sensitive to their profitability while the leverage decisions of 
firms that are located in low FDI provinces would be more sensitive to their 
profitability.  There could be several reasons for this.  For instance, firms in high FDI 
provinces might be less debt dependent or by virtue of where they are located, lenders 
might be more willing to lend to them irrespective of their profitability.  Our fourth 
hypothesis is therefore: 
H4: The leverage decisions of firms located in High FDI provinces are not affected by 
their profitability. 
 The next hypothesis that we test is whether the amount of subsidies received 
by firms affect the leverage decisions of firms.  We try to include this variable in our 
regression specification but it is insignificant in most cases.  We therefore use the 
level of subsidies received as an exogenous variable to separate our sample of firms as 
subsidies could possibly affect the leverage decisions of firms through their effect on 
profits.  We expect that the leverage of firms that receive a high level of subsidies 
would not be affected by their profitability.   
H5: Profitability is irrelevant in the leverage decisions of firms that receive more 
subsidies. 
China joined the WTO in 2001.  This has been a major event as acceding to 
WTO implied that China had now secured its exports markets.  Its exports were no 
longer subject to the vagaries of US politics. Hence, there might have been a pre and 
post WTO effect on the leverage decisions.  For instance, firms might have increased 
their leverage to meet growing demands after China joined WTO or they could on the 
other hand have used less debt so that they have spare debt capacity.  Either way, we 
can say that accession to WTO could possibly have an effect on the leverage decisions 
of Chinese firms in our sample.  Therefore the sixth and final hypothesis we test is: 
H6:  There has been a WTO effect on the leverage decisions of Chinese firms. 
 168 
5.5 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	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We use a similar empirical specification as that used by RZ (1995)56. 
 
(Leverage/Assets)it = λ0  + λ 1 (Leverage/Assets)it-1 +λ 2 (Return on Assets )it + λ 3 (Log 
Sales )it  + λ 4 (Tangible assets)it  + λ 5 (Sales Growth)it   + νi + νt + εit                         (5.2)                    
 
Return on Assets is proxied by profitability.   Log Sales is the log of real sales used as 
a proxy of size.  Tangible assets is used as a measure of collateral and proxied for by 
the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets.  Unfortunately, the sub-sample of data that 
we have does not contain the market price of shares and therefore we cannot calculate 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of growth opportunities.  We therefore have to rely on a Sales 
Growth measure to capture growth opportunities.   
We estimate equation 6.2 using the first-difference Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, (Arellano and Bond, 1991) which takes into account both 
firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. Our instrument 
set includes (Leverage)it-1 , (Return on Assets)it , (Log Sales)it  , (Tangible assets)it  and (Sales 
Growth)it    which are lagged 2 to 5 times.  All observations below or higher than the 1
st 
and 99th percentiles are deleted to avoid problems with outliers. 
We use the Sargan test and the m2 to evaluate if our model is correctly 
specified.   The J statistic is the Sargan/Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions.  
Under the null of instrument validity, the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
number of parameters. If the model used is correctly specified and the instruments are 
adequate, the variables in the instrument set should not be correlated with the 
idiosyncratic component of the error term εit.  On the other hand, the m2 test, which 
tests for second-order serial correlation, is asymptotically distributed as standard 
normal under the null of second-order serial correlation57.  This test provides a further 
check on the specification of the model and on the validity of variables dated t-2 as 
instruments.   
 
                                                 
56 We try to include a tax variable in our specification as used by Booth et al (2003), however, the 
coefficient is insignificant in most cases so we drop this variable. 
57 If the p-values for the Sargan and the m2 test are both greater than 0.05, then the instruments are 
acceptable. 
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5.6		
The summary statistics in column 1 of Table 5.1 give the summary statistics across 
the full sample.  It indicates that listed manufacturing firms in China have overall 
leverage at around 22% of assets58.   Similar to the findings of Chen (2004), Huang 
and Song (2005) and Gennip (2005), we find that most of the leverage of Chinese 
firms consists of short-term debt while long-term debt is very minimal at less than 5% 
of assets (see Figure 5.4 in Appendix 5.10).  This has 2 possible implications.  Either 
firms are unwilling to borrow long-term or banks are unwilling to lend long-term.  
The summary statistics further indicate that the listed manufacturing firms we 
consider here have quite low profitability at around 3% of assets.   The financial 
performance of firms is captured by the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity variables (ROE).  As shown in Figure 5.5 Appendix 5.10, these firms have not 
been performing quite well. 
 Next we report the statistics on the regression variables across the 3 regions 
that we consider in this study.    The summary statistics reported in columns (2), (3) 
and (4) of Table 5.1 suggest that there are no big differences in the financing patterns 
and firm characteristics across the regions.  Firms in all three regions have similar 
levels of overall leverage and short-term and long-term debt.  There is not much 
difference in firm size, the amount of collateral that can be provided by the firms or 
growth opportunities across the regions.   
 We also report summary statistics of firms located in High FDI and Low FDI 
regions in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.1. Unlike what we would normally expect, 
firms located in high FDI region and Low FDI region have similar leverage (23% and 
21% respectively).  We also report summary statistics of firms according to the level 
of subsidy that they receive which acts as a crude measure of state intervention in 
columns (7) and (8). Firms that receive high level of subsidies have overall leverage 
of 23% which is higher than the leverage of firms that receive low subsidies at 21% 
which could possibly indicate that lenders are willing to lend to firms if they receive 
some form of ‘help’ from the state.   
A noticeable feature worth noting about high subsidy/high state intervention 
firms is that they have higher growth opportunities.  This could reflect the fact that 
firms that have high growth opportunities receive subsidies from the state because the 
                                                 
58 See Table 5.A in Appendix 5.10 for a survey of the leverage ratios across developed and developing 
countries as taken from the studies by RZ (1995) and Booth et al (2001).   
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state wants to further encourage these firms or it could on the other hand imply that 
firms which receive more subsidies have more funds and so they have more growth 
opportunities. We do not find significant changes in firm leverage before or after 
China joined the WTO in columns (9) and (10) of Table 5.1. All these suggest that 
listed Chinese firms have not experienced significant changes in leverage across 
geographical locations and across time.  However, these issues are investigated in 
further detail using more involved econometric techniques in the next section. 
 
'	

Table 5.2 presents the regression results for the full sample of firms. Column (1) gives 
the results using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. In column (2) we again 
use the OLS method but we include industry dummies as leverage could potentially 
be influenced by the industry to which the firm belongs59.  The results suggest that 
profitability negatively influences the leverage of listed Chinese manufacturing firms. 
However, the OLS method ignores both firm-specific heterogeneity and potential 
endogeneity of regressors.   
In column (3) of Table 5.2 we use the Within Groups estimator (Fixed Effects) 
that takes account firm-specific heterogeneity.  The results suggest that profitability 
and size (measured by log of real sales) are the major determinants of leverage of 
these firms.  However, the Within Groups estimator ignores the potential endogeneity 
of regressors, for example, size affects the profitability of firms and vice versa.  We 
therefore use the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator in column (3) that takes into account both firm specific heterogeneity and 
potential endogeneity of our regressors.    
The benchmark case is that if the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
(0.402) obtained using the GMM estimator lies between the coefficient obtained 
under the OLS (0.837) and Fixed Effects estimator (0.348), then the first-difference 
GMM estimator is the best one to use. The results obtained using the first-difference 
GMM estimator in column (4) further indicate that the financial policies of listed 
Chinese firms are not very different from firms in other parts of the world and give 
some support to the findings of RZ (1995) and Booth et al (2001).  The lagged 
dependent variable is positive and significant (0.402) indicating that if a firm has high 
                                                 
59 Note that we cannot include industry dummies in the Fixed Effects and GMM estimations. 
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leverage at time t-1 then the firm is also likely to have high leverage at time t. From 
this point onwards we limit our estimation methodology to the GMM estimator.  
  Like previous studies that have used data on listed firms in China, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between leverage and profitability of Chinese 
firms as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of -0.425, which 
indicates that Chinese firms do rely on internal finance.  As these firms experience an 
improvement in their profitability, they tend to reduce the amount of leverage in their 
capital structure. These findings are, to some extent, in accordance to the results 
obtained by Chen (2004) and Huang and Song (2005) and confirm the finding that 
Chinese firms tend to follow some form of Pecking Order in their financing, that is 
they always prefer to use internal finance first, then debt60.
We find a positive and significant relationship between leverage and the size 
of the firm (0.023) indicating that leverage increases with size and vice versa.  This 
result could possibly indicate that larger listed Chinese firms get easier access to debt 
financing.  As stated by Green (2004) most of the external finance of firms comes 
from bank finance as the bond market is relatively under-developed.  Tangibility 
measured by the asset structure (collateral) does not have any effect on the leverage of 
Chinese firms.  This is not surprising as collateral in China is hardly executable and 
therefore not an important determinant of whether or not a firm can have access to 
leverage (Gennip, 2005).  Another explanation for this could also be the fact that these 
ex-SOEs have special relationships with banks and therefore collateral is not really 
important.  A third possible explanation could be the fact that since we consider only 
manufacturing firms they can possibly have assets that are “specialised” and cannot 
really serve as collateral (see Schaller, 1993 and Guariglia, 2006). 
Growth opportunities are insignificant and suggest that they are not important 
determinants of leverage.   One explanation as to why growth opportunities are 
insignificant could be the fact that the sales growth variable is an imperfect measure.  
However since we consider manufacturing firms sales would be a good proxy for 
growth opportunities of these firms.  But the sales of these firms have been quite 
stagnant. This could therefore explain why growth opportunities are not significant.  
Hence we cannot accept our first hypothesis (H1) that factors that affect the financing 
of firms in other parts of the world also affect the financing of listed manufacturing 
                                                 
60 It should be noted that in Chen (2004) the pecking order is internal finance, then equity and finally 
debt. 
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firms in China, but we cannot reject this hypothesis either.  Some factors like 
profitability and size are significant while other factors like collateral and growth 
opportunities are not significant.61 
Next, we examine the debt maturity structure of the firms in our sample as 
these firms seem to use disproportionately more short-term debt than long-term debt.   
Prior studies have found that firm characteristics such as size and the amount of 
collateral are likely to influence the amount of long-term debt that firms use.  
However, column (5) of Table 5.2 shows that none of the firm characteristics except 
profitability influence the amount of long-term debt that listed manufacturing firms 
use.  Similarly, in column (6), we find that except the profitability and size of the 
firm, none of the firm characteristics influence the amount of short-term debt in the 
capital structure of these firms.   
We normally expect profitability (internal finance) to have a negative 
relationship with the amount of short-term debt that a firm uses.  Clearly, short-term 
debt is a substitute for internal finance as shown by the negative coefficient on the 
profitability variable (-0.317).  However, it worth noting that the lagged debt variable 
is positive and significant both when short-term debt and long-term debt is the 
explanatory variable indicating that previous period debt strongly determines debt 
levels in the current period. 
As proposed by Barclay and Smith (1995), firms with higher informational 
asymmetries use debt with shorter maturities. The fact that the financial structure of 
these Chinese firms is excessively tilted towards short-term debt indicates that these 
firms suffer from quite serious problems of information asymmetry.  The increased 
use of short-term debt by Chinese firms possibly indicates that lenders are only 
willing to lend short-term as this allows them to better monitor the firms and reduce 
misbehaviour (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).  Obviously this is quite 
alarming as being listed these firms should be the ones to suffer the least from 
informational asymmetry problems.  However, as proposed by La Porta et al, (2000), 
when the legal system is inefficient, asymmetric information is more pervasive and 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are more current.  On the other hand 
                                                 
61 To check for the robustness of our results, we use another measure of profitability, that is 
distributable profit.  Distributable profit is profit left after all taxes and payments have been made and 
what is actually left to distribute to shareholders.  The results (not reported), are mostly similar to the 
results obtained above.  Also see Table 5.A in Appendix 5.10 for a comparison with different studies. 
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this behaviour might reflect the preferred financial strategy of listed Chinese firms in 
China. 
On the supply side, the results above indicate that banks are not very confident 
about lending to these firms.  Obviously, these firms seem quite static as their 
profitability has remained quite stagnant.  The question then arises as to why banks 
lend to these firms at all.  This would obviously be explained by the fact that being 
ex-SOEs, these listed firms still benefit from some form of special relationship with 
banks.  Hence we accept our second hypothesis (H2) that listed manufacturing firms 
in China suffer from maturity mismatching. 

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The GMM regression results when we consider regional variation are shown in Table 
5.3.  First, we group our firms in geographical groups: Eastern, Central and Western 
China and use them as interaction dummies, where they are interacted with all the 
regressors. 
The results that we obtain shown in column (1) of Table 5.3, indicate that 
there is not much difference in the leverage decisions of firms. It is worth noting that 
the lagged dependent variable is always positive and significant indicating that lagged 
leverage is an important determinant of leverage decisions.  A firm that has high 
leverage is likely to have high leverage in the next period for Eastern and Central 
provinces. However, the lagged debt variable for firms located in the western region is 
insignificant, implying that there is no relationship between debt levels at time t and 
time t-1 for these firms.  They might have high debt in one period and low debt in the 
next.  This peculiar behaviour could possibly indicate that firms in Western region 
might benefit from special treatment as they are located in the most disadvantageous 
region in China.  In the early 2000s for instance the Chinese government started 
implementing the Western Development Strategy Plan whose aim was to develop the 
west. 
  The profitability variable is negative and significant for all regions.  The size, 
structure and sales growth variables are mostly insignificant across all regions. We 
test for the statistical differences in the coefficients and find that at least for the lagged 
debt and profitability variables the coefficients obtained are statistically different from 
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each other62.  All the other coefficients on the variables are not really statistically 
different from each other.  For instance, the firms in our sample are all listed firms 
and do not vary much in size, the amount of collateral that they can offer or their 
growth opportunities63. In column (2) of Table 5.3 we use long-term debt as the 
dependent variable while in column (3) we use short-term debt as the dependent 
variable.  Compared to the results in column (1), the results in column (3) show that 
leverage measured by short-term debt is robust to the results obtained previously, 
when an overall measure of leverage was used as the dependent variable.   
To check for the robustness of our results, we perform a series of checks.  In 
column (4) of Table 5.3, we use an alternative measure of profit, where we use 
distributable profit instead of net profit as our profitability measure.  In column (5), 
we use an alternative measure of asset structure that takes into account total fixed 
assets instead of net fixed assets as our collateral measure.  The results indicate that 
our results are robust and that profitability and size are the main determinants of 
leverage across listed Chinese manufacturing firms.   
 Further exploiting regional variation, we consider firms located in regions that 
receive high FDI and low FDI. In 2004 for instance, China attracted US $60.6 billion 
in foreign direct investment, but more than ¾ of this investment were channelled into 
the coastal region (Business Times, 2004), because of this we believe that it would be 
interesting to split the sample into High FDI and Low FDI regions.   However, it 
should be noted that the amount of shares held by overseas shareholders barely 
amounts to 2-3% of assets (Shirai, 2002).  As explained earlier, due to lack of firm-
level FDI data, we use provincial level FDI data.  As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in 
Appendix 5.10, FDI patterns have changed over time, so a province that was high FDI 
could switch to being low FDI over time and vice versa.  Hence we do not accept or 
reject our third hypothesis H3.  Leverage decisions of firms are quite similar across 
regions except in the western region. 
The results when FDI is taken into account are shown in Table 5.4.  Once 
again the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant.  The coefficient on the 
profitability variable although negative is insignificant for firms located in high FDI 
                                                 
62 The F-statistic obtained when we test for the equality of the coefficients is 13.23 for lagged debt and 
5.20 for the profitability variable suggesting that these variables when interacted with region dummies 
are statistically different from each other. 
63 When the state first listed the firms, the best performing ones from each province were selected to be 
quoted so it is not surprising that the leverage of firms do not differ much across regions. 
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province-years suggesting that there is no relationship between leverage and 
profitability for firms located in high FDI province-years.  This would possibly 
suggest that these firms are less debt dependent by virtue of where they are located or 
they might be more reliant on FDI than debt64.  Firms that are located in low FDI 
province-years exhibit a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, 
suggesting that these firms behave more like firms in other parts of the world and are 
likely to be more debt dependent.  Other explanatory variables like size, collateral and 
growth when interacted with the high FDI and low FDI dummies do not really give 
any significant results.  Hence we accept our hypothesis H4 that the leverage 
decisions of firms located in High FDI provinces are not affected by their 
profitability. 
Next we examine the effect that state intervention has on the leverage 
decisions of firms using firm-level data on subsidies.  As mentioned before we take 
into account the amount of subsidies that firms receive to proxy for state intervention.  
The results obtained indicate that for firm-years that receive high subsidy, profitability 
is not a significant variable that affects the amount of leverage in a firm.  There is 
evidence therefore that firms that receive more subsidies benefit from special 
treatment as their leverage decisions are not affected by their profitability, while the 
leverage decisions of firms that receive less subsidies are more dependent on their 
profitability levels. We therefore accept the hypothesis H5, that there exists state 
intervention in the form of subsidies and this influences leverage decisions of firms. 
The results above indicate that firm-years that are located in high FDI 
provinces (using provincial level FDI) and receive high subsidies (using firm-level 
subsidies), that is, experience quite high state intervention do not operate according to 
firm fundamentals.  Therefore this suggests that firm-years located in low FDI 
provinces and firm-years receiving low subsidies behave more like firms in other 
parts of the world as their leverage decisions are affected by their profitability. 
China joining the WTO in 2001 has been a major event.  The country’s 
accession to WTO meant that Chinese firms now had secure export markets and this 
likely reduced the amount of uncertainty faced by these firms.  Therefore, there is a 
possibility that this has had an effect on the leverage decisions of Chinese firms.  
However the results obtained in Table 5 indicate that at least on the leverage front, 
                                                 
64 Unfortunately we do not have firm level FDI so we cannot examine this issue further. 
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there does not seem to have been a WTO effect on the leverage decisions of listed 
Chinese firms.   
As shown in Table 5.5, the pre-WTO and post-WTO results are not very 
different. The only significant result is the profitability variable that is negative and 
significant only after 2001, which possibly indicates that firms are now more likely to 
be operating according to their economic fundamentals.  Pre-WTO firms might be 
benefiting from soft budget constraints that could explain why profitability is 
insignificant in their leverage decisions.  However, all the other variables such as size, 
collateral and growth opportunities are insignificant both pre-WTO and post-WTO 
suggesting that nothing much has changed65.  Hence we reject hypothesis H6 and 
conclude that there has not been a strong WTO effect on the leverage decisions of 
firms. 
 
5.9 
	

In this paper, we have investigated what affects the leverage decisions of listed 
manufacturing firms in China.  We find that although Chinese listed firms have quite 
low leverage, most of their debt is short-term, suggesting that maturity matching 
might be a problem, and that banks prefer to lend short-term, which points towards a 
risk averse behaviour of the latter. Our results suggest that despite declining 
profitability, our listed Chinese firms are still able to service debt.  This could 
possibly explain why banks are still willing to lend to them or points towards the fact 
that despite substantial financial reforms, Chinese firms still benefit from soft budget 
constraints. 
Next, we investigate if financing behaviour differs across regions as markets 
in China are usually cited as being fragmented.   Huge development gaps exist 
between the Eastern and Western regions and this could possibly affect the financing 
patterns across regions. We do not find evidence to support this claim, as firms 
operating in different regions appear to have similar levels of leverage. However, 
these results should be interpreted cautiously as we are here focussing solely on the 
behaviour of listed manufacturing firms which are typically large firms and are a tiny 
sample out of the population of Chinese firms who are likely to be more dynamic than 
the firms we have considered in our study. 
                                                 
65 This could also be because WTO accession would only impact export-oriented firms.  However, we 
do not have information about whether our sample of firms export or not. 
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 Next, we explore regional heterogeneity by considering firms located in High 
and Low FDI recipient provinces.  The results we obtain suggest that the leverage 
decisions of firms located in High FDI provinces are not influenced by their 
profitability, while profitability is an important determinant of the leverage decisions 
of firms located in low FDI provinces.  We also find evidence suggesting that the 
level of subsidies obtained influences the leverage decisions of firms.  Finally, we 
explore the time dimension in our dataset by considering whether joining WTO in 
2001 has had any effect on the leverage decisions of the firms in our sample.  We do 
not find any significant differences in the financing patterns of firms before or after 
this event. 
In conclusion, our results suggest that the single main determinant of leverage 
decisions of Chinese firms is the profitability of these firms.  Profitability is 
significant across the full sample and even when the sample is split according to the 
various geographical attributes.  It is also significant when the sample is split in the 
year 2001.  Profitability is only insignificant for high FDI regions and high subsidy 
firm-years.  Unlike other factors such as size or collateral that are significant in only a 
few cases, profitability is mostly negative and significant, suggesting that Chinese 
firms do operate according to a pecking order and that their preferred source of 
finance is internal finance.  In this respect, Chinese listed firms are therefore not very 
different from their western counterparts after all. 

  









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Number of 
years of 
observation Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 73 1.52 1.52 
2 88 1.83 3.35 
3 153 3.19 6.54 
4 400 8.33 14.87 
5 700 14.58 29.45 
6 558 11.62 41.07 
7 651 13.56 54.62 
8 536 11.16 65.79 
9 468 9.75 75.53 
10 240 5 80.53 
11 495 10.31 90.84 
12 348 7.25 98.08 
13 78 1.62 99.71 
14 14 0.29 100 
Total 4,802 100  
 
 
 
Leverage (LEV)  
Calculated as the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by assets. 
 
Short-term debt (STD) 
Borrowing with a maturity of less than one year (including one year) and not yet 
repaid scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: A210101 
 
Long-term Debt (LTD) 
Debt that the company borrows from banks or other financial institutions, with a 
maturity of over one year (not including one year) scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: A220101 
 
Net Profit (PROFITABILITY) 
The net profit realized by a company scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: B150101 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Calculated as Net Profit/Assets 
 
Revenue from Main Operations (Sales) 
Log of the real revenues generated by the main operating activities of a company.  
Sales growth (Sales Growth) is calculated as the change in log of real sales using the 
above measure. 
Index Number of Data Field: B110101 
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Net Fixed Assets (STRUC) 
Calculated as the difference between Fixed Assets and Accumulated depreciation 
scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data field: A130127 
 
Fixed Assets:  The original cost of a company’s various fixed assets, including the 
cost of fixed assets under finance lease. 
Index Number of Data field: A130101 
 
Accumulated Depreciation: The accumulated depreciation of various fixed assets of a 
company including that of fixed asset acquired under finance lease. 
Index Number of Data field: A130113 
 
Subsidies (SUBSIDY): Various subsidies received by a company such as subsidy for 
loss due to government policies, and refund of value-added tax. 
Index Number of Data field: B130402 
 
Return on Equity (ROE), calculated as distributable profit divided by Shareholder’s 
Equity. Distributable profit is defined as the portion on a company’s profit available 
for distribution. Shareholder’s Equity is the total capital invested by shareholders into 
a company in accordance with the memorandum and articles of the company 
Index Number of Data field: B220101 
Index Number of Data field: B130402 
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TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
 (1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Eastern 
Region 
(3) 
Central 
Region 
(4) 
Western 
Region 
(5) 
High 
FDI 
(6) 
Low 
FDI 
(7) 
High  
State 
Intv.  
(8) 
Low 
State 
Intv.  
(9) 
Pre 
WTO 
(10) 
Post 
WTO 
No. of 
observations 
3253 1776 773 688 1245 2008 953 2003 1488 1765 
(LEV / A )it 0.216 
(0.126) 
 
0.218 
(0.129) 
0.204 
(0.123) 
0.221 
(0.122) 
0.229 
(0.131) 
0.207 
(0.122) 
0.229 
(0.121) 
0.209 
(0.128) 
0.210 
(0.119) 
0.221 
(0.132) 
(LTD / A )it 0.049 
(0.064) 
 
0.044 
(0.060) 
0.058 
(0.068) 
0.051 
(0.068) 
0.042 
(0.060) 
0.053 
(0.067) 
0.054 
(0.067) 
0.047 
(0.063) 
0.049 
(0.061) 
0.049 
(0.066) 
(STD / A )it 0.167 
(0.110) 
 
0.174 
(0.115) 
0.146 
(0.099) 
0.171 
(0.107) 
0.186 
(0.118) 
0.154 
(0.103) 
0.175 
(0.107) 
0.163 
(0.111) 
0.160 
(0.102) 
0.172 
(0.117) 
(PROFIT/A)it 
 
0.031 
(0.052) 
0.033 
(0.050) 
0.030 
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.056) 
0.031 
(0.053) 
0.032 
(0.052) 
0.038 
(0.031) 
 
0.028 
(0.059) 
 
0.043 
(0.049) 
0.022 
(0.053) 
(LNSR)it 13.300 
(1.115) 
 
13.407 
(1.187) 
13.247 
(0.965) 
13.087 
(1.051) 
13.331 
(1.213) 
13.281 
(1.051) 
13.208 
(1.086) 
13.338 
(1.124) 
13.050 
(1.124) 
13.500 
(1.065) 
(STRUC/A)it 0.292 
(0.128) 
 
0.291 
(0.133) 
0.303 
(0.119) 
0.283 
(0.124) 
0.277 
(0.130) 
0.301 
(0.126) 
0.282 
(0.115) 
0.297 
(0.133) 
0.274 
(0.119) 
0.308 
(0.133) 
(SalesG) it 0.147 
(0.470) 
 
0149 
(0.471) 
0.121 
(0.437) 
0.173 
(0.501) 
0.141 
(0.509) 
0.151 
(0.444) 
0.182 
(0.461) 
0.134 
(0.473) 
0.229 
(0.573) 
0.103 
(0.397) 
(Subsidy)it 0.076 
(0.226) 
 
0.084 
(0.246) 
0.057 
(0.170) 
0.079 
(0.228) 
0.078 
(0.233) 
0.076 
(0.222) 
0.235 
(0.362) 
0.010 
(0.059) 
0.073 
(0.202) 
0.079 
(0.244) 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample means.  The 
subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1995-2004.  (LEV/A) is the sum of long-term and 
short-term debt divided by assets.  The other measures of leverage are long-term debt over assets (LTD/A), short-
term debt over assets (STD/A).  (PROFIT/A) is profitability divided by assets, (LNSR) is the log of sales and 
(STRUC/A) is the ratio of tangible assets to assets, we use a sales growth measure (SalesG) to proxy for growth 
opportunities. (Subsidy) is the subsidies received by the firm scaled by net profit.  Column (1) gives the summary 
statistics for the full sample.  Columns (2), (3) and (4) reports the summary statistics according to the regions where 
the firms are located.  Columns (5) and (6) report summary statistics according to the level of FDI received by firms 
in different regions.  Columns (7) and (8) take into account the level of state intervention by accounting for the level 
of subsidies received by firms.  Finally, columns (9) and (10) we take into account firm-years before and after 2001, 
the year in which China joined the WTO. 
 
 
 181 
TABLE 5.2:REGRESSION RESULTS:FULL SAMPLE 
 OLS 
 
 
(1) 
OLS 
 
 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
(3) 
GMM 
 
 
(4) 
GMM 
Dep var 
LTD 
(5) 
GMM 
Dep Var 
STD 
(6) 
( LEV /A)it-1 0.837*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.824*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.348*** 
(0.023) 
0.402*** 
(0.075) 
0.423*** 
(0.080) 
0.414*** 
(0.075) 
(PROFIT/A )it 
 
-0.285*** 
(0.039) 
-0.317*** 
(0.040) 
-0.367*** 
(0.043) 
-0.425*** 
(0.118) 
-0.165*** 
(0.089) 
-0.317*** 
(0.131) 
(LNSR)it -0.002 
(0.001) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
0.006** 
(0.004) 
 
0.023** 
(0.014) 
 
0.013 
(0.017) 
 
0.039*** 
(0.018) 
 
(STRUC/A)it  0.015 
(0.012) 
 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
 
0.018 
(0.022) 
 
-0.022 
(0.080) 
 
-0.060 
(0.057) 
 
-0.000 
(0.075) 
 
(SalesG) it 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
 
R-squared 0.710 0.720     
Sample size 2354 
 
2354 
 
2354 
 
1549 1549 1549 
rho 
 
  0.648    
J    0.096 0.438 0.163 
m2    0.237 0.596 0.406 
Industry 
Dummies 
- yes - - - - 
Time Dummies Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) reports results using the OLS method.  In column (3), we use the Fixed 
Effects method while in column (4), (5) and (6) we use the First Difference GMM method.   We report 
asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. ρ presents the portion of total error variance accounted for 
by unobserved heterogeneity.  Under the null of no serial correlation ρ, is asymptotically distributed as 
N( 0, 1).  m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of 
the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.  
Instruments used are (LEV/A )it  , ( LTD /A)it-1 , (STD /A )it-1 , (PROFIT/A)i ,(LNSR)it , (STRUC/A)it  and 
(SalesG)it and all  lagged two to five times.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as 
regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to Table 5.1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 5.3:	
		
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 1 2 
DEP VAR 
LTD 
3 
DEP VAR 
STD 
4 
ROBUST
NESS 
CHECKS 
5 
ROBUST
NESS 
CHECKS 
6 
YEAR> 
1999 
(LEV /A)it-1*EASTERN 
 
0.411*** 
(0.097) 
0.803*** 
(0.170) 
0.366*** 
(0.104) 
0.524*** 
(0.112) 
0.613*** 
(0.132) 
0.407*** 
(0.118) 
(LEV/A)it-1*CENTRAL 
 
0.573*** 
(0.137) 
0.045 
(0.175) 
0.587** 
(0.170) 
0.649*** 
(0.181) 
0.619*** 
(0.182) 
0.507*** 
(0.167) 
(LEV/A)it-1*WESTERN 0.117 
(0.112) 
0.232 
(0.145) 
0.143 
(0.183) 
-0.074 
(0.154) 
0.128 
(0.162) 
0.120 
(0.158) 
(PROF/A) it*EASTERN 
 
-0.345** 
(0.140) 
-0.078 
(0.107) 
-0.313** 
(0.164) 
-0.330*** 
(0.189) 
-0.200 
(0.284) 
-0.303** 
(0.151) 
(PROF/A it*CENTRAL 
 
-0.532** 
(0.214) 
-0.225 
(0.166) 
-0.381 
(0.255) 
-0.623 
(0.303) 
-0.699 
(0.445) 
-0.528** 
(0.218) 
(PROF/A it*WESTERN -0.654* 
(0.322) 
0.041 
(0.232) 
-0.688** 
(0.325) 
-1.044*** 
(0.391) 
-0.828*** 
(0.461) 
-0.691** 
(0.383) 
(LNSR)it* EASTERN 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.018) 
0.039*** 
(0.019) 
0.037*** 
(0.020) 
0.071*** 
(0.032) 
-0.000 
(0.021) 
(LNSR)it* CENTRAL 
 
0.020 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
0.046*** 
(0.024) 
0.050** 
(0.027) 
0.076 
(0.048) 
0.063* 
(0.040) 
(LNSR)it* WESTERN 0.037*** 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.046*** 
(0.022) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
0.076*** 
(0.031) 
0.050* 
(0.032) 
(STRUC/A)it* EASTERN -0.106 
(0.103) 
-0.122 
(0.092) 
-0.109 
(0.127) 
-0.139 
(0.135) 
-0.122 
(0.262) 
-0.045 
(0.130) 
(STRUC/A)it* CENTRAL 
 
0.071 
(0.143) 
0.095 
(0.125) 
0.107 
(0.157) 
0.201 
(0.242) 
0.052 
(0.352) 
0.064 
(0.159) 
(STRUC/A)it* WESTERN 
 
-0.012 
(0.115) 
-0.003 
(0.114) 
0.080 
(0.135) 
0.168 
(0.179) 
0.111 
(0.233) 
-0.062 
(0.116) 
(SalesG) it * EASTERN -0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
(SalesG) it * CENTRAL 
 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.030) 
-0.009** 
(0.028) 
(SalesG) it *WESTERN 
 
-0.027 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.032** 
(0.016) 
-0.041*** 
(0.022) 
-0.034 
(0.024) 
Sample size 1566 1566 1566 1566 1523 1327 
J (Sargan) 0.148 0.613 0.352 0.067 0.073 0.053 
m2 0.480 0.574 0.348 0.481 0.588 0.446 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (LEV/A )it  (PROFIT/A)i ,(LNSR)it , 
(STRUC/A)it  and all (SalesG)it,  lagged two to three times and interacted with the region dummies: 
Eastern, Central and Western.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and 
instruments. In column (1), we use the total debt measure as the dependent variable.  In column (2) we 
use long-term debt as the dependent variable while in column (3) we use short-term debt as the 
dependent variable.  In columns (4) and (5), we check for the robustness of our results by considering 
an alternate measure of asset structure and profitability.  Finally in column (6), we use data as from the 
year 2000 as this was the year where accounting reforms were undertaken and the reporting systems of 
firms were becoming more standardized.  * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Also see notes to Tables 5.1 
and 5.2. 
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Table  5.4:FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS 

 1  2 
(LEV /A)it-1* HIGHFDI 0.467*** 
(0.125) 
(LEV /A)it-1* HIGH SUBSIDY 0.529*** 
(0.127) 
(LEV /A)it-1*LOW FDI 0.257*** 
(0.117) 
(LEV /A)it-1* LOW SUBSIDY 0.368*** 
(0.084) 
(PROF/A) it * HIGHFDI -0.032 
(0.188) 
(PROF/A) it*HIGH SUBSIDY -0.765 
(0.525) 
(PROF/A) it*LOW FDI -0.715*** 
(0.224) 
(PROF/A) it*LOW SUBSIDY -0.606*** 
(0.146) 
(LNSR)it* HIGHFDI -0.001 
(0.020) 
(LNSR)it* HIGH SUBSIDY 0.051*** 
(0.019) 
(LNSR)it* LOW FDI 
 
0.008 
(0.021) 
(LNSR)it* LOW SUBSIDY 0.059*** 
(0.020) 
(STRUC/A)it* HIGHFDI -0.266** 
(0.041) 
(STRUC/A)it* HIGH SUBSIDY 0.205** 
(0.155) 
(STRUC/A)it* LOW FDI 
 
0.180 
(0.128) 
(STRUC/A)it*  LOW SUBSIDY -0.086 
0.092 
SalesG it * HIGHFDI 0.021 
(0.015) 
SalesG it * HIGH SUBSIDY -0.003 
(0.022) 
SalesG it * LOW FDI 0.024 
(0.017) 
SalesG it * LOW SUBSIDY -0.032** 
(0.016) 
Sample size 1566 
 
Sample size 1549 
 
J 0.536 
 
J 0.215 
 
m2 0.318 
 
m2 0.288 
 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (LEV/A )it  (PROFIT/A)i ,(LNSR)it , 
(STRUC/A)it  and (SalesG)it all  lagged two to three times and interacted with dummies: High FDI, Low 
FDI or High Subsidy and Low Subsidy.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors 
and instruments.  Also see notes to Table 5.2 and 5.3. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Table  5.5:FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATORS 
(LEV /A)it-1* PREWTO 
 
0.344*** 
(0.084) 
(LEV /A)it-1* POSTWTO 0.290*** 
(0.106) 
(PROF/A) it * PREWTO -0.241 
(0.197) 
(PROF/A) it*POSTWTO -0.528*** 
(0.162) 
(LNSR)it* PREWTO 0.011 
(0.021) 
(LNSR)it* POSTWTO 
 
0.022 
(0.021) 
(STRUC/A)it* PREWTO -0.029 
(0.087) 
(STRUC/A)it* POSTWTO 
 
0.005 
0.101 
SalesG it * PREWTO -0.002 
(0.015) 
SalesG it * POSTWTO 0.025 
(0.022) 
Sample size 1566 
 
J 0.098 
 
m2 0.220 
 

Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (LEV/A )it  (PROFIT/A)i ,(LNSR)it , 
(STRUC/A)it  and all (SalesG)it,  lagged two to three times and interacted with dummies: Pre WTO and 
post WTO. Pre WTO is a time dummy equal to 1 for all years prior to 2001 while post WTO is a 
dummy equal to 1 for all years after and including 2001 to account for WTO accession.  Time dummies 
are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to Table 5.2 and 5.3. * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 








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TABLE 5.A:CROSS COUNTRY LEVERAGE RATIOS 
 Number of 
firms 
Time Period Total Debt 
Ratio
66
 
Long-term 
Debt Ratio 
Developed Countries     
United States 2580 1991 27 37 
Japan 514 1991 35 53 
Germany 191 1991 16 38 
France 225 1991 25 48 
Italy 118 1991 27 47 
United Kingdom 608 1991 18 28 
Canada 318 1991 32 39 
Developing Countries
67
     
Brazil 49 1985-1991 30.3 9.7 
Mexico 99 1984-1990 34.7 13.8 
India 99 1980-1990 67.1 34.0 
South Korea 93 1980-1990 73.4 49.4 
Jordan 38 1983-1990 47.0 11.5 
Malaysia 96 1983-1990 41.8 13.1 
Pakistan 96 1980-1987 65.6 26.0 
Thailand 64 1983-1990 49.4 N/A 
Turkey 45 1983-1990 59.1 24.2 
Zimbabwe 48 1980-1988 41.5 13.0 
     
China 815 1995-2004 22 4.90 
Sources: Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al (2001) 





                                                 
66 Leverage ratios are calculated as total debt/assets for the G7 countries and for China. 
67 Unfortunately, the leverage ratios for the developing countries are only available as total liabilities 
divided by total liabilities plus net worth. 
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Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time 
where t=1995-2004.  (LEV/A) is the sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by assets.  The other measures of leverage are long-term debt over assets (LTD/A), short-
term debt over assets (STD/A).  (PROFIT/A) is profitability divided by assets, (LNSR) is the log of sales and (STRUC/A) is the ratio of tangible assets to assets,  we use a sales 
growth measure (SalesG) to proxy for growth opportunities.   (Subsidy) is the subsidies received by the firm scaled by net profit.
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 Chen (2003) Huang and 
Song (2005) 
Gennip (2005) This study 
(2006) 
Dataset Dow-China 88 
Index 88 firms 
(1995-2000) 
CSMAR Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 
371 firms 
(1993-2003) 
CSMAR 
(Manufacturing 
only) 
Methodology Pooled OLS 
Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects 
OLS, Tobit GMM GMM 
Profitability negative negative Negative negative 
Growth positive negative Positive n.s 
Size n.s positive Positive positive 
Asset structure positive positive n.s n.s 
Tax -- positive -- -- 
The table above compares our results with the results obtained in previous studies.  
We find that overall our results are robust to what has been obtained previously in this 
literature.  From here, we innovate on existing research in many ways by taking 
account of FDI, subsidies and many other factors. 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
Figure 5.1 
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FDPROV: Mean of FDI/GDP for different provinces over 1995-2003 
 
Figure 5.2 
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The above diagram shows that provinces that in 1995 did not receive FDI have started 
receiving FDI in 2000, indicating a movement of FDI towards the interior of China. 
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Figure 5.3 
SUBSIDIES as a % of NET PROFIT 
 
 
The figure above shows how subsidies scaled by net profit behaved over the period.  
As can be seen it is positive in all years and peaked in 1999.  This behaviour could 
possibly be related to China joining the WTO in 2001.  China had to comply with 
some regulations before joining the WTO and one of them included that it would not 
provide subsidies to its firms that would thereby allow them to compete unfairly 
against firms in other parts of the world.  The trend of the subsidies variable scaled by 
profit exhibits an upward trend until 1999 and drops sharply just before 2000, just 
before China joined the WTO. After 2001 (once China joined WTO), subsidies are on 
the rise again indicating that even among listed firms state intervention still exists. It 
is clear from the diagram above that subsidies are still being used.   
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The graph above shows that leverage (LEV) of Chinese firms (scaled by assets) 
consists mainly of short-term debt (STD-debt with a maturity of less than 1 year), 
while long-term debt (LTD-debt with a maturity of more than 1 year) is quite low. 


1"*#,		

			

The above diagram shows that the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) of 
firms have been declining over the years suggesting that firms in our sample have not been 
performing quite well. 
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Figure 5.6 
 
 
 
Source: Fan, 1995. 
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In this chapter we investigate the cash holdings of listed Chinese manufacturing firms.  
Chinese firms are among the biggest savers in the Chinese economy and it is 
interesting to study the factors that lead these firms to hold vast amounts of cash.  The 
main motivation of this study comes from Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 
(henceforth ACW, 2004).  They find that unconstrained US firms hold 8-9% of their 
total assets in the form of cash and marketable securities, while constrained firms hold 
around 15% of their assets in liquid form.  Chinese listed firms in our sample hold 
around 19% of their assets in cash over the 1995-2004 period, which possibly 
suggests that these firms are financially constrained. 
In a Financial Times article (2006), Martin Wolf wrote: “the most vexed issue 
between the two countries (US and China) is the payments “imbalances”.  Many in 
the US complain that China is manipulating its currency to preserve excessive 
competitiveness…it has a huge current account surplus (see Figure 6.1 in Appendix 
6.10)…forecast to be at $184 billion in 2006.”  However, he explains that China’s 
surplus savings cannot really be attributed to the ‘frugality’ of Chinese households.  
Indeed, China’s household and government sector are net savers but the massive 
amount of China’s savings comes from the corporate sector (see Figure 6.2 in 
Appendix 6.10). The listed manufacturing firms that we consider also seem to be 
accumulating vast amounts of cash. However, this is strange as the Chinese firms in 
our sample are not performing particularly well.  China’s corporations are generating 
vast savings and the main issue we investigate in this paper are the reasons for doing 
so. 
As far as we know no other study has investigated the cash policies of Chinese 
firms.  There have been a number of studies based on the US and the UK.  Using good 
quality financial data, we first investigate what are the factors that affect the cash 
holdings of Chinese firms and then examine the reasons why Chinese firms have 
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accumulated large reserves of cash. We assume that like debt policies, cash policies 
might also be determined by a target.  For instance, just like firms have an optimal 
debt ratio, they might similarly have an optimal cash ratio.  They might accumulate 
cash over a certain period of time and use up their cash thereafter.  We therefore 
include a dynamic element in our analysis of cash policies of Chinese firms.  Also 
unlike previous studies that have used OLS or fixed effects, we use the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM estimator which enables us to take into account firm-specific 
heterogeneity and the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. 
We next differentiate firms into more or less likely to face financial constraints 
based on size and profitability.  Specifically, we classify firms as small and large 
according to the distribution of their real assets and low profit and high profit 
according to their level of profitability. Small firms are likely to be informationally 
opaque, suffer from short track record and are more likely to face financial constraints 
in their access to external finance.  Larger firms on the other hand would be less likely 
to face financial constraints.  Similarly, low profit firms would probably have greater 
difficulty to get access to external funds while high profit firms would not encounter 
these problems.  We find that cash holding decisions are similar across the two groups 
of firms.  
Acceding to WTO seems to have been a major event in the Chinese calendar.  
This event could possibly have affected the cash holding behaviour of Chinese firms.  
We take into account the WTO event by considering firm cash holding behaviour 
before and after WTO accession.  Pre-WTO firms accumulated quite large amounts of 
cash reserves, which were not linked to any of our control variables.  However, post 
WTO firms seem to be saving out of profits. Overall, the results we obtain suggest 
that the main variables that affect cash holdings are changes in net working capital 
(NWC) and changes in leverage indicating that both of these variables are substitutes 
to cash holdings. 
The chapter is organised as follows:  In section 6.1 we review the theoretical 
literature.  Section 6.2 reviews the empirical literature while section 6.3 gives the 
motivation of our study. In section 6.4, we discuss a theoretical framework proposed 
by ACW (2004) and Han and Qiu (2007).  In section 6.5,  we formulate a set of 
testable hypotheses.  In section 6.6, we discuss our panel data regression specification 
in details.  In section 6.7, we elaborate on our dataset and discuss our summary 
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statistics. In section 6.8 we discuss our regression results.  Finally, section 6.9 
concludes. 
 
 
6.1 	
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 
 
Earlier studies in the literature have focussed on firms’ physical investments and other 
real expenditures.  Studies on capital structure have been based on firms’ choices 
between debt and equity when firms are faced with an internal “financing deficit,” 
whose calculations take cash holdings as exogenous.  Capital markets frictions not 
only affect real variables but more importantly, they affect financial variables. The 
recent literature has tried to study the impact of constraints on firms’ financial 
policies. In the previous chapters we show that there is a relationship between 
leverage and cash flow.  In this chapter we look at the other side of the coin and study 
how cash holdings affect the leverage decisions. 
Similar to the literature on capital structure, which first started with the 
assumption of perfect capital markets and later incorporated the idea that capital 
markets were highly imperfect, the literature on cash holdings too, has followed a 
similar pattern.  If capital markets are perfect, holdings of liquid assets are irrelevant.  
If a firm experiences a shortfall in liquid assets it can easily raise the required amount 
at the risk free rate.  However, capital markets are imperfect and raising additional 
funds is costly as the liquidity premium is positive in most cases.  Because of this and 
other reasons discussed below, management likes to hold cash in firms. 
Improvements in financial technology have been made and this should mainly 
reduce holdings of cash.  However, the opposite has been observed lately.  According 
to Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2005), US firms have accumulated huge stockpiles of cash 
and the fall in net debt has been so dramatic that average net debt for these firms has 
actually been negative.  Some examples are firms like Microsoft and Exxon, who 
have accumulated in excess of $30 billion in cash.  The increase in cash holdings have 
been closely associated with what they call the disappearing “dividends 
phenomenon”. 
There are various reasons why management would like to hold on to cash.  
First managers might be risk averse.  They could also hold on to cash to have more 
flexibility in pursuing their own objectives.  Also, managers might want to 
accumulate cash to avoid making payouts to shareholders and keep funds within the 
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firm.  The question that arises then is why is cash so important?  Cash is like free cash 
flow (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1998, henceforth OPSW 1998).  It 
allows management to make investments that capital markets might otherwise not be 
willing to finance.  
 
The following are the main reasons why firms hold cash. 
 
THE TRANSACTION MOTIVE 
The transaction motive was first proposed by Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr 
(1966).  The transaction motive refers to the cost that firms incur when converting a 
non-cash financial asset into cash and the uses of cash for payments.  In the real 
world, there are costs involved in buying and selling financial and real assets.  A firm 
short of liquid assets has to raise funds in the capital markets, liquidate existing assets, 
reduce dividends and investment, and renegotiate existing financial contracts or some 
combination of these actions (OPSW, 1998).   
 
THE PRECAUTIONARY MOTIVE 
Firms hold cash to be in a better position to cope with adverse shocks when access to 
capital markets is costly.  The precautionary motive for holding cash is based on the 
impact of asymmetric information on the ability to raise funds.  Even when firms have 
access to capital markets to raise financing, they may not want to do so at a particular 
point in time because the securities they are planning to issue are undervalued.  In this 
case, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms can overcome this problem by 
building up financial slack, which they define as cash, cash equivalents and unused 
risk-free borrowing capacity. 
 
THE AGENCY MOTIVE 
First proposed by Jensen (1986), the agency motive proposes that entrenched 
managers would rather hold on to cash when the firm has poor investment 
opportunities rather than increase the payouts to shareholders.  Conflicts of interest 
might arise between shareholders and managers.  Managers may have incentives to 
hold on to large amounts of cash reserves to pursue their own objectives at the 
expense of shareholders.  They can squander funds by consuming perquisites and/ or 
making inefficient investment decisions.  The reason why managers would want to 
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hold on to large cash holdings is that they can use the resources when needed instead 
of having to turn to external finance.  External investors can discipline managers by 
monitoring and therefore preventing managers from doing what they want to do with 
the funds.  To avoid this discipline, managers would like to hold on to large cash 
reserves. 
This agency conflict can be solved through managerial ownership (Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2003).  Managerial ownership (giving management some fraction of 
ownership in the firm) can help to align the interests of managers with that of 
shareholders.  When managers own part of the firm, they are less likely to divert 
resources away from value maximisation as they bear part of the costs of their actions.   
 
TAX MOTIVE 
Firms that generate income abroad have incentives to keep that income abroad in 
order to avoid taxes upon repatriation.  Consequently, multinational firms may 
optimally accumulate cash abroad.  The US and many other countries tax the foreign 
income of their firms, but these taxes can be deferred until earnings are repatriated.  
As a result, many multinational firms have an incentive to retain earnings abroad and 
to a large extent these firms hold these funds in cash.  Tax incentives can possibly 
explain why firms might increase foreign cash holdings especially when these 
holdings are a substitute for domestic cash holdings. 
Several factors have been identified in the literature that are believed to affect 
the level of cash holdings by firms.  According to OPSW (1998) a firm’s cash 
holdings would be determined by the marginal benefit and marginal cost of those 
holdings.  Therefore an optimal theory of liquid asset holdings has to address the issue 
of why it is more efficient for the firm to hold an additional dollar of liquid assets 
instead of decreasing leverage by some amount or increasing hedging. 
Management that maximizes shareholder wealth should set the firm’s holdings 
at a level such that the marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the marginal cost of 
those holdings.  The cost of holding liquid assets include the lower rate of return of 
these assets because of a liquidity premium and also tax disadvantages.  The benefits 
of holding liquid assets include the fact that the firm saves on transaction costs to 
raise funds and does not have to liquidate assets to make payments (Transaction 
Motive).  The other benefit is that firms that hold enough liquid assets can use them to 
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finance its activities and investments if other sources of funding are not available or 
are excessively costly (Precautionary Motive).  
 
There are two broad explanations for cash holdings which have their root in the 
capital structure literature.  These are the Tradeoff Theory and the Financial 
Hierarchy Theory. 
 
The Tradeoff Theory 
The Tradeoff theory suggests that firms tradeoff the costs and benefits of holding cash 
to derive optimal cash levels.   A value-maximising firm evaluates the marginal cost 
and marginal benefits of cash holdings to determine the optimal cash ratio. 
 
The Financing Hierarchy Theory 
The Financing Hierarchy Theory (OPSW, 1998), proposes the alternative hypothesis 
that there is no optimal amount of cash.  For this to be the case, firms are assumed to 
be able to issue at low cost to raise cash whenever they experience a shortfall in 
finance in their financing requirements.  The literature on capital structure has 
recognised that firms might have a target net debt ratio; however, firms might be 
indifferent whether they have high cash holdings and low debt or low cash holdings 
and high debt.  The financing hierarchy model predicts that firms that have high cash 
flows would save more cash while firms that invest more would have fewer internal 
resources and hence would accumulate less cash.  Firms that are larger are likely to be 
successful firms and would hold more cash.  Also, firms that pay more dividends 
should have lower cash. 

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Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) were the first to empirically examine the 
determinants of corporate liquidity of US firms.  They view cash holdings as 
investment in liquid assets especially as it reduces firms’ dependence on costly 
external finance.  However, this investment in liquid assets is costly as liquid assets 
earn a low rate of return.  Using a panel of 915 US industrial firms during the 1975-
1994 period, Kim et al (1998) find that firms tend to have an optimal amount of 
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liquidity.  This liquidity is increasing in the cost of external financing, the variance of 
future cash flows and the profitability of future investment opportunities.  This 
liquidity is decreasing in the rate of return on current investment opportunities and the 
size of the firm.  Hence, Kim et al (1998) conclude that when faced with asymmetry 
induced financial constraints firms should stock up on liquid assets to finance future 
investment opportunities with internal funds. 
Opler et al (1998), examine the determinants and implications of cash holdings 
of cash and marketable securities by listed firms in the US over the 1971-1994 period.  
They find evidence supportive of the static trade-off model of cash holdings.  In 
particular, firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold 
relatively high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets.  Firms that have the greatest 
access to the capital market such as large firms and firms with good credit ratings tend 
to hold less cash.  Management tends to accumulate cash if it has the opportunity to 
do so. Hence, the precautionary motive for holding cash is very strong.   
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) model a firm’s demand for liquidity 
to develop a new test for the effect of financial constraints on corporate policies (the 
model is studied in more detail in the next chapter).    Keynes proposed that the 
importance of balance sheet liquidity is influenced by the financial constraints faced 
by firms.  Liquidity management is likely to be irrelevant for firms that are 
unconstrained, that is, who do not face any difficulties in obtaining finance.  
However, firms that face financing frictions might want to manage their liquidity 
resources.  Firms that expect financing constraints in the future could respond to those 
constraints by hoarding cash.  
Almeida et al (2004) try to investigate this issue by taking into account US 
firms and classifying them into financially unconstrained and financially constrained 
firms, using a number of different criteria.  They find that while unconstrained firms 
hold 8-9% of their total assets in the form of cash and marketable securities, 
constrained firms hold around 15% of their assets in liquid form.  They next study the 
cash flow sensitivities of cash, that is, how cash holdings respond to changes in cash 
flow at firms facing different degrees of financial constraint.  Their results suggest 
that constrained firms save much more out of their cash flows while unconstrained 
firms do nothing.  They therefore conclude that unconstrained firms have 
indeterminate cash policies. 
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Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2005) investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on firm value and particularly examine how managerial entrenchment and 
lack of shareholder oversight influence both the value and the use of cash resources.  
Cash holdings represent a large fraction of corporate assets and can easily be spent by 
management.  Governance possibly has an impact on cash policies of firms as 
indicated by the saying that “left to their own devices, managers will waste corporate 
resources.”  Using US data over 1990-2003, Dittmar et al (2005) examine this issue 
and find that holding large cash reserves is problematic only when firms are poorly 
governed and/or managers are poorly monitored.  Firms that have poor governance 
are more likely to waste cash resources and thus destroy firm value. 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006), examine why US firms hold much more cash 
than what they used to before.  To do this, they use data from the annual industrial 
files on the WDRS database for the period 1980-2004.  Financial firms are excluded 
because they may carry cash to meet capital requirements rather than for economic 
reasons.  They find that US firms have dramatically increased their average cash ratio 
between 1980-1994.   This increase is concentrated among firms that do not pay 
regular dividends.  The main reason for this increase in cash ratio is that cash flow 
risk for American firms has increased.  They hold much less inventories and capital 
expenditures and R&D expenditures have increased.  Although the derivative market 
has grown there is still a very important precautionary motive in holding cash for 
these firms. 
Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan and Talavera (2006) investigate the link between the 
optimal level of non-financial firms’ liquids assets and uncertainty.  They use a panel 
of non-financial US firms drawn from the COMPUSTAT quarterly database covering 
the period 1993-2002.  Their results indicate that firms increase their liquidity ratios 
when the macroeconomic uncertainty or idiosyncratic uncertainty increases.  Smaller 
firms are much more sensitive to both forms of uncertainty and hold much more cash 
on average than do large firms.  Hence they too find evidence in favour of a 
precautionary motive for holding cash. 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2006) examine the issue of why US firms 
hold so much cash and if this can be explained using a tax-based explanation.  They 
propose that US multinationals could be holding cash in their foreign subsidiaries 
because of the tax costs associated with repatriating income.  They use a sample of 
US firms over the 1982-2004 period from Compustat and draw data from the Bureau 
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of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of US Direct Investment Abroad that 
contain information on domestic and foreign cash holdings.  The results obtained 
suggest that tax incentives increase foreign cash holdings as US firms increasingly see 
foreign cash holdings as a substitute for domestic cash holdings.  Thus repatriation 
taxes reduce domestic cash holdings. 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2006) examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm cash holdings.  They study how agency problems 
affect the propensity to stockpile cash in the US.  They find that firms with weak 
shareholders rights, low insider ownership and higher board independence have 
smaller cash reserves than those with strong shareholder rights, high ownership and 
less independent boards.  Firms with weaker corporate governance have smaller cash 
reserves. This could be explained by the fact that firms with poor governance and self 
interested managers might choose to spend cash quickly rather than gain flexibility 
through stockpiling it. 
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Ozkan and Ozkan (2003), investigate the empirical determinants of corporate 
cash holdings for a sample of UK firms.   Using a sample of publicly traded non-
financial UK firms over the 1984-1999 period, they find that liquidity exerts a 
negative influence on cash holdings of firms and the same is true for leverage. The 
more highly levered a firm, the less cash it will hold.  Firms that have more growth 
opportunities tend to hold more cash.  However they do not find evidence that firms 
with more volatile cash flows hold more cash.  Also they do not find any relationship 
between size and cash holdings. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) then focus on how managerial ownership among 
other corporate governance characteristics might influence the cash holdings of firms. 
They mainly examine how the board structure and the ultimate controllers of 
companies influence the cash holdings of firms in the UK.  The UK corporate sector 
is mainly characterised by insufficient external market discipline and the lack of 
efficient monitoring by financial institutions and company boards.  This in turn can 
provide managers with greater freedom to pursue their own interests that may include 
holding higher cash balances. 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) find that managerial ownership plays an important 
role in determining corporate cash holdings in the UK.  They find evidence that the 
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relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings is non-monotonic.  
Cash holdings first decrease with the equity ownership of managers, consistent with 
the incentive-alignment argument.  Companies with managerial ownership between 
20% and 30% have the lowest cash holdings.  After reaching a minimum, the 
association between cash and managerial ownership becomes positive providing some 
support for the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership. 
This result is significantly different from the results obtained by OPSW (1998) 
who find that there is no significant influence of managerial ownership on cash 
holdings at higher ownership levels, that is, there exists neither alignment nor 
entrenchment.  These results suggest that managerial ownership has different 
implications in the UK than in the US.  It reinforces the impression that the UK 
corporate sector suffers from lack of external market discipline. 
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Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) examine how agency problems 
namely in the form of shareholder protection rights affect cash holdings of firms.   
Using data on 11,000 companies in 45 countries, they find that firms in countries 
where shareholder rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as 
corporations in countries with good shareholder protection.  Shareholders in countries 
with good protection rights can force managers to dissipate their cash reserves by 
paying dividends or buying back shares.  However, managers in countries with poor 
protection rights seem to hoard cash possibly because it is easy for managers to use up 
the cash stocks for their own benefit and reduces the pressure on these managers to 
‘perform.’ 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) examine if firms in countries with 
poor protection rights hold more cash.  Using a sample of 35 countries and data over 
the 1988-1999 period, they find that firms in countries with poorer institutions hold 
more liquid assets (cash) than they would if they were located in the US.  They 
control for GDP per capita, financial development, stock return volatility and inflation 
among other variables.  They find that a firm in a country with the worst institutions 
has from 5% to 25% more liquid asset holdings in proportion to total assets than a US 
firm.  They conclude that the precautionary motive of holding cash is quite important 
in explaining why countries with poorer institutions hold more liquid assets. 
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Chang and Noorbakhsh (2006), examine the impact of globalisation on the 
cash holdings of firms.  The rapid integration of international capital markets has been 
characterised by an explosion of FDI flows.  Chang et al (2006) examine the influence 
of FDI as an international source of financing in corporate financial decision makings. 
They introduce the ratio of FDI to GDP in their regressions to capture the effect of 
globalisation on cash holdings.  Using data on 22,000 industries in 48 countries in the 
year 2000, they find that as the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP increases, firms tend to 
hold less cash.    Hence they conclude that cash holdings and FDI inflows are 
substitutes.  This suggests that inflows of FDI partially substitute for the needed 
capital that firms traditionally raise in domestic capital markets.  They then separate 
the sample into G7 countries and non-G7 countries.  Their findings indicate that FDI 
inflows seem to act as substitutes for corporate cash holdings in G7 countries while 
they seem to have a complementary effect in non-G7 countries. 
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Pal and Ferrando (2006) examine how financial constraints might influence 
firms’ cash policy in the Euro area.  The data they use is on non-financial corporations 
in the Euro area obtained from the AMADEUS database of Bureau van Dijk.  The 
data covers the 1994-2003 period.  They find that growth opportunities captured by 
sales growth do not affect liquidity demand and various types of investments in 
tangible, intangible and financial assets are negatively related to cash holdings.  Net 
working capital seems to be a substitute for cash and is negatively related to cash 
holdings while the cash savings of firms are positively affected by an increase in 
short-term leverage.  Larger firms seem to accumulate larger cash reserves implying 
that size has a positive influence on cash holdings. 
Next, they study if the results change if they separate firms into categories that 
face various degrees of financial constraints.  They distinguish among absolutely 
constrained, relatively constrained and unconstrained firms.  The results they obtain 
suggest that all firms save cash out of their cash flows in a systematic way since they 
operate under market imperfections where liquidity is relevant for the intertemporal 
allocation of capital.  What they mean by this is that when firms obtain a loan, they 
save part of the funds obtained and use it over a certain period of time.  Hence fixed 
costs induce firms to raise external funds infrequently and to use cash holdings as a 
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buffer.  Pal and Ferrando (2006) therefore conclude that regardless of financing 
constraints, there is an optimal amount of cash holdings. 

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An interesting question that arises in this case is that do firms in different 
institutional context hold different levels of cash?  Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) 
examine the effect of bank power on cash holdings of firms.  Firms in Japan have 
higher cash holdings than those in the US or Germany.  There are possible agency 
problems associated with a bank centered system that lacks another source of 
monitoring which is the case in Japan.  In the Japanese system, a main bank acts as a 
monitor and firms are members of large industrial groups (keiretsu) with coordinated 
cross holdings.  Because in Japan banks have close relationships with banks, we 
would expect that firms would not be required to hold high levels of cash holdings as 
they can easily have access to bank financing if they experience a shortfall.   
Using data on Japanese firms over the period 1974-1995, Pinkowitz and 
Williamson   (2001) find that these firms held quite large amounts of cash.  This could 
be explained by the fact that banks persuaded firms to hold large amounts of cash.  As 
the financial system weakened and firms were no longer accountable to banks, the 
firms still held on to large amounts of cash for precautionary reasons.  Hence the cash 
holdings of firms did not change much over time but the reasons for holding cash 
changed over time with the weakening of the financial system. 
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US firms seem to have been holding large amounts of cash.  We can’t help but 
wonder if these large cash holdings have implications on firm value.  To put it more 
simply, is it the case that these large cash holdings hinder firm performance? 
Managers tend to destroy value when they spend cash windfalls or large stockpiles of 
cash.  The first study to examine whether shareholders interests are harmed by a 
policy of retaining large cash reserves is Mikkelson and Partch (2002).  They examine 
whether the persistent large cash reserves of US firms actually hinder the performance 
of these firms.  They study 89 publicly traded US firms that held 25% of their assets 
in cash and cash equivalents at the end of the years 1986 to 1991.    They find that 
persistent policies of large cash holdings do not harm shareholders interests.  High 
cash holdings of firms support investment and growth.  They also find evidence that 
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high cash firms grow faster, undertake higher levels of investment and have higher 
ratios of market to book value of assets.  Additionally, they do not find evidence that 
operating performance of firms with persistent large cash reserves suffer from a 
conservative financial policy. 
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Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan and Talavera (2006) find that firms increase their liquidity 
ratios when the macroeconomic uncertainty or idiosyncratic uncertainty increases.  
Smaller firms are much more sensitive to both forms of uncertainty and hold much 
more cash on average than large firms. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006) find that US 
firms have dramatically increased their average cash holdings over the period 1980-
1994.   The main reason for this increase in cash holdings is that the cash flow risk for 
American firms has increased.  These firms hold much less inventories but capital 
expenditures and R&D expenditures have increased.  Although the derivative market 
has grown in the US, these two studies find that there is still a very important 
precautionary motive in holding cash for these firms.  So why do Chinese firms hold 
cash? 
Listed Chinese firms have accumulated quite important amounts of cash since 
they have been listed.  In this chapter, we examine the reasons why they accumulated 
such large reserves of cash.  In the pre-reform period, Chinese firms were state-owned 
and received all financing from government bureaus.  The interdependence between 
state and enterprises created soft budget constraints for firms.  Huang (2003) proposed 
that SOEs are at the top end of the political pecking order. SOEs hence benefit from 
easier access to bank credit, foreign exchange, business opportunities, political 
support and legal protection.  Wang and Zhu (2004) state that while public listing in 
developed countries either turns a privately-held company into a more widely-held 
public company, public listing in China is largely used to corporatize SOEs.  As a 
consequence of this, the state still holds around 60% of the shares of formerly state 
owned enterprises that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
Being formerly state-owned enterprises, these firms could possibly still be benefiting 
from soft budget constraints as explained in Chapter 5. 
We examine what has happened to the cash holdings of Chinese firms as from 
the mid-1990s.   The diagram below indicates that the firms in our sample have 
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accumulated quite large amounts of cash between 1995-2004 and these cash holdings 
peaked in the year 2000 (the year just before China joined the WTO). 
 
 
                                Source: Author’s calculations. 
An interesting question is why these firms accumulated so much cash? What is the 
need for these listed companies to accumulate cash if these listed companies face soft 
budget constraints?  They do not really need to do this as being (partially) state-owned 
they still have a special relationship with banks.  If ever they experience a shortfall in 
cash flow, they can easily obtain the shortfall from state-owned banks. 
The Chinese listed firms have not been performing too well.  In fact, their 
financial performance has been deteriorating over the period shown.   
                  Figure 6.4: Relationship between Cash Holdings and Profit 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Despite a deteriorating profitability, as shown in the figure above, these firms 
have continued to accumulate reserves of cash.  This behaviour, we believe could be 
explained by the WTO agenda.  China accepted to join the WTO in 2001 but prior to 
this it had to satisfy some conditions such as reducing state intervention and opening 
its banking sector to foreign banks (Lu, 2006).  It is clear that once foreign banks 
entered the Chinese market, domestic banks would face competition from them and 
would therefore try to improve the portfolio of their borrowers.  One way of doing 
this was to stop lending to unprofitable firms.  
 Due to the uncertainty that this represented, these firms might have held on to 
large amounts of cash, and therefore we could say that these large cash holdings were 
largely for precautionary reasons.  From Figure 6.4 it is quite clear that Chinese firms 
piled on quite important reserves of cash because they were uncertain about what was 
going to happen post China joining the WTO, especially in terms of their accessibility 
to loans. 
Another feature worth noting is the behaviour of subsidies in Figure 6.5 of 
Appendix 6.10. The subsidies variable is defined as “various subsidies received by a 
company such as subsidy for loss due to government policies, and refund of value-
added tax.”  As shown in Figure 6.5, beginning 1998 up till 2000, firms received a 
dramatic increase in the amount of subsidies from the state.  Scaled by assets, these 
subsidies seem quite minimal; however, when scaled by net profit these subsidies are 
quite significant.  For example in certain years, subsidies have been up to 10% of net 
profit. 
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The model that is described in this section is taken from ACW (2004).  This is 
undoubtedly the first paper that tried to model a firm’s cash holdings under financial 
constraints.  ACW (2004) model a firm’s demand for liquidity to develop a new test 
of the effect of financial constraints on corporate policies.   Extending the literature on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity that mainly investigates the effect of financial 
constraints on the sensitiveness of investment to changes in cash flow, ACW (2004) 
examine how financial constraints affect the sensitivity of cash to changes in cash 
flow.  
 In particular, they try to find how changes in cash holdings respond to 
changes in cash flow. Their main conclusion is that firms that are financially 
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constrained save more cash out of their cash flows.  These financially constrained 
firms therefore have positive cash flow sensitivities.  On the other hand, 
unconstrained firms have ‘indeterminate’ cash flow sensitivity as their cash savings 
are not systematically related to cash flows.   After this, many other studies have 
attempted to model the cash holdings of firms based on other criteria as discussed in 
the empirical background section68.   It should be noted that we do not exactly follow 
the ACW (2004) model.  In fact we make the cash flow a continuous distribution and 
ignore hedging.  Han and Qiu (2007) examine the cash holding decisions of US firms 
under continuous cash flows and study how changes in the volatility of cash flow 
affects cash holding decisions. 
 
<

	A		
ACW (2004) analyse the corporate demand for liquid assets in an imperfect capital 
market framework.  The firm faces a dynamic problem where it has both present and 
future investment opportunities.  To model financial constraints it is assumed that the 
firm does not have sufficient internal resources (in this case cash flow) to fund all 
projects with positive NPV. In many cases firms are restricted in their ability to 
borrow from external sources, that is, they suffer from external financial constraints as 
they cannot borrow the amounts that they would have liked to borrow. Therefore to 
ensure that the firm is able to fund any positive NPV projects that arise, the firm can 
save cash out of cash flows. 
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The model has 3 dates 0, 1 and 2.  At time 0, the firm is an ongoing concern whose 
cash flow from current operations is c0 . At time 0, the firm has the option to invest in 
a long-term project that requires I0 today and pays G(I0) at time 2.  At time 1, the firm 
expects to have another investment opportunity which requires an investment of I1 
and pays H(I1) at time 2.  The production functions are assumed to have standard 
properties, that is, they are increasing, concave and continuously differentiable.  Since 
the firm is assumed to be an ongoing concern, it has existing assets that produce a 
cash flow equal to c1 at time 1.  Cash flow in period 1 is random and follows a 
                                                 
68 For instance, Han and Qiu (2007) account for the effect of the volatility of cash flow on cash  
sensitivities. 
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probability distribution F on +
−
−
⊂ Rcc ],[ 11 . I1(c1) is the investment that the firm makes 
in period 1 that gives cash flow equals to c1.  
The assumptions underlying the model are as follows: the discount factor is 1 
and everyone is risk neutral. The cost of investment goods at dates 0 and 1 is 1.  Both 
investments I0 and I1 can be liquidated at t=2, generating a payoff equal to q(I0+I1) 
where q is ≤ 1 and I0 and I1 >0
69.  The total cash flows from both investments are 
therefore: g(I0)≡ G(I0)+qI0 and h(I1)=H(I1(c1))+qI1(c1). 
 
ACW (2004) mainly rely on a Hart and Moore (1994) type of framework 
where only hard/tangible assets can be used as collateral.  Therefore, the next 
assumption, critical towards making the firm financially constrained, is that cash 
flows G(I0) and H(I1) are not verifiable and thus cannot be contracted upon.  Hence 
the firm cannot pledge cash flows as collateral to outside investors but can only 
borrow against the productive assets using them as collateral.   If the firm does not 
pay back its debt, creditors seize the assets that were used as collateral.   The 
liquidation value of the assets is assumed to be given by (1-τ) qI.  The parameter τ∈ 
(0,1) is a function of factors such as the tangibility of a firm’s assets and of the legal 
environment that dictates relations between debtors and creditors.  For a high enough 
τ, firms may pass up positive NPV projects because they experience a lack of external 
finance.  These firms thus become (externally) financially constrained.  
In the model above, firms can be financially constrained in two ways.  They 
are internally financially constrained if the size of the cash flows from existing assets 
is smaller than capital expenditures associated with the new investment opportunities. 
                                                 
69 The parameter q implies that when an investment is liquidated, the amount obtained is less that the 
actual value of that investment cost. For the purpose of our analysis we assume that q is liquidation 
costs.  Because these costs have to be paid the actual amount obtained might be less that the value of 
the investment. 
t=1 
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In this case, firms will need to borrow from external sources.  However, firms can 
also be externally financially constrained when they have limitations in their capacity 
to raise external finance. This can cause them to invest below their first best 
investment levels.  Although the above model is mainly based on collateralized debt 
being the main source of external finance, ACW (2004) state that its intuition is 
unchanged even if uncollateralized debt or equity issues are the main sources of 
external finance.  The only requirement is that constrained firms have to pay a 
premium over and above the fair cost of uncollateralized debt and/or equity.  
Imperfection and therefore illiquidity is captured by τ.   
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In the ACW (2004) model, there are no new investment opportunities to fund at time 
2.  The firm is only concerned about whether or not to store cash from time 0 until 
time 1.    The firm’s objective is to maximise investment.  Let t denote the time period 
where t can be 0 1 or 2.  d denotes dividends, B represent borrowing amounts, I stands 
for investment, and C denotes the amount of cash the firm chooses to carry forward.  
τ  and q are as defined previously. This problem of the firm is to find optimal 
investment, leverage and cash holding policies, that is finding **1
*
0
*
1
*
0 ,,,, CIIBB  that 
maximise the expected NPV of the investment projects.  This is shown below. 
 
I
max  ( ])())(([)( 111100 FcIcIhIIg −Ε+−                                                      (6.1) 
subject to the following constraints: 
 00000 ≥−−+= CIBcd       (6.2) 
 0)()( 111111 ≥+−+= CcIcBcd                       (6.3) 
 )())(()( 1101102 cBBcIhIgd −−+=                   (6.4) 
 00 )1( qIB τ−≤        (6.5) 
 )()1()( 1111 cqIcB τ−≤                                        (6.6) 
 
In the first equation, the firm maximises investment given the net returns of project G 
and the expected net returns from project H, subject to the constraints given by 
equations 6.2-6.6.    The first two constraints restrict dividends (d) to be non-negative 
in times 0 and 1.  Equation 6.2 for instance shows that dividends paid at time 0 is 
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equal to the cash flows generated by existing assets in place plus the amount the firm 
needs to borrow (B0) to be able to invest amount I0, minus any cash savings (C0) that 
the firm carries forward to period 1.  The dividend paid in period 1 given by equation 
6.3, is equal to the cash flow generated by the investment plus any amount borrowed 
minus the amount invested plus the cash flow saved from the previous period used to 
overcome the shortfall in cash in period 1.  
The dividend constraint for period 2 given by equation 6.4 suggests that 
dividends in period 2 will be equal to what is obtained after liquidating both 
investments and repaying all the debt.  Therefore, terms B0 and B1 are the borrowing 
amounts, which have to be lower than the collateral value generated by the new 
investments.  Debt obligations are repaid at the time when the assets they help to 
finance generate cash flows. ACW (2004) also take into account hedging by firms.  
However, we ignore this so as to keep the model simpler.  Another reason for this is 
that the futures market is likely to be quite underdeveloped in China and it might not 
be very important to control for hedging.   
The firm is financially unconstrained if it is able to invest at the first-best level 
at times 0 and 1, which are defined as 
 
g’ 1)( *0 =I                   (6.7) 
1))((' 1
*
1 =cIh                    (6.8) 
 
For the firm to be financially unconstrained, its investment policy needs to satisfy all 
the dividend and borrowing constraints stated previously (B0, )( 11 cB ,C).  The 
condition for the firm to be unconstrained is that there exists a financial policy such 
that  
 
CBcI FB −+≤ 000                  (6.9) 
CcBcI FB ++≤ )( 1111                (6.10) 
 
for amounts B0 and )( 11 cB  that are less than or equal to the collateral value created by 
the first-best investments. 
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The exogenous parameters that determine whether a firm is unconstrained are 
the cash flows from existing assets, the liquidity of a firm’s assets and the first-best 
investment levels.  In the ACW (2004) model firms can be unconstrained in two 
different circumstances.  First, having sufficient internal funds, that is, having high 
enough c0 and c1 relative to the sizes of their fist-best level of investment. These firms 
can be regarded as being “internally” financially unconstrained.  Second, having high 
capacity for external finance, that is, having low τ, these firms can be regarded as 
being “externally” financially unconstrained. 
If the constraints above are not binding, this implies that unconstrained firms 
have indeterminate cash policies.  For instance, if a firm j is financially unconstrained, 
it can replace its financial policy ((B0j, )( 11 cB j ,Cj) with an entirely different financial 
policy ( )),(, 110 jjj CcBB
∧∧∧
, with no implications on its value.  Hence, an unconstrained 
firm has no unique optimal cash policy.  It can either save excess cash or pay it out in 
dividends; (ACW (2004), pp 1783).  Therefore, there is no systematic relationship 
between cash holdings and increases in cash flow.  Han and Qiu (2007) suggest that 
this result is in essence similar to what Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed, that is, 
when capital markets are perfect, financing decisions are irrelevant.  Similarly for 
unconstrained firms, cash policies are irrelevant and changes in volatility of cash flow 
would have no effect on the cash holdings of firms. 
A firm is financially constrained if its investment policy is distorted from its 
first-best level because of borrowing constraints.  A constrained firm cannot 
undertake all positive NPV projects.  This entails a trade-off.   Holding cash entails a 
cost in terms of forgoing today’s investment while the benefit of holding cash is the 
increase in the firm’s ability to finance future investment projects.  As suggested by 
ACW (2004), forgoing a dividend payment in periods 0 and 1 is a zero NPV project.  
Therefore, it is optimal for a constrained firm not to pay any dividends and exhaust its 
borrowing capacity in both periods 0 and 1. 
 
Thus the investment levels of constrained firms are given by: 
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where qq τλ +−≡ 1 .  The constrained firm’s optimization problem is to find the cash 
holdings that maximise 
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When a solution is interior, the optimal cash holdings C*(c0 ,F) satisfy the following 
first-order condition: 
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The above condition can be interpreted as follows: When the firm holds an additional 
dollar, this increases the marginal return on the investment in period 0, but decreases 
the expected marginal return on the investment in period 1. Therefore holding cash 
entails a trade-off, as explained above. The optimal condition is where the marginal 
return on investment in period 0 equals the marginal return on investment in period 1.  
By holding more cash the firm is able to relax the constraints on its ability to invest in 
the future. 
To determine how much of its current cash flow a constrained firm will save, 
we need to calculate the derivative of ∂C*/∂c0.  This can be defined as the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash.  The cash flow sensitivity of cash in the presence of financial 
constraints is given by the following: 
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As this sensitivity is positive, it indicates that if a financially constrained firm gets a 
positive cash flow this period, it will optimally allocate the extra cash across time, 
saving a fraction of those resources to fund future investments. 



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The main implication of the model is that the cash flow sensitivity of cash ∂C*/∂c0 is 
positive for constrained firms, while it is indeterminate for unconstrained firms.  
Empirically, this implies that constrained firms increase their cash holdings, that is, 
add to their liquid assets in response to increases in cash flows.  ∂C/∂c0 is greater than 
0 for these firms.  Unconstrained firms on the other hand display no such systematic 
behaviour in liquidity management. ∂C/∂c0 is not statistically different from zero. In 
section 6.8, we empirically investigate the issues raised in the theoretical model.   

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In this section, we develop three main testable hypotheses that will enable us to better 
understand the cash saving behaviour of listed Chinese manufacturing firms.  First, 
we study the main determinants of cash holdings of these firms. Then, we take into 
account factors such as financial constraints and WTO accession. 
 
a) FACTORS AFFECTING CHANGES IN CASH HOLDINGS OF CHINESE 
FIRMS 
Many studies have examined the cash policies of firms in the US and the UK.  
However, none have studied the cash policies of Chinese firms.  If Chinese firms 
behave like firms in other parts of the world, then factors that affect cash holdings of 
firms in the US should also affect the cash holdings of firms in China.  Hence the first 
issue we investigate are the factors that might influence the cash holdings of these 
firms.  This is important as it is clear that Chinese firms are the most important savers 
in the world.  Our first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1:  Factors that affect cash holdings of firms in the US also affect the cash holdings 
of firms in China. 
 
b) ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
The next issue we investigate is whether financing constraints affect the cash holdings 
of listed Chinese manufacturing firms, that is whether the predictions of the ACW 
(2004) model hold. ACW (2004) find that constrained firms tend to save out of their 
cash flows leading to a positive relationship between changes in cash holdings and 
cash flow.  Unconstrained firms on the other hand have an indeterminate relationship 
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between cash holdings and cash flow.  To distinguish between constrained and 
unconstrained firms, we use a classification criterion that has been widely used in the 
investment-cash flow literature and classify firms according to their size, that is, the 
level of their real assets.  We use the percentile methodology.  Those firms that have 
their real assets in the lowest 25th percentile of the distribution of the real assets of all 
firms are classified as SMALLit as they are likely to be financially constrained 
(overall).  This is done by industry and by year.  All firms having their real assets in 
the top three quartiles of the distribution of the real assets of all firms are classified as 
LARGEit (by industry and year) as they are likely not to be financially constrained
70.  
The second criterion that we use to account for financial constraints is the 
level of net profits of the firm.  We classify those firms that are in the bottom quartile 
of the distribution of profits of all firms as Low Profitit. This is done by industry and 
by year.  Firms that are in the bottom quartile are seen to be financially constrained as 
they cannot invest at their first-best level and need to have recourse to external 
funds71.  All firms having their profits in the top 3 quartiles of the distribution of 
profits of all firms are classified as High Profitit again by industry and by year.  
More profitable firms can hold more cash if they choose to do so.  Hence High 
Profit firms can have larger cash holdings than smaller firms.  However, it might also 
be the case that larger firms find that they have easy access to debt finance and find 
no reason to save cash out of cash flows. In this case they would choose to save less 
cash and would have low cash holdings.   Less profitable firms who find it more 
difficult to have access to external finance would more likely be saving more cash out 
of cash flows. However, it could also be the case that smaller firms need to allocate 
the cash flows towards investment (as they are financially constrained) and might not 
therefore be able to save cash out of cash flows. 
We take the stand adopted by ACW (2004) and hypothesize that large/more 
profitable firms have indeterminate cash policies such that there will be no systematic 
savings of cash observed.  For financially constrained firms, a positive relationship 
between changes in cash holdings and cash flow should be observed.  Hence the 
hypothesis we test is that larger firms have an indeterminate cash policy as they are 
not financially constrained.  Smaller firms are financially constrained and therefore 
should have a positive cash sensitivity to cash flow. 
                                                 
70 We use other cut-off levels to check for robustness, however we do not report these results. 
71 In other words, these firms are regarded as being internally financially constrained. 
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H2: Larger firms or more profitable firms have an indeterminate cash flow sensitivity 
of cash while smaller firms or less profitable firms have a positive cash flow 
sensitivity of cash. 
 
c)  BANKING REFORMS AND WTO ACCESSION 
Major banking reforms were undertaken in China in 1994 when the central 
government decided to separate policy banks from commercial banks.  The banking 
reforms comprised important steps such as granting limited licenses to foreign banks, 
reducing government intervention in credit allocation and loosening interest rate 
controls (Shirai, 2002).  However, until recently most bank credit was still directed to 
inefficient state enterprises; leaving good private enterprises without access to credit.  
 A further impetus to the reform in the banking sector came about with the 
imminent entry of China into the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  The behaviour 
of the listed Chinese manufacturing firms that we consider suggest that there has been 
a pre and post WTO effect on the behaviour of these firms.  In particular, pre-WTO 
these firms seem to have been accumulating quite large amount of cash while post-
WTO this behaviour seems to have eased as shown in Figure 6.1 above.  Between 
1995 and 2000 these firms accumulated dramatic amounts of cash which peaked in 
2001 and started declining thereafter.  The reason for this could be that Chinese firms 
were uncertain as to what was going to happen once China joined the WTO especially 
regarding their access to bank credit.   
One of the conditions imposed on China when it joined the WTO was that it 
would open its banking sector to foreign banks.  Obviously now the state-owned firms 
would face competition from these banks.  It was unclear to Chinese firms if the state-
owned banks would still be lending to them and therefore despite their bad 
performance with declining profitability, they still added to their cash stock.  They 
could also have taken debt and held on to that debt in the form of cash holdings.  The 
behaviour of the subsidies variable (Figure 6.5 in Appendix 6.10) also suggests that 
even the government was uncertain about the WTO effect, so they increased the 
subsidies they gave to their listed firms before accession. 
Hence we believe that the WTO agenda has had an important effect on the 
cash holdings of listed Chinese manufacturing firms.  To investigate this, we examine 
whether cash holding decisions pre and post-WTO were different by splitting our 
sample into pre-WTO and post-WTO.  We create two dummy variables.  Pre-WTO is 
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a dummy equal to one if year is less than 2001 and zero otherwise.  Post-WTO is a 
dummy equal to one if year is greater or equal to 2001 and zero otherwise.  Therefore, 
the fourth hypothesis we test is: 
H3: Cash Holding decisions of firms were different Pre-WTO and post-WTO. 
 
<<			
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Following OPSW (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we take the unobservable 
target cash ratio *itCash  of firms as a function of several firm-specific characteristics, 
x, suggested by theory and a disturbance term εit.  The firm specific characteristics, 
which might determine the optimal cash ratio of a firm might include for instance the 
cash flow, leverage, investment, size and other variables that proxy for the liquid 
assets of the firm. 
Cashit* =  itit
K
k
k xB ε+∑
=1
                                 (6.15) 
where firms are represented by subscript i=1,………,N and time by t=1………,T and k 
is supposed to represent the number of explanatory variables that are included in the 
specification and therefore k=1,2,3,…only.  Firms adjust their cash holdings in order 
for their current cash ratio to be close to the target ratio.   
 
The empirical specification to test the cash flow sensitivity of cash is estimated from a 
specification in which a firm’s decision to change its cash holdings is modelled as a 
function of a number of sources and uses of funds.  The reduced form model is 
adapted from ACW (2004), so that it is more appropriate for the Chinese case.  The 
reduced form equation used to empirically investigate the cash holdings of Chinese 
firms is as follows: 
 
∆Cash/Assetsit = ρ0 ∆Cash/Assetsit-1 + ρ1Profitit + ρ2 ∆NWCit + ρ3 ∆Leverageit + 
ρ4Investmentit + ρ5 Log Salesit + ρ6 Sales Growthit + αi + αt + µit                          (6.16)          
 
The annual change of a firm’s cash to assets ratio that is changes in cash holdings 
over assets is explained by changes in lagged cash holdings over assets and a function 
of the firm’s profitability (Profit), ie, return on assets, changes in Net Working capital 
(∆NWC), changes in leverage (∆Leverage), investment (Investment), size proxied by 
log of sales (Log Sales) and growth opportunities as captured by the sales growth 
variable (Sales Growth).  These variables are discussed in detail below.  
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Profitability  
The cash flow of firms is an important determinant of their cash holdings as found in 
a number of studies on the US.  In the first instance, we proxy for cash flow by using 
a profitability measure.  This is because the Chinese firms in our sample did not start 
reporting their cash flows until 1998.  Firms with higher profitability would 
accumulate more cash everything else being equal as found by many studies on the 
US, where firms have a very strong motive for holding cash for precautionary reasons 
and thus, accumulate cash whenever they have the opportunity to do so.  Figure 6.6 in 
the Appendix 6.13 shows the relationship between cash holdings and profitability.  
Until 2001, the listed Chinese manufacturing firms in our sample seem to have been 
saving cash out of their profits despite declining profitability.  However, after 2001, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between cash holdings and profitability72. 
 
Net working capital (NWCit) 
We include changes in net working capital in our regression as working capital can be 
a substitute for cash or it can compete for the available pool of resources as suggested 
by Fazzari and Petersen (1993).  We calculate this measure as total current assets 
minus total current liabilities minus cash holdings such that this measure is net of cash 
holdings.  Changes in NWC can be a substitute for cash as cash can be regarded to as 
being “negative NWC.” This idea is similar to that proposed by Mikkelson and Partch 
(2002), who suggest that cash is negative debt.  If net working capital is regarded as a 
substitute, then we would expect a negative relationship between changes in net 
working capital and changes in cash holdings.  Figure 6.6 in Appendix 6.10 shows the 
behaviour of NWC over the 1995-2004 period.  NWC has declined dramatically over 
the period.  Figure 6.7 shows the relationship between cash holdings and NWC.  It 
can be seen that after 1998, cash holdings have increased in the face of deteriorating 
NWC suggesting that these two variables are substitutes. 
 
Leverage  
Firms can use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash because leverage can act as a 
proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt.  Firms that have high cash levels for 
                                                 
72 As will be demonstrated later this behaviour can be linked to WTO accession and a change in the 
financial constraints that firms faced pre and post WTO. 
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instance are also known to have low leverage (Mikkelson and Partch, 2002).  In the 
real world because of financing frictions, raising external funds is costly.  Therefore 
firms could possibly regard cash and low (or negative) debt as substitutes.  We would 
expect a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage.  Figure 6.4 above 
showed the relationship between cash holdings and leverage of the firms in our 
sample.  Although leverage has not changed much over the years, cash holdings have 
increased dramatically.  
 
 Investment 
We control for investment as it has been suggested in the literature that most of 
investment is potentially being financed by internal sources of finance (Myers, 1984, 
2001).  A financially constrained firm that has difficulty getting access to external 
sources of financing could possibly be using its cash holdings to finance investment.  
Therefore we expect a negative sign on the INVESTMENT term as cash holdings 
would fall when firms invest more and cash holdings would increase when firms 
invest less. 
 
Size
We proxy for firm size using the log of sales (Log Sales) as has been used in prior 
studies (Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998), Opler et al (1998), Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2003)).  There are economies of scale in holding cash.  For instance, it is often 
quoted in this literature that it is cheaper to hold cash than to send someone to the 
bank.  Hence the larger the firm, the more cash that firm would hold.   However, it 
could also be that larger firms suffer less from asymmetric information and can obtain 
funds at a relatively cheaper cost as lenders are willing to lend to these firms, in which 
case larger firms would hold less cash.  The evidence put forward in the literature 
however suggests that larger firms hold more cash. 

Sales Growth 
Previous literature has found that growth opportunities affect the amount of cash firms 
hold (ACW, 2004, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2003). Firms with higher growth opportunities 
normally prefer to hold more cash.  A possible explanation for this could be that 
internal funds like cash are the cheaper sources of funds and thus firms always prefer 
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to hold cash so that they can finance those growth opportunities when they come 
along.  Another explanation put forward in the literature about cash holdings is that 
growth opportunities are intangible assets and therefore firms that have high growth 
opportunities are likely to face more agency costs. Due to this, these firms would 
resort to internal financing when possible.  We capture growth opportunities by a 
growth in sales measure. 
 
Subsidies 
Although government intervention is said to have been greatly reduced since China 
undertook its reforms, there is a subsidy variable in our dataset that suggests that state 
intervention is not totally gone73.  This subsidy variable is described as “various 
subsidies received by a company such as subsidy for loss due to government policies 
and refund of value-added tax.”  We scale the subsidies variable by net profit and find 
that the amount of subsidies received is up to 10%.  These subsidies could be 
influencing the cash holding decisions of Chinese listed firms as constrained firms 
might be using their subsidies to finance their operations or simply adding them to 
their cash holdings.  Because of this we include this subsidies measure in our 
regression specification.   
 
We include another explanatory variable in other specifications: 
Risk 
Han and Qiu (2007) include a cash flow volatility measure in their study of cash 
holdings of US firms.  They find that uncertainty proxied by a cash flow volatility 
measure positively influences the cash holdings of constrained US firms while it is 
insignificant for unconstrained firms.  Unfortunately we cannot use a cash flow 
volatility measure as cash flow exists in our dataset only from 1998 onwards.  Hence, 
as in Comin et al. (2006), Comin and Philippon (2005) and Garcia and Guariglia 
(2007), our main volatility measure is calculated as the standard deviation of the 
firm’s total real sales growth, measured over a rolling window of 5 years (see Data 
Appendix for more details on this measure). 
                                                 
73 China applies a series of measures that allow for refunds, reductions, or exemptions from taxes and 
other payments owed to the government.  These appear designed to subsidize exports of manufactured 
goods or to support the purchase of domestic over imported equipment and certain other manufacturing 
inputs. 
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Since we use panel data, we include both a firm specific and time specific 
error term.  Hence, the error term now consists of three components: νi is a firm-
specific fixed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics, νt 
represents a time specific component and reflects aggregate effects common across 
companies to control for macroeconomic influences, including factors as nominal 
interest rates and inflation, εit is an idiosyncratic error term.  
We estimate equation (6.18) using the first-difference Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, (Arellano and Bond, 1991) which takes into account 
both firm-specific heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors. Our 
instrument set in the baseline specification includes (Cashit)it-1,  (Profitability)it , 
(∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it, (Investment)it ,(Log Sales)it ,(Sales Growth)it and (Subsidies)it 
which are lagged 2 to 5 times.  In other specifications, we include (Risk)it lagged 2 to 
3 times (where possible) in our instrument set. 
We use the Sargan test and the m2 to evaluate if our model is correctly 
specified.   The J statistic is the Sargan/Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions.  
Under the null of instrument validity, the J statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the 
number of parameters. If the model used is correctly specified and the instruments are 
adequate, the variables in the instrument set should not be correlated with the 
idiosyncratic component of the error term εit.  On the other hand, the m2 test, which 
tests for second-order serial correlation, is asymptotically distributed as standard 
normal under the null of second-order serial correlation74.  This test provides a further 
check on the specification of the model and on the validity of variables dated t-2 as 
instruments.   
 
6.7 		
Unlike previous studies, that have mainly focussed on US firms and firms in the UK, 
we focus on Chinese firms in the manufacturing sector.  The paper uses a relatively 
new database which is the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database 
(CSMAR), developed and maintained jointly by the Centre for China Financial 
Research at the University of Hong Kong and the Shenzhen GTA Information 
                                                 
74 If the p-values for the Sargan and the m2 test are both greater than 0.05, then the instruments are 
acceptable. 
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Technology Co.  The CSMAR-A Database has collected the data available in all the 
annual reports of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges since 1990.  No other existing financial database on China listed 
companies is as comprehensive.  The data is collected from a number of first- hand 
sources such as Securities Times, Shanghai Securities daily and China Securities 
Daily. It contains the financial data (including the balance sheet, statement of profit 
and profit distribution, statement of changes in financial position and cash flow 
statement) of all companies listed on both exchanges.   
Table 6.1 shows that Chinese firms have indeed accumulated quite large 
amounts of cash.  In a period of less than 10 years, their cash holdings have almost 
doubled (from 10% in 1996 to 20% in 2004).  The summary statistics also indicate 
that until 2001, listed Chinese manufacturing firms have accumulated quite large 
amounts of cash but after 2001, cash holdings have started to fall.  Profitability has 
deteriorated over the whole period while the negative summary statistics obtained for 
Net Working Capital indicates that the current liabilities far exceed the current assets 
(net of cash) of these firms.  Leverage is around 22%.  The sales growth measure 
which acts as a proxy for capturing growth opportunities indicates that in 2001, 
growth opportunities were seriously affected (possibly due to WTO accession). 
 The risk measure capturing the volatility of sales growth, calculated as the 
standard deviation of sales growth over a 5 year rolling window, indicates that the 
volatility of sales growth has steadily declined over the period considered.  The 
subsidies variable defined as “various subsidies received by a company such as 
subsidy for loss due to government policies and refund of value-added tax” indicates 
that firms still receive quite substantial amounts of subsidies (compared to their 
profits) over the period considered. 
In Table 6.2, we show the summary statistics using the classification scheme 
where firms are classified according to financial constraints.  We use the distribution 
of real assets to act as a proxy for financial constraints and similar to previous 
literature, we assume that larger firms are financially unconstrained while smaller 
firms are financially constrained.  In columns 1 and 2, firms are classified according 
to distribution of real assets while in columns 3 and 4 firms are classified according to 
the distribution of profits.  In columns 5 and 6, we classify firms as belonging to 
either Pre-WTO firm-years or Post-WTO firm-years. 
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As expected (and found by OPSW (1999) and ACW (2004) in the case of US 
firms), larger listed Chinese manufacturing firms hold less cash (17% of assets) while 
smaller firms hold a large portion of their assets in cash (25% of assets).  This 
possibly indicates that smaller firms are financially constrained and therefore hold 
more cash than larger firms.  Larger firms are more highly levered indicating that 
larger firms can get easy access to external finance.  The risk and subsidies variables 
are the same for all sizes if firms.   
In columns 3 and 4, we classify firms as Low Profitit and High Profitit 
according to their level of profitability.  We find that firms that have low profits 
actually hold less cash, giving evidence that these firms cannot save out of profits.  
High profit firm-years have better growth opportunities, which is not surprising since 
growth opportunities are calculated as the growth in sales and profits in turn depend 
largely on sales (as manufacturing firms are considered here). 
Next, in columns 5 and 6, we consider pre-WTO and post-WTO firm-years as 
we noticed a significant change in the cash holding behaviour of Chinese firms before 
and after 2001, the year in which China gained access to WTO membership.  Pre 
WTO, the firms are holding more cash (around 22% of assets) while post WTO, the 
firms are holding less cash (around 15% of assets).  As we discussed before, this 
behaviour of accumulating cash before WTO accession could be associated with the 
uncertainty that these firms faced during this period. 
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Table 6.3 shows our regression results.  The lagged change in cash holdings is 
negative which suggests that firms do have an optimal cash holding target.  The 
results indicate that Chinese firms do not tend to save out of their profits as suggested 
by the statistically insignificant coefficient on the profitability term. In the ACW 
(2004) world, this would imply that Chinese firms are financially unconstrained, that 
is, they have indeterminate cash policies because their cash flows (net profits) do not 
affect changes in their cash holdings.  This could indicate that these listed Chinese 
firms face soft budget constraints.  The presence of these soft budget constraints 
imply that firms do not have difficulties in finding financing sources especially in the 
form of funding from the state or local authorities. 
On the other hand, we know that listed Chinese firms are possibly financially 
constrained as these firms operate in a highly imperfect and underdeveloped financial 
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system. They face severe restrictions on share issues as they have to satisfy a number 
of criteria before they are allowed to issue any new shares.  The insignificant 
coefficient on the profitability variable is reflected by Figure 6.4 which shows that 
there is no relationship between cash holdings and profitability over the period.  
While profits remained stagnant and deteriorated, cash holdings increased 
significantly indicating that there is no specific relationship between them.  
 Similar to the results obtained by ACW (2004) and OPSW(1999) we find that 
listed Chinese firms have a negative relationship between changes in cash holdings 
and changes in NWC (-0.317), if NWC increases the change in cash holdings is 
negative as firms hold less cash suggesting that NWC and cash holdings are 
substitutes.  A negative relationship (-0.738) is also observed between the change in 
cash holdings and changes in leverage suggesting that if the change in leverage 
increases the change in cash holdings falls.  Chinese firms have low profitability and 
their cash holdings are quite high.  One possible reason for them to be able to do so 
was that they took debt and saved part of that debt.  For this to be the case, we should 
have observed a positive relationship between changes in leverage and changes in 
cash holdings.  However, the negative relationship observed suggests that listed 
Chinese firms do not use debt to accumulate cash. 
The coefficient obtained on the investment term suggests that investment is 
significant indicating that cash holdings are used for financing investment.  The 
coefficient on size is positive and significant suggesting that size influences cash 
holdings of firms.  The sales growth term suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and changes in cash holdings. However the term is 
insignificant.  
We perform a series of robustness checks. In column 2, we include the 
subsidies variable in our regression specification.  The results obtained are robust to 
the ones obtained previously.  The insignificant coefficient on the subsidies variable 
possibly indicates that subsidies do not affect cash holdings.  In Column 3, we include 
a risk measure to account for any uncertainty that these firms might face over the 
period considered.  Because this risk measure is calculated as the standard deviation 
of the firm’s total real sales growth, measured over a rolling window of 5 years we 
lose observations for the following years 1995, 1996, 2003, 2004.  Including the risk 
variable changes our results significantly but the risk variable itself is insignificant.  A 
possible explanation for this could be the fact that the sales of these listed firms have 
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remained quite stable over the period considered in this paper and therefore the firms 
have not experienced much volatility over this period. 
 In columns 4, 5 and 6, we use data from the year 2000 onwards.  The reason 
for doing this is Figure 6.3, which indicates that the cash holdings behaviour started 
to change after the year 2000.  Also, after the year 2000, the relationship between 
cash holdings and profitability seems to have changed as well.  In column 4 we use 
the same specification as in column 1 while in column 5 we use the same 
specification as in column 2 where we include the subsidy variable in the 
specification; all data is from 2000 onwards.  In column 6, we use the same 
specification as in column 1 but we use a cash flow measure instead of profits (as 
used by ACW, 2004).  The results for the 3 specifications in columns 4, 5 and 6 are 
quite robust.  However, they also suggest that the determinants of cash flow after the 
year 2000 are not the same.  Especially, changes in leverage no longer affect cash 
holdings.  This can be explained by the fact that post 2001 firms have started to face 
difficulties in obtaining loans from banks and leverage is therefore irrelevant in their 
cash holding decisions. 
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In Table 6.4, we take into account similar classification scheme used by ACW (2004) 
and classify firms as financially constrained and unconstrained.   
The regression specification used is the one used previously but all the variables are 
interacted with two dummy variables as shown below: 
 
∆Cash/Assetsit = β01  ∆Cash/Assetsit-1*SMALLit + β02 ∆Cash/Assetsit-1*LARGEit  
+β11Profitit*SMALLit+β12Profitit*LARGEit+β21∆NWCit*SMALLit+β22∆NWCit*LARGE
it+β31∆Leverageit*SMALLit+β32∆Leverageit*LARGEit+β41Investmentit*SMALLit + 
β42Investmentit *LARGEit + β51 Log Salesit*SMALLit+ β52 Log Salesit*LARGEit + β61 
Sales Growthit*SMALLit+ β62 Salesit*LARGEit+β71Subsidiesit*SMALL 
+β72Subsidiesit*LARGE + γi + γt + εit     (6.17) 
 
We next distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms taking 
into account the profitability of firms.  
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∆Cash/Assetsit = β01 ∆Cash/Assetsit-1*LOWPROFITit + β02∆Cash/Assetsit-1*HIGH 
PROFITit+β11Profitit*LOWPROFITit+β12Profitit*HIGHPROFITit+β21∆NWCit*LOWP
ROFITit+β22∆NWCit*HIGHPROFITit+β31∆Leverageit*LOWPROFITit+β32∆Leverageit
*HIGHPROFITit+β41Investmentit*LOWPROFITit + β42Investmentit *HIGHPROFITit+ 
β51LogSalesit*LOWPROFITit+β52LogSalesit*HIGHPROFITit+β61SalesGrowthit*LOW
PROFITit+β62SalesGrowthit*HIGHPROFITit+β71Subsidiesit*HIGHPROFIT 
+β72Subsidiesit*LOWPROFIT +γi + γt + εit     (6.18) 
 
 In column (1) of Table 6.4, we account for financial constraints using the distribution 
of real assets. As mentioned previously, those firms that have their real assets in the 
lowest 25th percentile of the distribution of the real assets of all firms are classified as 
SMALLit (Dummy1it) as they are likely to be financially constrained.  This is done by 
industry and by year.  All firms having their real assets in the top three quartiles of the 
distribution of the real assets of all firms are classified as LARGEit (Dummy2it) (by 
industry and year) as they are likely not to be externally financially constrained.   
The results indicate that, when firms are classified as being financially 
unconstrained according to the distribution of their real assets, the factors that affect 
changes in cash holdings of Chinese firms are changes in working capital, changes in 
leverage and investment (at least for the large firms).  Most of these variables are 
insignificant for the smaller firms suggesting perhaps that these firms do not operate 
according to firm fundamentals. 
The profitability term is insignificant for both small and large firms.  In the 
ACW (2004) world, this would imply that Chinese firms are unconstrained, that is, 
they have indeterminate cash policies because their cash flows (net profits) do not 
affect changes in their cash holdings.  However, this explanation is unlikely to make 
much sense.  The reason why all the coefficients could be insignificant could possibly 
be because we consider listed firms.  As shown in the summary statistics, these listed 
firms are not very different in their levels of profitability or when classified according 
to the level of real assets.  Hence the lack of variation among the firms in our dataset 
could possibly explain this result.  Also as discussed before, Figure 6.4 in Appendix 
6.10 clearly shows that there is no relationship between cash holdings and 
profitability of these firms. 
For large firms, changes in NWC are negatively (and significantly) related to 
changes in cash holdings, again giving evidence that NWC and cash holdings are 
 226 
substitutes.  Changes in leverage are negatively related to changes in cash holdings 
suggesting that at least large firms do not use leverage to accumulate cash.  
Investment is negatively related to changes in cash holdings indicating that some 
investment of both small and large firms is funded internally (ie from cash flows).  
The size variable is irrelevant possibly because of the lack of variation in 
characteristics of the firms we consider.  Similar results are obtained when we use the 
distribution of real profits to classify firms as being financially constrained or 
unconstrained as shown in column 2.   
In column 3, we take into account whether there has been a WTO effect on the 
cash holdings of firms. Dummy1 stands for pre-WTO while Dummy2 stands for post-
WTO.  In this case, the interesting result is that post-WTO firms actually accumulate 
cash out of profits (0.643) as suggested by the positive and significant coefficient on 
the profit variable.  In an ACW (2004) world this would suggest that firms were 
financially unconstrained pre-WTO but post-WTO, they are financially constrained.  
This could well possibly be the case.  Pre-WTO, firms could get easy access to loans 
as banks were always willing to lend to these firms. However, with WTO coming in, 
domestic banks started to face competition from foreign banks and as domestic banks 
became unwilling to lend to these firms, firms started to find difficulties to get access 
to finance and thus became financially constrained.   
We next take into account how financial constraints have changed by taking 
into account both financial constraints and WTO accession.  We do this by interacting 
the profitability variable with both a dummy measuring financial constraints and a 
dummy indicating WTO accession.  Hence the regression specification used is as 
follows: 
 
∆Cash/Assetsit = β01  ∆Cash/Assetsit-1*PREWTOit + β02 ∆Cash/Assetsit-1*POSTWTOit  
+β111Profitit*PREWTO*LOWPROFITit+β112Profitit*PREWTO*HIGHPROFITit 
+β121Profitit*POSTWTO*LOWPROFITit+β122Profitit*PREWTO*HIGHPROFITit 
+β21∆NWCit*PREWTO+β22∆NWCit*POSTWTO+β31∆Leverageit*PREWTO 
+β32∆Leverageit*POSTWTO+β41Investmentit*PREWTO+β42Investmentit*POSTWTO 
+β51Log Salesit*PREWTO+β52Log Salesit*POSTWTOt+β61SalesGrowthit*PREWTO 
+β62SalesGrowthit*POSTWTO+β71Subsidiesit*PREWTO +β72Subsidiesit*POSTWTO  
+γi + γt + εit     (6.20) 
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The results indicate that in the pre WTO years profitability did not influence the 
change in cash holdings for both low profit and high profit firms.  The respective 
coefficients of -0.248 and 0.436 obtained on low profit and high profit firm years are 
not significant.  In an ACW (2004) world, this implies that firms were financially 
unconstrained irrespective of their levels of profitability.  Listed Chinese 
manufacturing firms did not accumulate cash out of their profits.  This also reflects 
the fact that firms were possibly benefiting from soft budget constraints and therefore 
they did not find it important to save cash out of their profits before China joined the 
WTO.   
 However the results obtained are quite different for the post WTO years.  The 
coefficient obtained for both low profit and high profit firm years are positive and 
significant (0.402 and 0.967 respectively).  This indicates that post WTO accession, 
listed Chinese manufacturing firms are accumulating cash out of their profits.  
According to ACW (2004) model, this indicates that these firms are now financially 
constrained.  The coefficient for high profit firms is larger as this indicates that 
financially constrained firms that are more profitable are able to save more cash out of 
their profits.  The results therefore indicate that firms with high profit firms in the post 
WTO period accumulate more cash out of their profits than low profit firms.  The F 
statistics obtained (F(2,556)=9.41) suggest that these two coefficients are significantly 
different from each other.  To check for the robustness of our results, we interact the 
profitability variable with both a dummy capturing financial constraints through the 
distribution of real assets and a dummy indicating WTO accession.  The results are 
shown in Table 6.675. 

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In this paper, we study the cash holding decisions of listed Chinese manufacturing 
firms.  The main motivation for this study is the very high savings rate observed 
among Chinese firms especially in the years preceding China joining the WTO.  We 
start off from the ACW (2004) framework where we assume that constrained firms 
would save cash out of their cash flows while unconstrained firms would exhibit no 
such relationship.   
                                                 
75 The results are mostly robust.  However, the results indicate that larger firms in the PREWTO period 
have a positive coefficient on the profitability term.  This indicates that these firms were saving cash 
out of their profits.  This contradicts our predictions. 
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We then examine 3 main hypotheses.  First we examine if factors that affect 
cash holdings in other parts of the world also affect the cash holdings of firms in 
China.  The results we obtain suggest that some of the determinants of cash holdings 
in other parts of the world (especially the US) also affect the cash holdings of Chinese 
firms.  Second we distinguish among financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
using a number of criteria. The results suggest that Chinese firms do not save out of 
their profits.  We explain this result through the lack of variation in firm 
characteristics of listed Chinese firms.  Third, we investigate if WTO accession has 
changed firm behaviour especially in the case of cash savings.  We find that firms 
save out of their profits post-WTO, but it is not clear where the high cash savings in 
the pre-WTO years were coming from.   
Overall the results suggest that the factors that mainly affect changes cash 
holdings of listed Chinese firms are changes in NWC and changes in leverage.  These 
two variables are negatively related to changes in cash holdings and suggest that firms 
only increase their cash holdings when NWC decreases or the amount of leverage 
falls.  Obviously there are some limitations in our study which mainly amount to data 
limitations.  First, we do not have a cash flow measure and we mainly rely on net 
profits to proxy for cash flows.  Second, firms in our sample are all large firms and 
there is not much variation among them.  Third, we control for growth opportunities 
through a sales growth measure, which might not properly capture growth 
opportunities.   Our results should therefore be interpreted cautiously as we are here 
focussing solely on the behaviour of listed manufacturing firms which are typically 
large firms and are a tiny sample of the population of Chinese firms.  Lastly, we have 
been able to identify in this study what factors affect the cash holdings of listed 
Chinese manufacturing firms.  Where this cash is being generated from still remains a 
mystery and could potentially be an area of future research. 
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
STRUCTURE OF UNBALANCED PANEL 

Number of 
years of 
observation Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 73 1.52 1.52 
2 88 1.83 3.35 
3 153 3.19 6.54 
4 400 8.33 14.87 
5 700 14.58 29.45 
6 558 11.62 41.07 
7 651 13.56 54.62 
8 536 11.16 65.79 
9 468 9.75 75.53 
10 240 5 80.53 
11 495 10.31 90.84 
12 348 7.25 98.08 
13 78 1.62 99.71 
14 14 0.29 100 
Total 4,802 100  
 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
Cash Holdings (Cash Holdings) 
The company total of cash in hand, bank deposits, overseas deposits, bank draft 
deposits, credit card deposits, L/Cs etc. 
Index Number of Data Field: A110101 
 
Cash Flow (CF) 
Calculated at the sum of net income plus depreciation plus the amortisation of other 
long-term assets, intangible assets and long-term prepaid expenses.  
Index Number of Data Fields: D610701, D610801, D610851 
 
Leverage (LEV)  
Calculated as the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by assets. 
 
Short-term debt (STD) 
Borrowing with a maturity of less than one year (including one year) and not yet 
repaid scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: A210101 
 
Long-term Debt (LTD) 
Debt that the company borrows from banks or other financial institutions, with a 
maturity of over one year (not including one year) scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: A220101 
 
Investment (INV) 
Investment is calculated as the change in tangible assets plus depreciation. 
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Net Profit (PROFIT) 
The net profit realized by a company scaled by assets. 
Index Number of Data Field: B150101 
 
Net Assets (Net Assets) 
Calculated as total assets minus cash holdings. 
Index Number of Data field: A100000 
 
Net Working Capital (NWC) 
Calculated as total current assets minus total current liabilities minus cash holdings. 
Index Number of Data field: A110000, A210000,A110101 
 
Sales (Sales)  
Revenue from Main Operations is calculated as the log of the real revenues generated 
by the main operating activities of a company.  Sales growth (SalesG) is calculated as 
the change in log of real sales using the above measure. 
Index Number of Data Field: B110101 
 
Subsidies (SUBSIDY) 
Various subsidies received by a company such as subsidy for loss due to government 
policies, and refund of value-added tax. 
Index Number of Data field: B130402 
Investment (Investment) 
Calculated as the change in tangible assets plus depreciation. 
 
Risk 
As in Comin et al. (2006) and Comin and Philippon (2005), our main volatility 
measure is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s total real sales growth, 
measured over a rolling window of 5 years. Specifically, denoting with Totalvolit this 
standard deviation for firm i at time t; with srgrit, the growth rate of the real sales of 
firm i at time t, and with it, the average growth rate between t-2 and t+2, we have: 
 
Total Volit=
2/1
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Source: Martin Wolf, Financial Times
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The figure above shows how subsidies scaled by net profit behaved over the period.  As can be seen it is positive 
in all years and peaked in 1999.  This behaviour could possibly be related to China joining the WTO in 2001.  
China had to comply with some regulations before joining the WTO and one of them included that it would not 
provide subsidies to its firms that would thereby allow them to compete unfairly against firms in other parts of the 
world.  The trend of the subsidies variable scaled by profit exhibits an upward trend until 1999 and drops sharply 
just before 2000, that is, just before China joined the WTO. After 2001 (once China joined WTO), subsidies are on 
the rise again indicating that even among listed firms state intervention still exists. It is clear from the diagram 
above that subsidies are still being used. 
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Figure 6.6: NET WORKING CAPITAL as a % of NET ASSETS 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASH HOLDINGS AND NWC 
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Figure 6.8: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASH HOLDINGS AND LEVERAGE 
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TABLE 6.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  
 
Full 
sample 
Sample 
Used 
in 
Estima 
tion 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
(CashHoldings/ 
N.Assets)it 
 
0.192 
(0.170) 
 
-- 
0.102 
(0.098) 
0.115 
(0.108) 
0.133 
(0.127) 
0.159 
(0.128) 
0.204 
(0.182) 
0.241 
(0.195) 
0.220 
(0.182) 
0.206 
(0.165) 
0.203 
(0.171) 
(∆Cash  
Holdings/Net 
Assets)it 
-0.019 
(0.144) 
-0.003 
(0.118) 
-0.000 
(0.048) 
-0.001 
(0.106) 
-0.017 
(0.146) 
-0.018 
(0.148) 
-0.003 
(0.134) 
0.020 
(0.145) 
0.003 
(0.162) 
-0.032 
(0.142) 
-0.035 
(0.124) 
(Profit/ Net Assets)it 
 
 
0.040 
(0.055) 
0.032 
(0.049) 
0.055 
(0.053) 
0.055 
(0.054) 
0.053 
(0.060) 
0.055 
(0.048) 
0.053 
(0.047) 
0.037 
(0.056) 
0.031 
(0.056) 
0.030 
(0.055) 
0.031 
(0.055) 
(NWC/ Net Assets)it 
 
 
0.023 
(0.180) 
-- 0.069 
(0.152) 
0.082 
(0.163) 
0.115 
(0.155) 
0.086 
(0.175) 
0.064 
(0.176) 
0.017 
(0.170) 
-0.017 
(0.176) 
-0.022 
(0.181) 
-0.027 
(0.184) 
(∆NWC/ Net Assets)it 
 
 
-0.030 
(0.116) 
-0.025 
(0.109) 
-0.020 
(0.082) 
0.002 
(0.111) 
0.005 
(0.100) 
-0.044 
(0.102) 
-0.037 
(0.125) 
-0.059 
(0.126) 
-0.038 
(0.118) 
-0.015 
(0.113) 
-0.026 
(0.112) 
(Leverage/ 
N.Assets)it 
 
0.219 
(0.127) 
-- 0.239 
(0.111) 
0.224 
(0.114) 
0.200 
(0.119) 
0.216 
(0.126) 
0.203 
(0.120) 
0.213 
(0.123) 
0.216 
(0.130) 
0.229 
(0.137) 
0.233 
(0.134) 
(∆Leverage/ 
N.Assets)it 
 
0.014 
(0.072) 
0.011 
(0.068) 
0.018 
(0.053) 
-0.000 
(0.067) 
0.007 
(0.068) 
0.020 
(0.063) 
0.004 
(0.073) 
0.027 
(0.076) 
0.007 
(0.073) 
0.015 
(0.073) 
0.015 
(0.071) 
(Investment/ 
N.Assets) it 
 
0.072 
(0.087) 
0.064 
(0.080) 
0.163 
(0.141) 
0.147 
(0.071) 
0.064 
(0.078) 
0.056 
(0.081) 
0.056 
(0.076) 
0.079 
(0.097) 
0.094 
(0.085) 
0.074 
(0.088) 
0.061 
(0.088) 
(Log Sales)it 
 
 
13.379 
(1.077) 
13.720 
(1.019) 
12.172 
(0.995) 
12.316 
(0.998) 
13.152 
(0.975) 
13.309 
(0.964) 
13.445 
(0.981) 
13.438 
(0.991) 
13.539 
(1.027) 
13.622 
(1.065) 
13.648 
(0.984) 
(Sales Growth)it 
 
 
0.135 
(0.422) 
0.081 
(0.329) 
-0.145 
(0.465) 
0.110 
(0.508) 
0.865 
(0.550) 
0.151 
(0.429) 
0.120 
(0.370) 
0.035 
(0.392) 
0.132 
(0.366) 
0.135 
(0.338) 
0.067 
(0.347) 
(Subsidies)it 
 
 
0.074 
(0.208) 
-- 0.052 
(0.177) 
0.040 
(0.133) 
0.086 
(0.243) 
0.111 
(0.241) 
0.048 
(0.115) 
0.066 
(0.195) 
0.079 
(0.229) 
0.079 
(0.218) 
0.233 
(-
0.038) 
(Risk)it 
 
 
0.378 
(0.249) 
-- --- 0.603 
(0.319) 
0.510 
(0.283) 
0.481 
(0.259) 
0.400 
(0.239) 
0.317 
(0.218) 
0.306 
(0.204) 
--- --- 
Sample size 
 
3750 1357 133 191 269 304 448 525 571 594 623 
 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample means.  The 
subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1995-2004.  (CASH HOLDINGS/ASSETS) is the 
company’s total of cash in hand, bank deposits, overseas deposits, bank draft deposits, credit card deposits and L/C 
deposits etc. ∆CASH HOLDINGS/ASSETS is the change in cash holdings normalised by 100.  Net Working capital 
(NWC) is calculated as current assets minus current liabilities minus cash holdings, ∆LEVERAGE is the change in 
debt, INVESTMENT is investment, LogSales is size proxied by log of sales and SalesGrowth is growth opportunities 
as captured by the sales growth variable.  Subsidies are total subsidies received scaled by net profits. Risk is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s total real sales growth, measured over a rolling window of 5 years.  
We also report summary statistics for the sample used in estimation for the baseline specification in column 2.  In 
the rest of the columns we report the summary statistics over the years 1996 -2004.  
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Table 6.2:SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SMALL LARGE 
LOW 
PROFIT 
HIGH 
PROFIT PRE-WTO POST-WTO 
(Cash Holdings/N.Assets)it 
 
0.246 
(0.217) 
0.174 
(0.147) 
0.129 
(0.121) 
0.216 
(0.179) 
0.217 
(0.179) 
0.152 
(0.146) 
(∆Cash  
Holdings/Net Assets)it 
-0.020 
(0.172) 
-0.017 
(0.134) 
-0.017 
(0.101) 
-0.019 
(0.159) 
-0.029 
(0.148) 
0.004 
(0.131) 
(Profit/ Net Assets)it 
 
0.042 
(0.061) 
0.040 
(0.053) 
-0.013 
(0.062) 
0.061 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.055) 
0.053 
(0.051) 
(NWC/ Net Assets)it 
 
0.068 
(0.192) 
0.009 
(0.175) 
-0.006 
(0.186) 
0.034 
(0.177) 
-0.013 
(0.179) 
0.081 
(0.167) 
(∆NWC/ Net Assets)it 
 
-0.033 
(0.133) 
-0.030 
(0.110) 
-0.041 
(0.108) 
-0.026 
(0.119) 
-0.033 
(0.118) 
-0.024 
(0.111) 
(Leverage/ N.Assets)it 
 
0.187 
(0.117) 
0.229 
(0.128) 
0.269 
(0.124) 
0.200 
(0.123) 
0.223 
(0.132) 
0.213 
(0.119) 
(∆Leverage/ N.Assets)it 
 
0.011 
(0.071) 
0.014) 
(0.072) 
0.016 
(0.066) 
0.013 
(0.074) 
0.015 
(0.073) 
0.009 
(0.068) 
(Investment/N.Assets) it 
 
0.057 
(0.084) 
0.076) 
(0.087 
0.035 
(0.076) 
0.087 
(0.087) 
0.077 
(0.090) 
0.059 
(0.079) 
(Log Sales)it 
 
12.486 
(0.820) 
13.672 
(0.993) 
12.929 
(1.077) 
13.530 
(1.033) 
13.567 
(1.020) 
13.061 
(1.096) 
(Sales Growth)it 
 
0.114 
(0.430) 
0.142 
(0.421) 
-0.006 
(0.483) 
0.189 
(0.383) 
0.096 
(0.361) 
0.233 
(0.530) 
(Subsidies)it 
 
0.069 
(0.206) 
0.076 
(0.208) 
0.131 
(0.336) 
0.053 
(0.124) 
0.078 
(0.220) 
0.068 
(0.188) 
(Risk)it 
 
0.378 
(0.243) 
0.378 
(0.253) 
0.429 
(0.274) 
0.355 
(0.234) 
0.311 
(0.210) 
0.462 
(0.269) 
 
Sample size 885 2783 885 2783 2313 1437 
The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample means.  
The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1995-2004.  Columns 1 and 2 show 
the summary statistics of Chinese firms listed according to financial constraints.  Firms are classified as 
SMALL if their assets are in the bottom quartile and LARGE if the assets are in the top quartile of the 
distribution of real assets of all-firm years.  Columns 3 and 4 give the summary statistics of firms 
according to the (internal) financial constraints.  Firms are classified as LOW PROFIT if their profit is in 
the bottom quartile of the distribution of profits of all firm-years and HIGH PROFIT if their profitability is 
in the top 3 quartiles of the distribution of profits of all-firm years.  Also see notes to Table 6.1.  In 
columns 5 and 6, we show the summary statistics of firms according to a sample split based on the year 
that China joined the WTO.  Column 3 gives the summary statistics in the pre WTO years (ie before China 
joined the WTO) while column 4 gives the summary statistics of post WTO firm-years (ie after China 
joined the WTO). 

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TABLE 6.3:FIRST DIFFERENCE GMM ESTIMATOR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(∆Cash Holdings/N.Assets)it-1 
 
-0.133*** 
0.032 
-0.129*** 
0.032 
-0.220*** 
0.052 
-0.119*** 
0.042 
-0.116*** 
0.041 
-0.113*** 
0.039 
(Profit/Net Assets)it 
 
0.182 
0.407 
0.072 
0.359 
0.443 
0.508 
-0.460 
0.574 
-0.383 
0.492 
-0.528 
0.574 
(∆NWC/Net Assets)it 
 
-0.317*** 
0.116 
-0.344*** 
0.111 
-0.289** 
0.150 
-0.405*** 
0.157 
-0.414*** 
0.154 
-0.415** 
0.172 
(∆Leverage/Net Assets)it 
 
-0.738*** 
0.203 
-0.622*** 
0.183 
-0.539*** 
0.246 
-0.247 
0.306 
-0.132 
0.283 
-0.309 
0.281 
(Investment/Net Assets)it 
 
-0.450*** 
0.181 
-0.464*** 
0.170 
-0.232 
0.247 
-0.495 
0.316 
-0.584** 
0.310 
-0.553** 
0.298 
(Log Sales)it 
 
0.135*** 
0.063 
0.108*** 
0.061 
-0.028 
0.069 
0.376*** 
0.117 
0.349*** 
0.109 
0.318*** 
0.113 
(Sales Growth)it 
 
-0.035 
0.038 
-0.059* 
0.036 
-0.037 
0.036 
-0.095 
0.077 
-0.102 
0.068 
-0.116* 
0.071 
(Subsidies)it 
  
0.013 
0.054 
-0.030 
0.053  
0.055 
0.101 
0.088 
0.114 
 (Risk)it 
   
0.052 
0.093   
 
Sample size 1357 1357 515 979 979 
 
979 
J 0.503 0.261 0.567 0.440 0.227 0.436 
m2 0.277 0.192 0.220 0.618 0.554 0.995 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  The 
J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument 
validity.  Instruments used are (Cash Holdings/N.Assets)it, (Profit/NetAssets)it, (∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it, 
(Investment)it, (Log Sales)it,(Sales Growth)it  and (Subsidies)it  and (Risk)it  in alternative specifications all  
lagged two to five times. In column 2, we include the subsidies variable in our regression specification.  In 
Column 3, we include a risk measure to account for any uncertainty that these firms might face over the period 
considered. In column 4 we use the same specification as in column 1 while in column 5 we use the same 
specification as in column 2 where we include the subsidy variable in the specification.  In column 6, we use 
the same specification as in column 1 but we use a cash flow measure (as used by Almeida et al, 2004) instead 
of profits.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see notes to 
Table 6.1 and 6.2. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 6.4: ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND WTO ACCESSION 
 1 
FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
MEASURED BY 
REAL ASSETS 
2 
FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
MEASURED BY 
PROFITABILITY 
2 
WTO 
EFFECT 
(∆Cash Holdings/Net Assets)it-1*Dummy1it 
 
-0.166 
(0.135) 
-0.180 
(0.175) 
-0.914*** 
(0.136) 
(∆Cash Holdings /Net Assets)it-1*Dummy2it 
 
-0.119*** 
(0.057) 
-0.122*** 
(0.039) 
-0.735*** 
(0.050) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.450 
(0.596) 
-0.245 
(0.431) 
0.384 
(0.300) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it * Dummy2it 
 
0.325 
(0.370) 
0.053 
(0.564) 
0.643*** 
(0.171) 
(∆NWC)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.107 
(0.229) 
-0.080 
(0.226 
-0.045 
(0.115) 
(∆NWC)it * Dummy2it 
 
-0.505*** 
(0.153) 
-0.389*** 
(0.125 
-0.217*** 
(0.073) 
(∆Leverage)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.410 
(0.424) 
-0.204 
(0.294 
-0.585*** 
(0.272) 
(∆Leverage)it * Dummy2it 
 
-0.523*** 
(0.197) 
-0.594*** 
(0.183 
-0.093 
(0.110) 
(Investment)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.572* 
(0.356) 
-0.559** 
(0.270) 
0.163 
(0.166) 
(Investment)it * Dummy2it 
 
-0.549*** 
(0.223) 
-0.535*** 
(0.211) 
-0.140 
(0.115) 
(Log Sales)it * Dummy1it 
 
0.081 
(0.064) 
0.136*** 
(0.057) 
0.034 
(0.030) 
(Log Sales)it * Dummy2it 
 
0.076 
(0.062) 
0.136*** 
(0.059) 
0.029 
(0.031) 
(Sales Growth)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.039 
(0.052) 
-0.123*** 
(0.055) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
(Sales Growth)it * Dummy2it 
 
-0.027 
(0.034) 
0.005 
(0.040) 
-0.050** 
(0.025) 
(Subsidies)it * Dummy1it 
 
-0.029 
(0.132) 
0.009 
(0.050) 
-0.041 
(0.040 
(Subsidies)it * Dummy2it 
 
0.008 
(0.061) 
-0.044 
(0.138) 
-0.03 
(0.034) 
Sample size 1357 1357 1730 
J 0.187 0.340 0.618 
m2 0.247 0.083 0.020 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. In Column (1) we investigate if 
financial constraints captured by the distribution of real assets affects the cash holdings of the listed Chinese firms in our sample; 
Dummy1 stands for SMALL while Dummy2 stands for LARGE.  Instruments used in column 1 are (∆Cash Holdings/Net 
Assets)it,, (Profit/Assets)it, (∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it ,(Investment)it ,(Log Sales)it, and (Sales Growth)it  lagged two to three times and 
interacted with dummies: SMALL and LARGE based on the distribution of their real assets. In Column (2) we investigate if the 
level of profitability of firms affects the cash holdings of the listed Chinese firms in our sample; Dummy1 stands for 
LOWPROFIT while Dummy2 stands for HIGHPROFIT. Instruments used in column (2) are (∆Cash Holdings/Net Assets)it,, 
(Profit/Assets)it, (∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it ,(Investment)it ,(Log Sales)it, and (Sales Growth)it  lagged two to three times and 
interacted with  dummies: LOW PROFIT and HIGH PROFIT, based on the distribution of their profits.  In Column (3) we 
investigate if WTO accession affected the cash holdings of the listed Chinese firms in our sample; Dummy1 stands for PREWTO 
while Dummy2 stands for POSTWTO.    Instruments used in column (3) are (∆Cash Holdings/Net Assets)it,, (Profit/Assets)it, 
(∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it ,(Investment)it ,(Log Sales)it, and (Sales Growth)it  lagged two to three times and interacted with  
dummies: PRE WTO and POST WTO. Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  Also see 
notes to Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.4.. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 6.5: ACCOUNTING JOINTLY FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND WTO ACCESSION 
(∆Cash Holdings/Net Assets)it-1*PREWTO 
 
-0.009 
(0.127) 
(∆Cash Holdings /Net Assets)it-1*POSTWTO 
 
-0.753 
(0.050) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *PREWTO* LOWPROFITit -0.248 
(0.525) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *PREWTO*HIGHPROFITit 
 
0.436 
(0.298) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *POSTWTO* LOWPROFITit 
 
0.402** 
(0.204) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it * POSTWTO*HIGHPROFITit 
 
0.967*** 
(0.288) 
(∆NWC)it *PREWTO 
 
-0.069 
(0.101) 
(∆NWC)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.217*** 
(0.068) 
(∆Leverage)it * PREWTO 
 
-0.608*** 
(0.276) 
(∆Leverage)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.081 
(0.104) 
(Investment)it * PREWTO 
 
0.187 
(0.163) 
(Investment)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.122 
(0.113) 
(Log Sales)it * PREWTO 
 
0.030 
(0.031) 
(Log Sales)it * POSTWTO 
 
0.022 
(0.032) 
(Sales Growth)it * PREWTO 
 
0.014 
(0.020) 
(Sales Growth)it *POSTWTO 
 
-0.036 
(0.024) 
(Subsidies)it * PREWTO 
 
-0.016 
(0.036) 
(Subsidies)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
Sample size 1730 
J 0.713 
m2 0.013 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (Cash Holdings/N.Assets)it, 
(Profit/NetAssets)it, (∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it, (Investment)it, (Log Sales)it, (Sales Growth)it and 
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(Subsidies)it  all  lagged two to three times and interacted with  dummies: PRE WTO and POST WTO. 
The Profit term is interacted with both the pre-WTO and post-WTO dummies and also High Profit and 
Low Profit dummies to investigate if the nature of financial constraints have changed after China joined 
the WTO.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
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TABLE 6.6: ACCOUNTING JOINTLY FOR FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND WTO ACCESSION 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
(∆Cash Holdings/Net Assets)it-1*PREWTO 
 
-0.913 
(0.123) 
(∆Cash Holdings /Net Assets)it-1*POSTWTO 
 
-0.753 
(0.047) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *PREWTO* SMALLit -0.075 
(0.366) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *PREWTO*LARGEit 
 
0.739*** 
(0.316) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it *POSTWTO* SMALLit 
 
0.881** 
(0.318) 
(Profit/Net Assets)it * POSTWTO*LARGEit 
 
0.671*** 
(0.197) 
(∆NWC)it *PREWTO 
 
-0.127 
(0.121) 
(∆NWC)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.226*** 
(0.067) 
(∆Leverage)it * PREWTO 
 
-0.497*** 
(0.228) 
(∆Leverage)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.095 
(0.105) 
(Investment)it * PREWTO 
 
0.007 
(0.161) 
(Investment)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.149 
(0.114) 
(Log Sales)it * PREWTO 
 
0.007 
(0.161) 
(Log Sales)it * POSTWTO 
 
0.012 
(0.032) 
(Sales Growth)it * PREWTO 
 
0.008 
(0.022) 
(Sales Growth)it *POSTWTO 
 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
(Subsidies)it * PREWTO 
 
-0.056 
(0.042) 
(Subsidies)it * POSTWTO 
 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
Sample size 1730 
J 0.625 
m2 0.022 
 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.  Instruments used are (Cash Holdings/N.Assets)it, 
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(Profit/NetAssets)it, (∆NWC)it, (∆Leverage)it, (Investment)it, (Log Sales)it, (Sales Growth)it and 
(Subsidies)it  all  lagged two to three times and interacted with  dummies: PRE WTO and POST WTO. 
The Profit term is interacted with both the PREWTO and POSTWTO dummies and also SMALL and 
LARGE dummies to investigate if the nature of financial constraints have changed after China joined 
the WTO.  Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors and instruments.  * indicates 
significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
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Previous studies on capital structure have mainly examined the determinants of debt 
or focused on the debt-equity mix choice of firms.  At the same time, papers that have 
taken into account financial constraints faced by firms have mainly examined 
investment-cash flow sensitivities.  In the first part of this study, we merge these two 
different strands of literature and try to examine how financial constraints affect the 
leverage decisions of firms.  In particular, in the first part of this study, as the main 
innovative aspect, we examine how financial constraints affect the relationship 
between leverage and cash flow of firms in the UK.  We focus on the relationship 
between leverage and cash flow for the simple reason that these are the two main 
sources of finance of firms even in countries where the stock market is very 
developed. 
In the second part of this study we focus on the financing behaviour of listed 
Chinese firms.  The reason why we study Chinese firms is that it provides a fresh 
approach as not much research has been done on the financing behaviour of Chinese 
firms.  We find that listed Chinese firms have low leverage and high cash holdings.  
This gives evidence that Chinese firms are quite financially conservative. 

'
		
In Chapter 2, we review both the theoretical and empirical studies that have tried to 
investigate the capital structure decisions of firms.  In the first part of the chapter we 
mainly focus on the capital structure decisions of large, listed firms.   In the 
theoretical part, we discuss theories on capital structure based on tax-based, agency 
cost, and asymmetric information theories.  However, we mainly focus on the Trade 
off Theory (TOT) and the Pecking Order Theory (POT).  In the empirical section we 
survey some recent empirical studies, which suggest that financing decisions across a 
number of countries are quite similar although there might be important institutional 
differences among countries.  For instance, the studies mainly show that firms that 
have more internal finance have lower leverage.  In the second part of the study we 
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concentrate on the theoretical and empirical literature of small and medium-sized 
firms (SMEs) that is, firms that cannot issue shares on stock markets. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the leverage decisions of quoted firms in the UK. 
We merge two different strands of literature and try to examine how financial 
constraints affect the leverage decisions of firms.  In particular, our main innovative 
aspect is our investigation of how financial constraints affect the relationship between 
leverage and cash flow.   First, we establish the fact that firms indeed follow a 
hierarchy when they decide what sources of finance they use.  We find that there is a 
negative relationship between leverage and cash flow indicating that when a firm 
experiences cash flow innovations, it tends to reduce the amount of leverage in its 
capital structure.  This result suggests that firms always prefer to use internal finance 
when it is available and also points towards a debt conservatism approach of firms 
that has clearly been observed in the last two decades.  Other factors that affect 
leverage in our study are the size of firms, their investment and their growth 
opportunities. 
In Part I of Chapter 3, we consider overall financial constraints, that is, we 
take into account factors like real assets, coverage ratios and level of indebtedness to 
determine the extent to which a firm is likely to face financial constraints.  These are 
mainly factors that outsiders would look at to determine whether a firm appears to be 
financially constrained or unconstrained and whether they would be willing to lend to 
that firm or not.  Similar to the results obtained by Almeida and Campello (2005) who 
study firms in the US, we find that for firms in the UK the sensitivity of debt to 
variations in internal funds is less negative for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms.  Overall, the results we obtain suggest that firms in the UK are 
financially conservative.  We find that even listed firms who have the broadest menu 
of financing choices actually chose from a few sources of finance, and among them 
internally generated funds and debt are the most important sources. 
In Part II of Chapter 3 we examine the financing of small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) in the UK, as these firms are more likely to suffer from financial 
constraints than the quoted firms.  We examine the relationship between firm leverage 
and cash flow at unquoted firms since these are the two most important sources of 
finance of most firms.  Our results suggest that the relationship between debt and cash 
flow can be better explained by the POT.  Cash flow is a vital source of financing of 
firms and they seem to follow a financial hierarchy when deciding what sources of 
 245 
finance to use.  If firms experience an increase in cash flow, they tend to reduce the 
amount of debt they hold, possibly by paying off debt but if cash flow falls firms 
would increase leverage in their capital structure.  
Unlike the previous section, we further investigate this negative relationship 
by taking into account both internal and overall financial constraints. If the pecking 
order theory is true then the main factor that would influence whether a firm would go 
for external finance is the availability of internal finance. For instance, if a firm had 
sufficient funds then it would choose not to have recourse to external finance and 
would use its internal funds.   In this case, overall financial constraints would be 
irrelevant for the firm.  If a firm is internally financially constrained and needs 
external funding, then obviously overall financial constraints become very important. 
We introduce internal financial constraints measured by the availability of internal 
finance to the firms. 
Our results suggest that internal financial constraints are the main factors that 
influence the amount of debt that a firm has in its capital structure.  Even if firms have 
negative cash flows they do not increase their leverage, although these firms are likely 
to be more debt dependent. The results obtained when firms are distinguished 
according to the level of overall financial constraints that they face, seem to suggest 
that however large a firm might be and however easy it is for a firm to have access to 
debt, firms inherently do not like to increase debt in their capital structure. The crux 
of the problem is then whether managers want to go for external financing.  Our 
results seem to indicate that these firms prefer to pay back debt when they experience 
an increase in their cash flows rather than borrowing more, say to invest.  They prefer 
to have less debt when they have negative or low cash flows, possibly to avoid the 
risk of bankruptcy. 
In the second part of this study we focus on the financing decisions of Chinese 
firms.  In Chapter 4 we review the Chinese economy. China is an interesting case 
study, especially since the Chinese miracle has become a phenomenon in itself.  We 
first discuss the transition and reform process in China.  Then we discuss finance and 
growth in the Chinese context and provide a detailed description of the Chinese 
financial system where we focus mainly on the development of the banking sector and 
the stock market. We also discuss the importance of foreign direct investment as this 
is the factor that has received a lot of attention especially in the Chinese case and has 
obviously played a role in the high economic growth that has been achieved.  We then 
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review some studies that have examined the leverage decisions of firms in China.  
After this we focus on the literature on cash holdings and review some studies. 
In chapter 5 we investigate the leverage decisions of listed manufacturing 
firms in China.  The reason for doing this is that we believe that this would provide an 
interesting comparison and would shed some light on how the firms in one of the 
fastest growing economy of the world, namely China, finance themselves.   We find 
that most of the debt of Chinese firms is short-term, suggesting that maturity matching 
might be a problem, and that banks prefer to lend short-term, which points towards a 
risk averse behaviour of the latter. Our results suggest that despite declining 
profitability, our listed Chinese firms are still able to service debt.  This could 
possibly explain why banks are still willing to lend to them or points towards the fact 
that despite substantial financial reforms, Chinese firms still benefit from soft budget 
constraints. 
We investigate if financing behaviour differs across regions as markets in 
China are usually cited as being fragmented.   Huge development gaps exist between 
the Eastern and Western regions and this could possibly affect the financing patterns 
across regions. We do not find evidence to support this claim, as firms operating in 
different regions appear to have similar levels of leverage. However, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously as we are here focussing solely on the behaviour of 
listed manufacturing firms which are typically large firms and are a tiny sample out of 
the population of Chinese firms who are likely to be more dynamic than the firms we 
have considered in our study. 
 Next, we consider firms located in High and Low FDI recipient provinces.  
After the US, China is the second major FDI recipient country76.  It is a fact that FDI 
has played a significant role in the growth miracle achieved by China.  We hence 
investigate the effect of FDI on leverage decisions by taking into account FDI across 
various provinces. The results we obtain suggest that the leverage decisions of firms 
located in High FDI provinces are not influenced by their profitability, while 
profitability is an important determinant of the leverage decisions of firms located in 
low FDI provinces.  We also find evidence suggesting that the level of subsidies 
obtained by firms influences the leverage decisions of firms.  Finally, we explore the 
time dimension in our dataset by considering whether joining WTO in 2001 has had 
                                                 
76 It is predicted that China will overtake the US in the coming years and will thus become the number 
one destination for FDI. 
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any effect on the leverage decisions of the firms in our sample.  We do not find any 
significant differences in the financing patterns of firms before or after this event.
Our results suggest that the single main determinant of leverage decisions of 
Chinese firms is the profitability of these firms.  Profitability is significant across the 
full sample and even when the sample is split according to the various geographical 
attributes.  It is also significant when the sample is split in the year 2001.  Profitability 
is only insignificant for high FDI regions and high subsidy firm-years indicating that 
profit is not an important determinant of leverage for firms located in high FDI 
provinces or for firms that receive high subsidies.  Unlike other factors such as size or 
collateral that are significant in only a few cases, profitability is mostly negative and 
significant, suggesting that Chinese firms do operate according to a pecking order and 
that their preferred source of finance is internal finance.  In this respect, Chinese listed 
firms are therefore not very different from their western counterparts after all. 
In Chapter 6, we study the cash holding decisions of listed Chinese 
manufacturing firms.  The main motivation for this is the very high savings rate 
observed among Chinese firms especially in the years preceding China joining the 
WTO. We examine if factors that affect cash holdings in other parts of the world also 
affect the cash holdings of firms in China.  Our results suggest that some of the 
determinants of cash holdings in other parts of the world (especially the US) also 
affect the cash holdings of Chinese firms.  Second we distinguish among financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms using a number of criteria. The results suggest 
that Chinese firms do not save out of their profits.  We explain this result through the 
lack of variation in firm characteristics of listed Chinese firms.  Third, we investigate 
if WTO accession has changed firm behaviour especially in the case of cash savings.  
We find that firms save out of their profits post-WTO, but it is not clear where the 
high cash savings in the pre-WTO years were coming from.   
Overall the results suggest that the factors that mainly affect the cash holdings 
of listed Chinese firms are changes in net working capital (current assets minus 
current liabilities minus cash holdings) and changes in leverage.  These two variables 
are negatively related to changes in cash holdings and suggest that firms only increase 
their cash holdings when net working capital decreases or the amount of leverage 
falls.   
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Table 7.1 below shows a comparison of firms examined in this study.   As mentioned 
previously, we have mainly focussed on firms in the manufacturing.  This allows us to 
directly compare our findings across the cross section of the firms used in this study 
and draw some general conclusion. Column (1) shows the summary statistics for 
listed firms in the UK, that is, those firms that are able to issue public equity.  Column 
(2) shows the summary statistics of unquoted firms in the UK that consist of small 
and medium-sized firms.  Column (3) presents the summary statistics for listed 
Chinese firms. 
When considering the overall leverage (sum of short-term and long-term debt) 
of the 3 different classes of firms, it is apparent that the unquoted UK firms are the 
most levered ones, giving evidence that these unlisted firms are more reliant on debt 
as a source of finance.  We can therefore conclude that firms that are restricted in their 
sources of financing and cannot issue shares are more dependent on debt.  
Furthermore, the main source of leverage of these unquoted UK firms is mainly bank 
debt.  When we compare the leverage of listed UK firms and listed Chinese firms, we 
find that the listed Chinese firms are more highly levered than the listed UK firms. 
The reason could be that listed UK firms issue comparatively more equity than listed 
Chinese firms or that Chinese firms are much more financially conservative than 
firms in the UK. In fact, Chinese firms face quite a number of restrictions in issuing 
shares and thus they might have to rely more on leverage.    
The UK stock market is quite mature as it has been quite a number of years 
since its establishment.  It has been documented in the recent literature that most 
activities on the stock markets especially in the UK and the US have been aimed at 
share buy-back or repurchase activities.  Firms have also tended towards reducing 
their leverage levels and have mainly concentrated on the accumulation of cash in 
their businesses.  The equity issues of both UK and Chinese listed firms have been 
quite minimal.  For UK firms equity issues have at most been 3% of assets.  For 
Chinese firms this is smaller at around 0.1% of assets (author’s calculations from 
available datasets).  This suggest that the single most important mean of raising 
finance could be regarded as being the initial public offering (IPO) event.  Once this 
event has occurred the additional equity issues of firms namely in the form of rights 
issues are quite rare and minimal.   
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Table 7.1 shows that unquoted firms have higher long-term debt than listed 
firms in the UK and China.    As mentioned above, the reason for this is that these 
firms are restricted in their financing options.  An interesting fact is that listed 
Chinese firms have been known to have low long-term leverage.  However as can be 
seen, listed UK firms also have the same level of long-term debt.  This suggests that 
there is nothing surprising in listed Chinese firms having around 5% of long-term debt 
relative to their assets.  What is significant is that while the debt structure of listed UK 
firms is more “balanced”, that is they have quite similar levels of long-term and short-
term debt, the debt structure of listed Chinese firms is excessively tilted towards 
short-term debt.  The Chinese firms in our sample have around 5% long-term debt 
ratio but short-term debt is almost 17% of assets.  This suggests that there are some 
problems in the Chinese corporate sector.  It could possibly indicate that either 
Chinese firms are more willing to borrow short-term rather than long-term or the fact 
that banks (who give out the major portion of debt) are more willing to lend short-
term rather than long-term.  It is not very clear whether this reflects a supply or 
demand effect.  However, what is clear from this is that there are macroeconomic 
uncertainties in terms of both monetary and fiscal policy and in this environment of 
uncertainty, firms and banks do not want to take risks lending/borrowing long-term. 
Listed firms in the UK have higher cash flow over assets than unquoted firms.  
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the cash flow of Chinese firms for the 
complete period77.  Regarding profitability, we see that listed UK firms are more 
profitable followed by unquoted ones and the least profitable ones are the listed 
Chinese firms.  Concerning the cash stock variable that measures the total amount of 
internal funds, we find that Chinese firms hold almost twice as much cash as listed 
firms in the UK.  This could possibly be reflecting the attitude of Chinese firms 
towards business.  They do not want high levels of debt and prefer to save.  Chinese 
manufacturing firms have the highest amount of sales followed by the unquoted firms 
in the UK and finally the quoted firms.  The amount of collateral of the firms 
measured by the level of tangible assets to total assets is similar across all the firms 
but Chinese firms have the lowest amount of collateral. 


                                                 
77Listed Chinese firms started reporting their cash flows only in 1998.  Although cash flows for earlier 
years can be calculated, we do not have the complete data required to be able to do this. 
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The regression that we use to examine leverage decisions of firms in the UK and China is the 
one used by Rajan and Zingales (1995) as shown below: 
 
(Leverage/Assets)it = λ0  + λ 1 (Leverage/Assets)it-1 +λ 2 (Return on Assets )it + λ 3 (Log Sales )it  
+ λ 4 (Tangible assets)it  + λ 5 (Tobin’s Q)it   + λ 6 (Tax)it   +νi + νt + εit                 (7.1)                  
 
Return on Assets is proxied by profitability.   Log Sales is the log of real sales 
used as a proxy of size.  Tangible assets is used as a measure of collateral and proxied 
for by the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets78.  Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of 
growth opportunies.  Unfortunately, the sub-sample of data that we have for the 
unquoted UK firms and the listed Chinese firm, does not contain the market price of 
shares and therefore we cannot calculate Tobin’s Q as a measure of growth 
opportunities.  We therefore have to rely on a Sales Growth measure to capture growth 
opportunities79.  Since we use panel data, we include both a firm specific and time 
specific error term.  Hence, the error term now consists of three components: νi is a 
firm-specific fixed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics, νt 
represents a time specific component and reflects aggregate effects common across 
companies to control for macroeconomic influences, including factors as nominal 
interest rates and inflation, εit is an idiosyncratic error term.  
The variables included in the regression are not marked in stone.  Since there 
is no specific theory that tells us what variables should be included in a regression to 
determine the leverage decisions of firms, researchers have included variables which 
they believe influenced the leverage decisions of firms. These studies include for 
instance Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2002), Benito (2003), although 
they do not specifically follow RZ (1995) specification but rather use its modified 
version and one that was more suited to their research purposes. 
Table 7.2 shows the regression results for all the firms (quoted UK firms, UK 
SMEs and listed Chinese firms) which are estimated using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) GMM estimator.  The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates 
                                                 
78 It should be noted that in the case of quoted UK firms in Chapter 3, we use an investment measure 
rather than a collateral measure.  We cannot include both as they are highly correlated.  In the case of 
the Chinese firms we exclude the tax measure as it is insignificant in most cases and by including it we 
would reduce the number of degrees of freedom. 
79 Hence we replace the Tobin’s Q measure in the regression with a Sales Growth measure to capture 
growth opportunities for unquoted UK firms and listed Chinese firms.  
 251 
that adjustment level is quite similar across firms in most cases; the estimated 
parameter associated with the lagged leverage (α=(1-λ)it) is 0.429 for listed UK firms, 
0.486 for unquoted UK firms and 0.402 for listed Chinese firms80.  This indicates that 
the adjustment parameter for the different firms is as follows: 0.571 for listed UK 
firms, 0.514 for SMEs in the UK and 0.598 for listed Chinese firms81. The value of 
the adjustment parameter indicates that the adjustment level is quite similar across 
firms in most cases, with Chinese firms closing the gap between their actual debt and 
target leverage more quickly, followed by listed UK firms and SMEs.  
The results indicate that Chinese firms possibly adjust to their target leverage 
more quickly maybe because the costs of being away from the target are high and the 
transaction costs of adjusting to the target are not very high.  Listed firms adjust to 
their target leverage quite quickly too, possibly because they are able to do so, while 
SMEs in the UK are the slowest to adjust to their targets probably because their 
adjustments costs are prohibitive. 
There is a negative relationship between leverage and cash flow that is 
according to the POT, and suggests that when firms experience an increase in cash 
flow, they tend to reduce the amount of leverage in their capital structure.  It also 
suggests that when cash flow falls, firms tend to increase their reliance on leverage, 
suggesting that cash flow and leverage are substitute sources of finance.   The 
magnitude of the negative coefficients are as follows: 0.527 for listed UK firms, 0.425 
for listed Chinese firms and 0.259 for the SMEs in the UK.  The magnitude of the 
negative coefficients suggest that when faced with positive cash flow innovations, 
listed UK firms are able to reduce their debt by a larger amount followed by listed 
Chinese firms and finally, the SMEs in the UK. 
These results suggest that the relationship between leverage and internal 
finance (measured by cash flow for listed and SMEs firms in the UK and profit for the 
listed Chinese firms) is better explained by the pecking order theory rather than the 
trade-off theory.  It also gives some support to the model proposed by Almeida and 
Campello (2005), who show that faced with positive cash flow innovations, 
unconstrained firms are able to reduce their leverage by a larger amount than 
                                                 
80 This adjustment parameter is emphasized in the Trade off Theory where firms adjust to a target level 
of debt every year.  Hence if firms are away from their target leverage, they tend to close the gap 
between target and actual leverage over a certain number of years. 
81 These adjustment parameters are calculated as one minus the coefficient associated with the lagged 
dependent variable. 
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constrained firms.  This is reflected in our results which suggest that listed UK firms 
are able to reduce their leverage by a larger amount than listed Chinese firms or SMEs 
in the UK. 
The firms in our study can be ranked upon their degree of financial 
constraints.  Listed UK firms are possibly the least constrained firms among the lot.  
They have high cash flow and operate in a well-developed financial system.   After 
them, listed Chinese firms come in the second place possibly because they operate in 
a lesser developed financial system; but they are ranked second because being listed 
they can issue equity and they are quite well-known which could also help them get 
access to loans when they are needed.  Lastly, come the SMEs in the UK.  SMEs are 
restricted in their financing sources, they can only use internal finance or other forms 
of leverage.  Although listed firms do not use equity financing a lot as shown in the 
previous chapters, the results indicate that being listed does influence the constraints 
that firms face.  Being listed possibly relaxes overall constraints as lenders are more 
willing to lend to listed firms as these firms have reputation value. 
We find that there is a positive relationship between size (measured by the log 
of sales) and leverage for listed UK (coefficient of 0.024) and Chinese firms 
(coefficient of 0.023), which is in accordance with the TOT, which postulates that 
larger firms normally take more leverage.  However, in the case of the UK SMEs we 
find that there is a negative relationship between size and leverage suggesting that 
when firms grow in size, they tend to reduce their leverage.  This can possibly be 
explained by the fact that SMEs tend to rely on external funds, usually loans when 
they have to grow but after a while the larger they grow in size, they pay back their 
debt and reduce their leverage. 
In the case of listed UK firms we look at the relationship between leverage and 
investment because we closely follow the Almeida and Campello (2005) model.  
However, because there are a number of problems with using the investment measure 
such missing values; in the case of SMEs and listed Chinese firms we use a collateral 
measure.  Collateral is likely to be positively correlated with the investment variable 
as we measure collateral as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets and normally 
investments adds to a firm’s stock of tangible assets.  For listed UK firms we find a 
positive relationship between investment and leverage that suggest that the more a 
firm invests the more levered it is.   
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These results indicate that although similar factors affect the financing of 
firms in both the UK and China, these factors do not always affect financing in the 
same way.  The amount of internal finance is always negatively related to leverage 
indicating that firms across these two countries follow some kind of pecking order in 
their financing.  However firms in these countries also behave in a very individualistic 
way.  The factors that affect (or do not affect) the financing of Chinese firms for 
instance reflect the environment in which they are operating. For instance, since 
collateral does not influence their leverage, this indicates that they operate in a 
financial system where they are highly favoured.  The fact that size is positively 
related to leverage for listed firms in both countries but negatively related to the 
leverage of SMEs indicates that SMEs are perhaps the most financially conservative 
firms among the lot.  However, this financial conservatism is not only restricted to 
SMEs.  In all the firms that we investigated, the fact that an increase in internal 
financing always led to a decrease in leverage even when we took into account 
financial constraints indicates that financial conservatism is an important aspect that 
needs to be accounted for when investigating financing decisions of firms. 
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This research has been mainly based on the factors that affect the financing decisions 
of firms.  It is mainly focussed on the demand side of finance, that is, we concentrate 
on the factors that influence the demand for external funds of firms mainly in the form 
leverage.  We take into account firm-specific characteristics while studying the 
behaviour of firms which could possibly help in policy implementation.  Our findings 
suggest that firms attach a lot of importance to internal funds.  In the case of large 
firms we find that although these firms can easily have access to external funds, they 
tend to reduce their reliance on outside funds whenever they have the opportunity to 
do so.  We find similar behaviour across small and constrained firms.   
All of this implies a major reliance of firms, especially unquoted ones, on cash 
flow.  Hence these firms might be constricting their performance according to their 
cash flows.  This has important implications on growth as it suggests that if these 
firms had been less debt averse (both when cash flows are negative or positive) 
perhaps they could grow more.  This is problematic as we expect that smaller firms 
would require more funds to grow and this tendency to reduce leverage would not be 
very strong among smaller firms.  This suggests that policy makers should take this 
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inherent debt-averse behaviour of small and medium-sized firms when taking policy 
decisions.  It is useless to make credit widely available if firms are themselves not 
willing to take the leverage.  Another policy implication of this is that even if credit is 
widely available, firms are unwilling to undertake leverage as the terms on which 
credit is being made available to them, do not suit them.  Hence, the terms of credit 
possibly need to be reviewed. 
In the case of Chinese firms other policy implications can be derived.  The fact 
that Chinese firms are both risk-averse and are sitting on huge stockpiles of cash 
suggest that these firms are accumulating resources and these resources are not being 
used for investment purposes.  This behaviour could be explained by the uncertainty 
that exists.  The Chinese government is probably not sending the correct signals. 
Therefore to eliminate any nasty surprises such as hikes in interest rates due to the 
decision of the Chinese government to tighten monetary policy, firms decide to play it 
safe and accumulate resources.  Obviously this has serious implications for growth in 
the Chinese economy.  The government has to come with measures that would 
positively affect confidence level in the economy together with other legal and 
financial reforms. 
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This study has been mainly based on the leverage decisions of firms in the UK and 
China.  For the purpose of this study and for the sake of simplicity we have focussed 
on a single measure of leverage that is the sum of short-term and long-term debt.  
Obviously factors that affect short-term debt and factors that affect long-term debt 
might be different.  For instance cash flow is a major determinant of short-term debt 
while long-term debt is more likely to be influenced by collateral.  For the sake of 
consistency and brevity we have not distinguished between the various components of 
leverage but this is obviously one of the limitations of this study and could be 
examined in more detail in future research. 
In our study we identify the factors that affect the cash holdings of listed 
Chinese manufacturing firms.  However we are not able to identify where these 
massive amounts of cash are being generated from. This still remains a mystery and 
could be another potential area of future research.  Particular attention could also be 
aimed at examining the equity issuance behaviour of these firms starting from the 
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initial public offering and examining how this has affected the cash holdings of these 
firms.  However to be able to do this, pre-issuance data is required as unfortunately 
the data that we have is only post-issuance data. 
In this study we have mainly examined the financing behaviour of 
manufacturing firms.  We examine the leverage decisions of listed manufacturing 
firms in the UK, SMEs in the UK that operate in manufacturing sector and listed 
Chinese manufacturing firms. It might be interesting to extend this analysis to other 
sectors of the economy.  In the case of China, we compared the financing behaviour 
of firms with firms in the UK.  However, a more interesting study would involve 
comparing firms in China and India as these are the two countries that are likely to be 
occupying the centre-stage for the next few decades. 
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Table 7.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Listed UK firms Unquoted UK firms Listed Chinese Firms 
 DATASTREAM 
(1) 
FAME 
(2) 
CSMAR 
(3) 
(LEV / A )it 0.146 
(0.100) 
0.330 
(0.206) 
0.216 
(0.126) 
(LTD / A )it 0.069 
(0.071) 
0.150 
(0.162) 
0.049 
(0.064) 
(STD / A )it 0.077 
(0.071) 
0.208 
(0.202) 
0.167 
(0.110) 
(Cash Flow) it 0.132 
(0.070) 
0.117 
(0.112) 
--- 
(PROFIT/A) 0.093 
(0.067) 
0.051 
(0.086) 
0.031 
(0.052) 
(Cash Stock) it 0.069 
(0.086) 
 0.146 
(0.143) 
(Log Sales)it 6.659 
(1.526) 
8.978 
(1.177) 
13.300 
(1.115) 
(Investment/A) 
 
(STRUC/A)it 
0.040 
(0.043) 
0.320 
(0.128) 
-- 
 
0.300 
(0.192) 
-- 
 
0.292 
B')&(C 
Q 
 
(SalesG) it 
2.817 
(2.492) 
 
 
0.077 
(0.318) 
 
 
0.147 
(0.470) 
(Tax) it 0.415 
(0.242) 
0.341 
(0.428) 
--- 
Sample Size 11761 80718 
 
3808 
Notes: The table reports sample means.  Standard deviations are presented in brackets below the sample 
means.  The subscript i denotes firms and the subscript t denotes time where t=1968-2000 for Datastream, 
t=1994-2004 for FAME and t=1994-2004 for CSMAR.  (LEV/A) is the sum of long-term and short-term 
debt divided by assets.  The other measures of leverage are long-term debt over assets (LTD/A), short-
term debt over assets (STD/A) and net leverage (Net LEV/A).  (CF/A) is cash flow divided by assets, our 
main measure of liquidity. (Log Sales) is the log of sales, (INV/A) is the firm’s investment as a percentage 
of assets (STRUC/A) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets that acts as a measure of collateral, we 
use Tobin’s Q (Q) or a sales growth measure (SalesG) to proxy for growth opportunities and (TAX) is the 
proportion of tax paid as a percentage of profit that proxies for tax rate.  
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Table 7.2: Regression Results: First Difference GMM 
 Listed UK firms Unquoted UK firms Listed Chinese Firms 
 Datastream Fame Csmar 
(LEV / A )it-1 0.429*** 
(0.031) 

0.486** 
(0.026) 
 
0.402*** 
(0.075) 
(Cash Flow) it -0.527*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.259*** 
(0.082) 
 
-0.425*** 
(0.118) 
(Log Sales)it 0.018*** 
(0.010) 

-0.106*** 
(0.025) 
 
0.023** 
(0.014) 
 
(Investment/A) 
 
(STRUC/A)it 
0.168*** 
(0.074) 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
-0.022 
(0.080) 
 
Q 
 
(SalesG) it 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.043 
(0.107) 
 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
 
(Tax) it 0.019* 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.020) 
 
--- 
J 0.341 0.934 
 
0.096 
m2 0.942 0.237 
 
0.237 
Sample size 3809 14955 1589 
Notes: We report asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation.  The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity.   Instruments used in column 1 are (LEV/A )it, (Cashflow/A)i 
,(INV/A)it ,(log Sales)it, (Q)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five times. Instruments used in column 2 are 
(LEV/A )it, (Cashflow/A)i ,(STRUC/A)it ,(log Sales)it, (Sales Growth)it  and (Tax)it  all  lagged two to five 
times. Instruments used in column 3 are (LEV/A )it, (cashflow/A)i ,(STRUC/A)it ,(log Sales)it, and  (Sales 
Growth)it  all  lagged two to five times. Time dummies are included in all specifications as regressors 
and instruments. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Also see notes to Table 7.1. 
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